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Separating Law-Making from Sausage-Making: 




Inspired, perhaps, by the old adage that ―people who like sausages and 
respect the law should never watch either being made,‖ there is significant 
resistance among judges and scholars alike to the idea that courts should 
review the lawmaking process. This doctoral dissertation challenges this 
prevalent position, and establishes the case for judicial review of the legislative 
process. 
The dissertation develops the arguments for the authority of courts to 
review the legislative process; the legitimacy and theoretical justifications of 
such judicial review; and the practical and normative importance of such 
judicial involvement. It also challenges the resistance to judicial review of the 
legislative process by scrutinizing, and seeking to rebut, the major arguments 
underlying this resistance, and revealing this position‘s doctrinal and 
theoretical incoherence, and its negative consequences.   
In an effort to provide a multifaceted exploration of the issue, the 
dissertation combines multiple approaches of legal scholarship, including a 
 
 
legal-doctrinal approach, a comparative law approach, a jurisprudential and 
constitutional theory approach, and an interdisciplinary approach that draws 
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Faithful, perhaps, to the old adage that ―people who like sausages and 
respect the law should never watch either being made,‖1 federal courts have 
been persistently reluctant to exercise judicial review of the legislative 
process.
2
 The idea that courts will determine the validity of legislation based 
on the adequacy of lawmaking procedures is highly controversial in the 
academic literature as well.
3
 This doctoral dissertation challenges this 
approach, and establishes the case for judicial review of the legislative process.  
The dissertation is divided into three articles. Each of the articles 
challenges a different aspect of the resistance to judicial review of the 
legislative process (JRLP). Each article also approaches the issue from a 
different theoretical and methodological perspective: The first article combines 
doctrinal and comparative approaches; the second article takes an 
interdisciplinary approach, focusing on political science research about 
legislative behavior; and the third article turns to constitutional theory and 
                                                          
1 This oft-quoted saw is usually attributed to Otto von Bismarck, however there is some 
controversy as to its origin. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COL. L. 
REV. 225, 240 n. 38 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Legislating with integrity, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 
373, 374 n. 9 (2003). 
2
 Marshall Field & Co.v. Clark 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and 
Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-rule with an Attorneyship Model of 
Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 493, 545 (1994) (noting ―the Court‘s persistent refusal 
to embrace judicial review of the legislature‘s deliberative process‖). 
3
 Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency 





jurisprudence. This preface provides a brief overview of the dissertation and 
explains how the three articles are tied together.  
The first article, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: 
Rethinking the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, challenges the Supreme Court‘s 
resistance to JRLP, embodied in the ―enrolled bill‖ doctrine. This long-
established doctrine requires courts to accept the signatures of the Speaker of 
the House and President of the Senate on the ―enrolled bill‖ as unimpeachable 
evidence that a bill has been constitutionally enacted,
4
 and effectively insulates 
the legislative process from judicial review.
5
  
The article reexamines the soundness of the enrolled bill doctrine‘s 
main rationales in light of factual and doctrinal developments. In addition, the 
article introduces two major novel arguments against this doctrine. First, it 
argues that the doctrine amounts to an impermissible delegation of both 
judicial and lawmaking powers to the legislative officers of Congress. Second, 
by examining the doctrine‘s historical origins and its interpretation, 
development and rejection in other countries, it establishes that this doctrine is 
inextricably related to the traditional English concept of parliamentary 
supremacy. Although the doctrine was never explicitly linked to legislative 
                                                          
4
 Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 672. 
5
 John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, 
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 527, 531 
(2001); John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A 





supremacy in the United States, this article argues that it amounts, in effect, to 
a view of the legislative process as a sphere of unfettered legislative 
supremacy, immune from judicial review. The article argues, therefore, that the 
doctrine is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution and the fundamental and 
well-settled principles of American constitutionalism. 
Arguing that the enrolled bill doctrine leaves the legislative process 
entirely to the control of the political branches, the article notes the need for 
further research on whether these branches can be relied upon to enforce the 
lawmaking provisions without judicial review. In particular, it notes that such 
research requires, inter alia, an examination of Congress‘s institutional 
competence, incentives, and mechanisms. This issue is examined in the second 
article, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers.   
Lawmakers as Lawbreakers challenges one of the prominent objections 
to JRLP: the claim that judicial review is not required or justified because 
Congress has ―adequate incentives‖ and ―numerous, effective techniques‖ to 
enforce the rules that govern the legislative process.
6
 It also responds to 
broader arguments that ―political safeguards‖ can reduce or eliminate the need 
for judicial review;
7
 and to recent claims that legal scholarship tends to rely on 
                                                          
6
 Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 
1457, 1505-07 (2005). 
7
 This phrase was famously coined in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 





public choice theory‘s over-simplified and overly cynical assumptions about 
lawmakers, when in fact ―legislators have greater incentives [to act as 
responsible constitutional decision makers] than scholars typically assert.‖8 
The article examines Congress‘s capacity and incentives to enforce 
upon itself ―the law of congressional lawmaking‖—the constitutional, 
statutory, and internal rules that constrain Congress‘s legislative process. It 
explores the political safeguards that may motivate lawmakers to engage in 
self-policing and rule-following behavior. It identifies the major political 
safeguards that can be garnered from the relevant legal, political science, 
political economy, and social psychology scholarship, and evaluates each 
safeguard by drawing on a combination of theoretical, empirical, and 
descriptive studies about Congress. Avoiding public choice theory‘s 
assumption that legislators are self-interested, single-minded reelection 
seekers, the article undertakes this inquiry under the assumption that 
lawmakers are motivated by a combination of self-interest and public-
                                                                                                                                                         
safeguards‖ debate see, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1670-71 & n. 2-6 (2007).  
8
 Mark Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives and Institutional 
Design, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 355, 356 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); see also, 
e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 65-66 (1999); 
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the 
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1708-09 (2002); 
Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1277, 1286-90 (2001); Barbara Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? 
The Effects of Incentives and Procedures, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 293, 294-97 





regarding motivations, and that they simultaneously pursue multiple goals, 
which also include ideology and desire to make good public policy. 
The article‘s main argument is that the political safeguards that scholars 
and judges commonly rely upon to constrain legislative behavior actually 
motivate lawmakers to be lawbreakers. It concludes that Congress‘s 
mechanisms and incentives to enforce the law of congressional lawmaking are 
lacking, and that Congress therefore cannot be relied upon to police itself. 
The third article, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the 
Legislative Process, turns to constitutional theory and legal theory to establish 
the theoretical case for JRLP. The article develops theoretical arguments to 
establish the authority of courts to review the legislative process, the crucial 
practical and normative importance of reviewing the enactment process, and 
the legitimacy of such review. 
This article focuses on a particularly striking aspect of the resistance to 
JRLP: the observation that most judges and scholars ―find it improper to 
question legislative adherence to lawful procedures,‖ while ―tak[ing] 
substantive judicial review for granted.‖9 The article is therefore largely 
devoted to challenging this dominant position in constitutional law and theory, 
                                                          
9





which views JRLP as less justified, and much more objectionable, than 
substantive judicial review. 
The article argues, inter alia, that, ironically, some of the major 
arguments for substantive judicial review in constitutional theory, and even the 
arguments in Marbury v. Madison
10
 itself, are actually more persuasive when 
applied to JRLP. It further claims that even some of the arguments raised by 
leading critics of judicial review can actually be employed as arguments for 
justifying JRLP. 
The article therefore concludes that JRLP is no less important, and in 
fact, more justifiable than substantive judicial review, and that the prevalent 
view that takes substantive judicial review for granted, while adamantly 
rejecting JRLP, is hard to sustain. 
The three articles complement each other, and come together into a 
comprehensive (albeit, by no means exhaustive) exploration, and defense of, 
judicial review of the legislative process. They can be read as three parts of one 
coherent dissertation. At the same time, each of the articles can also stand on 
its own feet, and can be understood independently of the other two. Morever, 
while the three articles focus on judicial review of the legislative process, each 
                                                          
10





of them also appeals to, and seeks to contribute to, broader issues of 







FIRST ARTICLE:  
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY IN THE UNITED STATES?: RETHINKING 
THE ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Cardozo once argued that ―[f]ew rules in our time are so well 
established that they may not be called upon any day to justify their existence 
as means adapted to an end.‖1 This Article argues that the day has come for the 
―enrolled bill‖ doctrine (EBD) to be reconsidered. Laid down in Marshall 
Field & Co. v. Clark, this doctrine requires courts to accept the signatures of 
the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate on the ―enrolled bill‖ as 
―complete and unimpeachable‖ evidence that a bill has been properly and 
constitutionally enacted.
2
 Although the federal courts have consistently and 
uniformly invoked this doctrine for more than a century,
3




                                                          
1 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921). 
2 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892). 
3 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C. (Public Citizen II), 486 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (noting that ―the Courts of Appeals have consistently invoked Marshall Field‖), cert. 
denied, 128 S. Ct. 823 (2007); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 203 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (describing EBD as ―‗a longstanding rule, invoked by many courts, including the 
Supreme Court and our own Court‘‖ (quoting United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 99 
(2d Cir. 2004))), cert. denied sub nom., OneSimpleLoan v. Spellings, 128 S. Ct. 1220 (2008); 
Public Citizen v. Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C. (Public Citizen I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 125 
(D.D.C. 2006) (noting that EBD ―has, in fact, been uniformly applied over the years‖), aff‘d 
sub nom., Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d 1342, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 823. 
4
 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 72 (2004) (describing 
EBD as ―little known‖). There are, of course, a few exemplary exceptions. These works are 





Recently, however, this doctrine garnered renewed interest as news reports 
widely reported allegations that the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) was 
enacted in violation of the Constitution‘s lawmaking requirements, namely, the 
bicameral requirement of Article I, Sections 1 and 7.
5
 Some even alleged ―‗a 
conspiracy‘ to violate the Constitution‖6 or a ―legally improper arrangement 
among certain representatives of the House, Senate and Executive Branch to 
have the President sign legislation that had not been enacted pursuant to the 
Constitution.‖7 Several different lawsuits challenged DRA‘s constitutionality, 
but the district and appellate federal courts were compelled by Field‘s EBD to 
dismiss all these cases without examining whether the Act was indeed passed 
in violation of the Constitution.
8
 Some courts opined that ―the meaning of 
Marshall Field and its continuing vitality more than 100 years after its 
issuance require a more complete examination,‖ but concluded that ―in the 
                                                          
5
 See Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 109 n.1. 
6
 See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/02/q-
when-is-bill-signed-by-president-not.html (Feb. 10, 2006, 10:33 EST) (arguing that the DRA 
case was, ―in fact, a ‗conspiracy‘ to violate the Constitution. That is to say, [House Speaker] 
Dennis Hastert has violated his constitutional oath by attesting to the accuracy of the bill, 
knowing that the House version was different (and having intentionally avoided fixing the 
discrepancy when it came to his attention before the House vote). And [President pro tempore 
of the Senate] Stevens and the President are coconspirators, assuming they, too, knew about 
the problem before they attested to and signed the bill, respectively‖). 
7 OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 200–01 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8
 E.g., Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 128; Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d at 1355; Conyers v. 
Bush, No. 06-11972, 2006 WL 3834224, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006); Cal., Dep‘t of Soc. 
Servs. v. Leavitt, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Cookeville Reg‘l Med. Ctr. v. 
Leavitt, No. 04-1053 (JR), 2006 WL 2787831, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2006); OneSimpleLoan 
v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., No. 06 Civ. 2979 (RMB), 2006 WL 1596768, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 
2006), aff‘d, 496 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2007); Zeigler v. Gonzales, No. 06-0080-CG-M, 2007 WL 





absence of an express overruling of the case by the Supreme Court, this Court 
is constrained to conclude that [EBD] remains in full effect today.‖9 Against 
this backdrop, this Article argues that reconsideration of this doctrine is 
particularly timely. 
Reconsideration of this time-honored doctrine is also appropriate because, 
as this Article will establish, factual and doctrinal developments since Field 
was decided in 1892 significantly erode its soundness. Its reexamination is also 
interesting, for as this Article demonstrates, this doctrine touches upon some of 
the most fascinating and vigorously debated issues in legal scholarship. These 
include, for example, separation of powers and the proper relationship between 
courts and legislatures; the appropriate allocation of authority to interpret the 
Constitution among the three branches of government; justiciability and the 
political question doctrine; and even the merits of textualism. Most 
importantly, however, this Article argues that EBD requires reevaluation 
because it has far-reaching ramifications that were largely overlooked by the 
Field Court and in much of the later discussions of the doctrine. This doctrine 
has the powerful effect of preventing judicial review of the legislative 
process—that is, judicial examination of the enactment process in order to 
determine compliance with the Constitution‘s lawmaking requirements.10 Any 
                                                          
9 Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16; see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 203, 208. 
10  While there are many models of judicial review of the legislative process—and all will 
apparently be blocked by EBD—this Article focuses on the model that grants courts the power 





doctrine that considers a whole sphere of governmental activity as immune 
from judicial review, and treats  certain constitutional provisions as judicially 
non-enforceable, requires special attention. As Professor Louis Henkin has 
written in another context, ―[j]udicial review is now firmly established as a 
keystone of our constitutional jurisprudence. A doctrine that finds some issues 
exempt from judicial review cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny.‖11  
This Article introduces two major novel arguments against EBD. First, it 
argues that the doctrine amounts to an impermissible delegation of both 
judicial and lawmaking powers to the legislative officers of Congress. It argues 
that the doctrine cedes the judicial power to interpret and enforce the 
constitutional lawmaking provisions, and the authority to determine the 
validity of legislation, to the exclusive and final authority of the legislative 
officers. It also argues that the doctrine permits the exercise of lawmaking 
authority by just two individuals—the Speaker of the House and the President 
of the Senate—rather than by Congress as a whole, as mandated by the 
Constitution. Second, by examining the doctrine‘s historical origins and its 
interpretation and development in other countries, the Article establishes the 
claim that this doctrine is intimately (if not inextricably) related to the 
traditional English concept of legislative supremacy, which views lawmaking 
                                                                                                                                                         
Constitution. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional 
Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1711–
13 (2002) (describing ―the model of procedural regularity‖). 





as an absolute sovereign prerogative and the legislative process as a sphere of 
unfettered legislative omnipotence. Although the doctrine was never explicitly 
linked to legislative supremacy in the United States, this Article argues that it 
amounts, in effect, to a view of the legislative process as a sphere of unfettered 
legislative supremacy, immune from judicial review. It argues, therefore, that 
the doctrine represents a view of the legislative process that is incompatible 
with the U.S. Constitution. This Article also advances the existing discussions 
on EBD by reexamining its major rationales and their soundness today.  
Part I discusses the grounds for the doctrine in Marshall Field & Co. v. 
Clark and its contemporary justifications. Part II describes the DRA case in 
more detail, as this case will provide the background for the reevaluation of 
EBD. Part III reexamines the doctrine‘s soundness in light of factual 
developments. Part IV reconsiders its soundness vis-à-vis later Supreme Court 
rulings and doctrinal developments. Part V argues that the doctrine amounts to 
an impermissible delegation. Part VI establishes the doctrine‘s link to 
legislative supremacy and its incompatibility with the Constitution. Part VII 
revisits the major and most common justification for the doctrine—that it is 
required by separation of powers and the respect due to a coequal branch. 
While conceding that some of the doctrine‘s rationales still offer a valid case 
for judicial restraint in reviewing the legislative process, this Article argues 
that EBD is on balance unjustifiable. Part VIII concludes, therefore, that there 





properly balance the competing considerations underpinning the debate about 
the doctrine.  
 
I. THE ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE: ITS FOUNDATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
This Part begins with a brief explanation of the basic terms of EBD. It 
then turns to examine the doctrine‘s grounds in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark 
and its modern justifications.  
 
A. The Enrolled Bill Doctrine: Basic Terms  
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution requires that before proposed 
legislation may become a law, the same bill must be passed by both houses of 
Congress and signed by the President.
12
 When one chamber of Congress passes 
a bill, the enrolling clerk of that chamber prepares the ―engrossed bill‖—a 
copy of a bill that has passed one chamber—which is printed and sent to the 
other chamber. After the bill has been agreed to in identical form by both 
chambers, the enrolling clerk prepares the ―enrolled bill‖—the final copy of a 
bill which has passed both chambers of Congress. The ―enrolled bill‖ is printed 
and signed by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, in 
attestation that the bill has been approved by their respective houses, and then 
presented to the President. It is this document that, if signed by the President, 
                                                          





is forwarded to archives from which the Statutes at Large are copied and the 
United States Code is subsequently compiled.
13
 
EBD requires courts to accept the signatures of the Speaker of the House 
and President of the Senate on the ―enrolled bill‖ as ―complete and 
unimpeachable‖ evidence that a bill has been properly enacted.14 
 
B. The Doctrine and Its Grounds in Marshall Field & Co. V. Clark 
EBD was adopted in the federal system in the 1892 decision of Marshall 
Field & Co. v. Clark. Marshall Field and other importers challenged the 
validity of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890. They argued that the enrolled 
version of the Act differed from the bill actually passed by Congress. Based on 
the Congressional Record, committee reports, and other documents printed by 
the authority of Congress, they argued that a section of the bill, as it finally 
passed, was omitted from the ―enrolled bill.‖15 The Court held, however, that 
courts may not question the validity of the ―enrolled bill‖ and may not look 
beyond it to the Congressional Record or other evidence.
16
 It stated:  
                                                          
13 1 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence 
Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1172 (2003); Charles W. Johnson, How 
Our Laws Are Made, H.R. REP. NO. 108-93, at 37–38, 50–51 (2003), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/howourlawsaremade.pdf.  On the enrollment 
process, see infra section III.B. 
14
 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892).  
15 Id. at 668–69.  





The signing by the speaker of the house of representatives, and 
by the president of the senate . . . of an enrolled bill, is an 
official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has 
passed congress. . . .  And when a bill, thus attested, receives 
[the President‘s] approval, and is deposited in the public 
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed congress 
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. . . . The respect 
due to coequal and independent departments requires the 
judicial department to . . . accept, as having passed congress, all 




Cognizant of the larger significance of this case, the Court noted that it 
―has received, as its importance required that it should receive, the most 
deliberate consideration,‖18 and enunciated a number of reasons for adopting 
EBD. A cardinal consideration was the Court‘s view that EBD is required by 
the ―respect due to coequal and independent departments.‖19 Another 
consideration was a consequentialist, or public policy, concern: the fear that 
allowing courts to look behind the ―enrolled bill‖ would produce uncertainty 
and undermine the public‘s reliance interests on statutes.20 An additional, 
related reason was the Court‘s reluctance to make the validity of a 
congressional enactment depend upon legislative journals, as the Court seemed 
to indicate mistrust in ―the manner in which the journals of the respective 
                                                          
17
 Id. at 672. 
18 Id. at 670.  
19 Id. at 672.  
20 Id. at 670 (―[W]e cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court 
should feel obliged . . . to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private 





houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keeping 
them.‖21 The final argument for the Court‘s adoption of EBD was that ―[t]he 
views we have expressed are supported by numerous adjudications in this 
country.‖22 
 The Court also recognized one major consideration against EBD: ―the 
duty of this court, from the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full 
effect to the provisions of the constitution relating to the enactment of laws.‖23 
It also noted the argument that EBD makes it ―possible for the speaker of the 
house of representatives and the president of the senate to impose upon the 
people as a law a bill that was never passed by congress,‖ but dismissed ―this 
possibility [as] too remote to be seriously considered.‖24 The Court concluded, 
therefore, that the ―evils that may result from the recognition of the principle 
that an enrolled act . . . is conclusive evidence that it was passed by congress, 
according to the forms of the constitution, would be far less than those that 
would certainly result from a rule making the validity of congressional 
enactments‖ depend upon the journals of the respective houses.25  
                                                          
21 Id. at 673.   
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 670. 
24 Id. at 672–73. 
25 Id. at 673; see also id. at 675 (―Better, far better, that a provision should occasionally find its 
way into the statute through mistake, or even fraud, than that every act, state and national, 
should, at any and all times, be liable to be put in issue and impeached by the journals, loose 






C. The Doctrine and Its Justifications Today 
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark was never reversed by the Supreme Court. 
EBD is, therefore, still consistently applied in the federal system today, mostly 
by lower courts.
26
 The doctrine is also still followed in a number of states.
27
 In 




As in Field, the principal contemporary justification for EBD continues to 
be the respect due to a coequal branch (which is also commonly framed as a 
separation-of-powers argument).
29
 Modern-day supporters of the doctrine 
                                                                                                                                                         
the land would lead to mischiefs absolutely intolerable.‖ (quoting Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 
253, 275 (1866) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
26 See, e.g., Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d 1342, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 2007); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. 
Sec‘y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 2007). For other recent examples, not related to the 
DRA, see United States v. Miles, No. 06-2899, 2007 WL 1958623, at *1 (7th Cir. July 3, 
2007); United States v. Campbell, No. 06-3418, 2007 WL 1028785, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 
2007); United States v. Chillemi, No. CR-03-0917-PHX-PGR, 2007 WL 2995726, at *7 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 12, 2007); United States v. Harbin, No. C-01-221(3), 2007 WL 2777777, at *4–6 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2007); United States v. McCuiston, No. C-04-676, 2007 WL 2688502, at 
*7–8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); and discussion infra section IV.D. 
27
 See 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §15:3 
(6th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
28 See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Locke, 105 P.3d 9, 22–23 (Wash. 2005); Birmingham-
Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 219–21 (Ala. 2005); Med. 
Soc‘y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 513 S.E.2d 352, 356–57 (S.C. 1999). 
29
 See, e.g., OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 202, 208; Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d at 1349–50, 
1354; Med. Soc‘y of S.C., 513 S.E.2d at 356–57; Wash. State Grange, 105 P.3d at 22–23; 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 388–89 (3d ed. 2001); SINGER, supra note 27, §15:3, at 820–
22; Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive 
Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (2000); Allen Crigler, Comment, Judicial Review of the 
Legislative Enactment Process: Louisiana‘s ―Journal Entry‖ Rule, 41 LA. L. REV. 1187, 1190 





argue that this justification is ―as powerful today as when Marshall Field was 
decided.‖30 The public‘s interest in the certainty of the law is also still 
commonly cited as a justification for the doctrine.
31
 ―Mutual regard between 
the coordinate branches and the interest of certainty‖ were also the two 
grounds Justice Scalia relied upon in his solitary concurrence in United States 
v. Munoz-Flores, in which he endorsed continued adherence to Field‘s EBD.32 
In contrast, the other original reason enunciated by the Field Court in 
support of EBD—the unreliability of legislative records—is much less 
common in contemporary sources.
33
 Nevertheless, part of the debate about 
EBD still revolves around the evidentiary question of the probative value of 
the enrolled bill in comparison with other sources of evidence, and some still 
argue that the enrolled bill constitutes more reliable evidence than legislative 
                                                                                                                                                         
Tree: A Legislative Drafter‘s Perspective on City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
35, 65 (2007); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: 
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 817 (1987); see 
also Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (noting that the respect due to a coequal branch is 
the primary rationale currently stated by state courts that still adhere to the EBD). 
30
 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6, 12–14, Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
Dist. of Columbia, 128 S. Ct. 823 (2007) (No. 07-141); see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 
208 (―[T]he separation-of-powers concerns at the forefront of Marshall Field . . . are surely 
undiminished by the passage of time . . . .‖).    
31 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962) (discussing the cases regarding validity of 
enactments and noting that judicial reluctance to review the enacting process is based on the 
respect due to coequal and independent departments and the need for finality and certainty 
about the status of a statute); ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 29, at 388; SINGER, supra note 
27, §15:3, at 820–22. 
32 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408–10 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also infra section IV.D. 





journals or other evidence.
34
 Hence, rather than completely disappearing, the 
justification for EBD based on the unreliability of legislative records has 
evolved into the ―comparative probative value‖ argument.35   
An additional argument in favor of EBD in current sources is the ―doctrine 
of convenience.‖ According to this argument, allowing courts to look behind 
the enrolled bill will place an undue burden upon the legislature to preserve its 
records and will unnecessarily complicate litigation and raise litigation costs.
36
  
Another possible reason for EBD is the argument that judicial review of 
the enactment process is not needed because Congress (coupled with the 
inherent check of the Presidential veto power) can be relied upon to police 
itself.
37
 Arguably, the fact that cases such as the DRA have been rare proves 
that the possibility of abuse of EBD is, as Field contended, ―too remote to be 
seriously considered.‖38 It has also been argued that even if violations of 
                                                          
34 See Crigler, supra note 29, at 1190; Comment, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process of 
Enactment: An Assessment Following Childers v. Couey, 30 ALA. L. REV. 495, 497 n.23 
(1978); William J. Lloyd, Judicial Control of Legislative Procedure, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6, 
12–13 (1952). 
35 See Lloyd, supra note 34, at 12–13. 
36 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 27, §15:3, at 822; Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. 
L. REV. 601, 636 (2006). 
37 Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 
1505-07 (2005); cf. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 243–44 
(1976) (supporting judicial review of the legislative process, but stressing that ―[o]ther 
participants than courts have the opportunity, and the obligation, to insist on legality in 
lawmaking‖). 
38
 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672–73 (1892); Brief for the Respondent in 
Opposition at 13, Public Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 128 S. Ct. 823 





constitutional requirements, procedural abuses, and other defects in the 
legislative process do occur, they are better remedied by the elected branches 
or the electorate.
39
       
 
II. THE DOCTRINE IN ACTION: THE DRA CASE 
The DRA was signed into law by President Bush on February 8, 2006. 
Shortly after its enactment, members of Congress and other plaintiffs 
challenged DRA‘s constitutionality in several lawsuits, arguing that it was 
invalid because it was not passed by the House and Senate in the same form, as 
mandated by Article I, Sections 1 and 7. It was alleged that the House voted on 
a version of the bill that was identical to the version of the bill passed by the 
Senate in all but one provision.
40
 In budgetary terms, this seemingly minor 
difference had significant consequences, amounting to an estimated $2 billion 
over five years.
41
 When the enrolled bill was prepared, a Senate clerk 
apparently ―corrected‖ this discrepancy by changing this provision back to the 
                                                                                                                                                         
place, the issue appears to have recurred only rarely, which provides another reason for not 
overruling such a well-settled precedent.‖). 
39
 See 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1350, at 832–34 (J. 
Chadbourn ed., 1972); Crigler, supra note 29, at 1190.  
40 Specifically, it was alleged that when preparing the Senate‘s version of the bill for 
transmittal to the House, a Senate clerk changed the text of Section 5101 of the bill, altering 
the duration of Medicare payments for certain durable medical equipment, stated as thirteen 
months in the version passed by the Senate, to thirty-six months. It was further alleged that the 
House voted on the version of the bill that contained the clerk‘s error and, therefore, was not 
identical to the version of the bill passed by the Senate. 





Senate‘s version (in violation of Senate and House rules, which clearly state 
that only the two Houses, by concurrent resolution, may authorize the 
correction of an error when enrollment is made).
42
 It was also alleged that the 
Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and President 
Bush were all aware, prior to the signing ceremony, that the bill presented to 
the President reflected the Senate bill but was never passed in identical form by 
the House. Nevertheless, the Speaker and President pro tempore signed the 
enrolled bill, in attestation that the bill had duly passed both houses, and the 
bill so attested was presented to and signed by the President. As noted, some 
plaintiffs even alleged that there existed a ―legally improper arrangement 
among certain representatives of the House, Senate and Executive Branch to 
have the President sign legislation that had not been enacted pursuant to the 
Constitution.‖43 Based on these factual allegations, supported by congressional 
documents and other evidence, the plaintiffs contended that, because the 
version of the DRA signed by the President was never passed by the House, 
                                                          
42 See 110th Congress House Rules Manual, H.R. Doc. No. 109-157, at 202, 277, 302 (2007), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/index.html [hereinafter House Rules Manual]; 
Robert B. Dove, Enactment of a Law 23–24 (1997), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/enactment/enactlaw.pdf. 
43 OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 200–01(2d Cir. 2007) (internal 









There is no dispute that a bill that does not meet the lawmaking 
requirements of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution (including the 
requirement that the same bill—that is, the same text—be passed by both 
chambers of Congress) does not become law.
45
 Nor is there doubt that ―[t]here 
is no authority in the presiding officers of the house of representatives and the 
senate to attest by their signatures . . . any bill not passed by congress.‖46 Even 
most of the facts in this case are largely undisputed.
47
 And yet, all district and 
appellate courts that have ruled upon these constitutional challenges felt 
compelled to dismiss them without examining whether the Act was passed in 
violation of the Constitution. The reason that the courts were unable to exercise 
any meaningful judicial review and enforce the Constitution in these cases was 
their adherence to EBD. As one court put it, ―[t]he argument is a sound one, as 
far as it can go—a bill that does not pass both houses in the same form is not 
good law, no matter what the president does—but, under Marshall Field, it 
                                                          
44 This factual background is based primarily on the allegations in Conyers v. Bush, 2006 WL 
3834224, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006), Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 110–13, and 
OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 200–01.  
45
 Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (―Certain fundamental principles are not in dispute. 
The bicameral requirement embodied in Article I, Sections 1 and 7, requires that the same 
bill—that is, the same text—be passed by both chambers of Congress. . . . Absent bicameral 
passage, a bill does not become a law . . . .‖); Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d at 1343; see also 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).  
46
 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669 (1892). 





comes to an abrupt stop with the attestation of the leadership of both houses of 
Congress that they [sic] did pass the bill in question.‖48 Some of the courts 
expressed misgivings about the soundness and propriety of EBD, but 
concluded that they were bound by it in the absence of an express overruling of 
Field.
49
 The Supreme Court denied petitions for writ of certiorari in these 
cases,
50
 indicating, perhaps, that it is disinclined to reconsider Field for the 
time being.  
The DRA case demonstrates part of the far-reaching ramifications of 
EBD: it forces courts to close their eyes to constitutional violations and to treat 
statutes as valid even in the face of (apparently) clear evidence to the contrary. 
Furthermore, as one appellate court explicitly held, there is no exception to this 
doctrine even in cases allegedly involving a deliberate conspiracy by the 
presiding officers of Congress to violate the constitutional provisions of 
lawmaking or to enact legislation not passed by both houses of Congress.
51
 
Admittedly, even if the allegations in the DRA case are true, this case is an 
example of a relatively minor constitutional violation in the legislative process. 
However, as we shall see in the next Part, examples from the states 
                                                          
48 Cookeville Reg‘l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, No. 04-1053 (JR), 2006 WL 2787831, at *4 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 26, 2006). 
49
 See, e.g., OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 203, 208; Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16, 
124. 
50
 See OneSimpleLoan, 128 S. Ct. 1220 (2008); Public Citizen, 128 S. Ct. 823 (2007). 





demonstrate that the doctrine forces courts to enforce statutes even when it is 
obvious that they were enacted in deliberate and much more egregious 
violation of the Constitution. 
 
III. THE DOCTRINE‘S SOUNDNESS IN LIGHT OF FACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS 
It is ―common wisdom,‖ as the Supreme Court noted, that ―the rule of 
stare decisis is not an ‗inexorable command,‘ and certainly it is not such in 
every constitutional case.‖52 One of the recognized considerations for 
overruling an earlier case is significant change in circumstances that 
undermines the factual assumptions of the earlier case.
53
 Sections III.A to III.D 
describe some of the major developments since Field was decided that 
undermine its factual foundations. In light of these developments, section III.E 
reconsiders the ―comparative probative value‖ justification of EBD.  
  
A. Improvements in Legislative Record-Keeping and Other Technological 
Developments 
One of Field‘s reasons for adopting EBD was the Court‘s mistrust of 
legislative journals.
54
 Some even argue that ―much of the Marshall Field ruling 
                                                          
52 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (quoting Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
53 Id. at 854–55, 861–64; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006).  





appeared to rest on an empirical sense of the undependability of the legislative 
Journals,‖ noting that the Field Court ―canvassed many state court cases 
disparaging the accuracy and scrupulousness of legislative Journal 
recordkeeping.‖55 Indeed, the Court relied on arguments from state supreme 
court cases that ―[l]egislative journals are made amid the confusion of a 
dispatch of business, and therefore much more likely to contain errors than the 
certificates of the presiding officers to be untrue,‖56 and that ―these journals 
must have been constructed out of loose and hasty memoranda made in the 
pressure of business and amid the distractions of a numerous assembly.‖57 
These decisions also stressed ―the danger . . . from the intentional corruption of 
evidences of this character.‖58  
This argument was a widespread justification for EBD in the late 
nineteenth century.
59
 When the doctrine was originally formulated in the 
United States, legislative record keeping was ―so inadequate‖60 that in almost 
every instance in the earlier cases ―it was an excuse for sustaining the enrolled 
                                                          
55 Vikram David Amar, Why the ―Political Question Doctrine‖ Shoudn‘t Necessarily Prevent 
Courts from Asking Whether a Spending Bill Actually Passed Congress, FIND LAW, Apr. 13, 
2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20060413.html. 
56 Field, 143 U.S. at 677 (quoting Weeks v. Smith, 81 Me. 538, 547 (1889)). 
57 Id. at 674 (citing Pangborn v. Young, 32 N.J.L. 29, 37 (N.J. 1886)). 
58 Id. 
59 SINGER, supra note 27, §15:10, at 837–38 & nn.1–2. 





bill on the theory that a careless record should not impeach an act solemnly 
signed.‖61 Under these factual conditions, there seems to be much sense in the 
argument adopted by the Field Court: ―Can any one deny that, if the laws of 
the state are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so imperfect, so 
unauthenticated, that the stability of all written law will be shaken to its very 
foundation?‖62 
With the improvement of record-keeping in the legislatures, however, this 
argument‘s strength significantly diminished and it has largely been abandoned 
in modern cases.
63
 In fact, some state supreme courts based their decision to 
overrule EBD, at least in part, on their conclusion that ―[m]odern automatic 
and electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of 
the original reasons for the rule.‖64 To be sure, this section is certainly not 
arguing that legislative records today are immune from mistakes or 
manipulation (albeit, neither is the enrolled bill, as the next section 
demonstrates).
65
 It is undeniable, however, that there has been dramatic 
                                                          
61 SINGER, supra note 27, §15:10, at 837–38. 
62 Field, 143 U.S. at 674 (quoting Pangborn, 32 N.J.L. at 37). 
63
 SINGER, supra note 27, §15:10, at 838 (―Modern cases have not stressed the poor quality of 
legislative records. Apparently the records are constantly being improved, and their 
authenticity is receiving a higher repute.‖). 
64 See, e.g., D & W Auto, 602 S.W.2d at 424. 
65 OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 207–08  (2d Cir. 2007) (―[A]lthough 
technological advances in printing and copying since the late nineteenth century may have 
removed some of the sources of unreliability in congressional documents, . . . even engrossed 
bills printed today are subject to error or mishandling.‖); Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 





improvement in legislative record-keeping and that the reliability of legislative 
journals has significantly improved since Field was decided.  
Moreover, technological developments provide additional means that were 
not available at the time of Field, which make it easier to reconstruct what 
actually happened in the legislative process.
66
 The rules of the House have 
provided for unedited radio and television broadcasting and recording of its 
floor proceedings since 1979, and the Senate has had similar rules since 
1986.
67
 Since 1996, there has also been live webcast coverage of House and 
Senate floor proceedings and committee hearings.
68
 These recordings provide 
an effective check on the official legislative records.
69
   
                                                                                                                                                         
However, such reliability concerns are alleviated, at least in part, by the ability of modern 
technology (for example, recording devices and computers) accurately to transcribe 
proceedings and make them readily accessible. Of course, even modern technology does not 
eliminate the problem of typographical and clerical errors, or mistakes arising from 
misunderstandings and hastily conducted business.‖) (citation omitted).  
66
 THOMAS, the Library of Congress website, which makes legislative records and much 
more information on legislative activity easily and freely available, is a good example. See 
About Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/abt_thom.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). 
67
 See Ron Garay, U.S. Congress and Television, THE MUSEUM OF BROADCAST 
COMMUNICATIONS, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htmlU/uscongress/uscongress.htm 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2008); Johnson, supra note 13, at 35. 
68 See Fednet, http://www.fednet.net (last visted Sept. 12, 2008); see also Office of the Clerk, 
U.S. House of Representatives, Electronic Technology in the House of Representatives, 
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/technology/ internet.html (last visited Feb. 27, 
2008) (detailing the history of the House‘s adoption of computer technology).  
69 The Hamdan case provides a remarkable example. In that case, it was alleged that 
statements had been inserted into the Congressional Record after the Senate debate on the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, presumably in order to influence the courts‘ interpretation of 
the Act based on its ―legislative history.‖ The Petitioner was able to show, based on a C-SPAN 
recording, that the statements were inserted in the Record after the fact. As a result, the Court 
gave no weight to these statements. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2766 
n.10 (2006); Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 5 n.6, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-






B. Changes in the Process of Enrollment 
Another, largely overlooked, factual development is the fact that the 
procedure for authenticating and signing the enrolled bill has changed 
significantly since Field was decided. As a result, the significance that should 
be attributed to the signatures of the presiding officers on the enrolled bill 
should be reassessed, as should the assumption of infallibility of the enrolled 
bill.  
The First Congress established in its joint rules an enrollment process that 
provided, inter alia, that the enrolled bill will be prepared by the Clerk of the 
House or by the Secretary of the Senate, examined for accuracy by a joint 
standing committee (the Committee on Enrolled Bills), and signed in open 
session in the respective houses by the Speaker of the House and by the 
President of the Senate.
70
 This was the enrollment process the Field Court had 
in mind when it adopted EBD: 
The signing by the speaker of the house of representatives, and 
by the president of the senate, in open session, of an enrolled 
bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as 
one that has passed congress. It is a declaration by the two 
houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a 
                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/analysis-hamdan-and-a-few-minutes-in-the-senate (Mar. 23, 
2006, 17:17 EST). 
70 J.A.C. Grant, Judicial Control of the Legislative Process: The Federal Rule, 3 W. POL. Q. 





bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the 




This was the enrollment process the Field Court had in mind when it held that 
the enrolled bill represents an ―official attestation‖ and a ―solemn assurance‖ 
by the two houses of Congress (or at least by the legislative officers 
themselves), and that, consequently, the ―respect due to coequal and 
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that 
assurance.‖72 Moreover, this was the enrollment process the Field Court had in 
mind when it flatly rejected the possibility that the presiding officers may 
―impose upon the people as a law a bill that was never passed by congress‖ as 
―too remote to be seriously considered‖73 because it ―suggests a deliberate 
conspiracy to which the presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, 
and the clerks of the two houses must necessarily be parties . . . .‖74 Hence, the 
specific enrollment procedure witnessed by the Field Court influenced both its 
assumption of the reliability of the enrolled bill and its holding about the 
deference it deserves.  
                                                          
71 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892) (emphesis added). The joint rules 
were abandoned in 1875, but the same practice (with very slight changes, if any) continued to 
exist at the time Field was decided in 1892. See Grant, supra note 70, at 366, 381 n.99 (noting 
that the Field Court was summarizing the then-current practice).   
72 Field, 143 U.S. at 672. 
73 Id. at 672–73. 





The modern process of enrollment, however, is quite different than the 
enrollment procedure described in Field. The original procedure of enrollment 
was molded to fit a Congress that passed only 118 bills in its two years.
75
 
However, with the dramatic increase in the number and length of bills passed 
by Congress in the twentieth century, ―the pressure of legislative business had 
forced each house to rely largely upon its clerical staff to check on the 
accuracy of enrolled bills.‖76 The Committee on Enrolled Bills was abolished, 
and today the responsibility for the enrollment process, and for examining and 
authenticating bills, has been transferred to the Clerk of the House and the 
Secretary of the Senate.
77
 The enrolled bill is prepared by the enrolling clerk of 
the House or the enrolling clerk of the Senate (depending on where the bill 
originated). The enrolling clerk receives all the relevant documents and 
prepares the final form of the bill, which must reflect precisely the effect of all 
amendments (either by way of deletion, substitution, or addition) agreed to by 
both legislative houses (with occasionally as many as 500 amendments!).
78
 The 
enrolled bill is then printed, and the Clerk of the House or Secretary of the 
Senate (depending on where the bill originated) certifies that the bill originated 
in her legislative house and examines its accuracy. When satisfied with the 
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76 Id. 
77 House Rules Manual, supra note 42, at 362–63; Dove, supra note 42, at 23; Johnson, supra 
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accuracy of the bill, the Clerk of the House (or Secretary of the Senate with 
regard to Senate bills) attaches a slip stating that she finds the bill truly 
enrolled and sends it to the legislative officers for signature.
79
 Furthermore, the 
presiding officers no longer sign the enrolled bill in open session. By the first 
half of the twentieth century, the presiding officers of both houses had 
abandoned the practice of signing the enrolled bill in open session;
80
 and at 
least since the 1980s, they have regularly signed enrolled bills when their 
houses are not in session.
81
 
In the modern-day Congress, therefore, both the arduous and painstaking 
task of preparing the enrolled bill and the task of examining and authenticating 
it are inevitably performed by legislative clerks. As a result of these changes, 
the signatures of the presiding officers on the enrolled bill ―soon meant little 
more than that the bill had been checked by persons in whom they had 
confidence . . . .‖82 Indeed, under the current enrollment process, and in light of 
the present workload of Congress, it defies belief that the legislative officers, 
let alone the two houses of Congress, play any significant (as opposed to 
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merely symbolic) role in authenticating bills. Today, the enrolled bill 
represents, in effect, more an attestation by legislative clerks that the bill has 
been duly passed by both houses than an attestation by Congress as a whole or 
even by the presiding officers themselves. To the extent that the Field decision 
rested on the premise that the enrolled bill deserves reverence because the 
legislative officers have personally attested that the bill was properly enacted, 
this rationale is significantly weaker today. Similarly, the argument that 
questioning the validity of the enrolled bill evinces lack of respect because it 
doubts the ―solemn assurance‖ of the legislative officers is also less convincing 
today. Contrary to Field‘s assumption, moreover, questioning the validity of 
the enrolled bill does not necessarily entail doubting the personal integrity of 
the legislative officers and legislative clerks or suggesting a deliberate 
conspiracy. It simply entails a realistic view of the enrollment process in the 
modern Congress to conclude that ―an occasional error is certain to occur.‖83 
Indeed, both federal and state experiences provide evidence that errors do 
occur in the enrollment process from time to time (including rare cases where 
even defeated bills were ―impose[d] upon the people as a law‖).84  
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In sum, the changes in the process of enrollment raise doubts as to the 
infallibility of the enrolled bill, as well as to the significance that should be 
attributed to the attestations of the presiding officers. At the very least, they 
warrant reexamination of the Field Court‘s assumption that the possibility that 
the legislative officers will (intentionally or mistakenly) ―impose upon the 
people as a law a bill that was never passed by congress‖ is ―too remote to be 
seriously considered.‖85 
 
C. Changes in Congress‘s Legislative Process 
Along with changes in the process of enrollment, there have also been 
significant changes in the congressional legislative process since Field was 
decided. One significant change is the demise of ―regular order‖ (the regular 
rules of procedure, which guarantee adequate time for discussion, debate, and 
votes), and the rise of unorthodox processes of legislation.
86
 One of these 
unorthodox legislative practices, of which the DRA is an example, is ―omnibus 
legislation‖—that is, the practice of combining numerous measures from 
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 THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS 
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 170–75 (2006); BARBARA SINCLAIR, 
UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2d ed. 
2000); see also Chad W. Dunn, Playing by the Rules: The Need for Constitutions to Define the 
Boundaries of the Legislative Game with a One-Subject Rule, 35 UWLA L. REV. 129, 135 
(2003) (―Despite the many rules in place to handle legislation, the major initiatives, which are 





disparate policy areas in one highly complex and long bill.
87
 These huge bills 
are often passed by Congress via all-night sessions under tight deadlines, 
without any notice or time for members to read or understand them.
88
 As one 
Representative described the passage of the (merely) 342-page-long Patriot Act 
in Congress: ―No one read it. That‘s the whole point. They wait ‗til the middle 
of the night. They drop it in the middle of the night. It‘s printed in the middle 
of the night. And the next morning when we come in, it passes.‖89  
Indeed, the length, scope, and complexity of omnibus bills, coupled with 
the highly accelerated pace of their enactment, means that representatives often 
vote for major legislation without knowing—or sometimes even without an 
opportunity to know—the contents of the bills.90 As one Congress member 
depicted the process of enacting a Budget Reconciliation Act:  
So voluminous was this monster bill that it was hauled into the 
chamber in an oversized corrugated box. . . .  While reading it was 
obviously out of the question, it‘s true that I was permitted to walk 
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Some argue that most bills that make their way through the current process 
are ―very large so that each member can have little hope of reviewing it,‖ and 
that, consequently, the policy ends up being decided by the chamber leaders, ―a 
few members, and more often their staffs.‖92  
Other recent changes in Congress and its legislative process—such as the 
decline of committees and the ascendancy of conference committees, and the 
growing power of legislative leaders at the expense of rank-and-file 
members—have joined the growth of omnibus legislation in diminishing the 
importance of debate in committees and on the floor, shifting the real 
decisionmaking to less formal and less public arenas.
93
 Some scholars argue 
that much of the action now takes place behind closed doors, with bills put 
together by a small group of leadership staff, committee staff, industry 
representatives, and a few majority party members, and then rammed through 
the formal legislative process.
94
  
Scholarship about the contemporary Congress provides ample evidence 
that these new legislative processes occasionally produce errors,
95
 as well as 
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enable stealth legislation serving rent-seeking interest groups that has not 
really passed majority muster.
96
 To be sure, this Article is certainly not arguing 
that the contemporary Congress is worse than the late-nineteenth-century 
Congress.
97
 It simply argues that the contemporary practices in the 
congressional legislative process should also be taken into account when 
reconsidering EBD. Several scholars argue that the pathologies in the current 
legislative process justify, in and of themselves, more robust judicial review of 
the legislative process.
98
 This Article, however, makes a more modest 
                                                                                                                                                         
final 3,000-page document was sent to the floor. When the mistake was discovered, after the 
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argument. It argues that the new unorthodox processes of legislation in 
Congress increase the danger of mistakes (or abuse) in the legislative process 
and in the process of enrollment. It argues, moreover, that the ability of 
members of Congress to notice such errors and mishandlings, and to check the 
work of legislative officers and their clerks, significantly diminishes.     
 
D. The State of the Doctrine in the Several States 
Today, only a minority of state courts still follow EBD while most have 
modified or completely rejected this doctrine.
99
 Although care must be 
exercised in making any generalization, the current tendency in the states 
seems to be in favor of the ―extrinsic evidence rule,‖ which considers the 
enrolled bill as prima facie correct, but allows evidence from the journals and 
other extrinsic sources to attack the presumption of validity.
100
 Hence, to the 
extent that the Field Court found support for its decision in the fact that ―[t]he 
views we have expressed are supported by numerous adjudications in this 
country,‖101 this argument is much less persuasive today. The experiences from 
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the states, moreover, are instructive in the reconsideration of additional 
grounds in Field. The states‘ experiences may help to demonstrate that the 
Field Court has overestimated the ―evils‖ that ―would certainly result‖ from 
allowing courts to look behind the enrolled bill, as well as underestimated the 
costs of the doctrine.
102
 
 The argument that overruling EBD will significantly raise litigation 
costs and the amount of litigation, and undermine the certainty and stability of 
the law, requires further empirical research. Even without further research, 
however, it seems that the experiences from states that rejected EBD provide 
reason to believe that Field‘s fears of allowing courts to look beyond the 
enrolled bill were highly exaggerated. Several states have for decades allowed 
consideration of evidence beyond the enrolled bill, and yet, there seems to be a 
relatively small number of reported cases of procedural challenges to 
legislation in these jurisdictions. New Jersey law, for example, has allowed 
challenges to the validity of a statute that was not duly or constitutionally 
enacted (within a year of its enactment) and permitted courts to examine the 
journals and even hear testimony to determine such challenges since 1873.
103
 
And yet, between 1873 and 1950 only nine challenges were brought, and since 
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1950, there have been apparently only seven reported challenges.
104
 Similarly, 
in the twenty-eight years since Kentucky overruled EBD in favor of the 
―extrinsic evidence rule,‖ there was apparently only one challenge to the 
validity of an enrolled version of a statute, and this challenge was rejected by 
the lower courts.
105
 Moreover, there seems to be no indication in any of these 
states that the stability of the law was substantially undermined.   
The experiences from the states are also illustrative in suggesting that the 
Field Court underestimated the costs of EBD. The Court seemed to assume 
that the ―evils that may result‖ from the doctrine are limited to the possibility 
that ―a provision should occasionally find its way into the statute through 
mistake, or even fraud‖106 and seemed to dismiss this possibility as ―too 
remote to be seriously considered.‖107 States‘ experiences demonstrate, 
however, that errors in the enrollment process do occur from time to time, 
including extreme cases where even defeated bills were ―enrolled, approved, 
and published as law.‖108 Moreover, state courts have often noted (and 
demonstrated) that EBD ―frequently . . . produces results which do not accord 
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with facts,‖109 and is ―conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other 
wrongdoings.‖110 Hence, the Field Court may have underestimated the 
probability of errors (or mishandlings) in the enrollment process.  
More importantly, the experiences from states that still follow EBD 
demonstrate that the costs of the doctrine are not limited to occasional mistakes 
or mishandlings in the enrollment process. The bigger malady of this doctrine 
is that it permits (and perhaps even encourages) deliberate and flagrant 
disregard of the lawmaking provisions of the Constitution. A case before the 
Supreme Court of Washington, which follows EBD, provides a vivid 
example.
111
 In that case, respondents asserted that a bill was unconstitutional, 
among other things, because the legislature ―flagrantly violated‖ the state 
constitution‘s requirement that ―[n]o amendment to any bill shall be allowed 
which shall change the scope and object of the bill.‖112 As the court reported, 
the appellants did not bother to deny that this constitutional provision was 
violated: ―Their position, briefly stated, is: ‗So what? There isn‘t anything the 
court can do about it, because, under its repeated decisions, there is no way it 
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can know what happened.‘‖113 The court indicated (and other state cases 
confirm) that it is not rare that such a position is taken in argument when 
questions are raised concerning the validity of legislation that was allegedly 
enacted in violation of constitutional restrictions.
114
 Hence, as the Supreme 
Court of Washington seemed to concede, under EBD, ―courts must perpetually 
remain in ignorance of what everybody else in the state knows,‖ and, 
consequently, constitutional procedural requirements become ―binding only 
upon the legislative conscience.‖115 
The experience of Illinois is also particularly interesting. EBD was 
adopted in Illinois through a new section in the 1970 state constitution.
116
 In 
1992, the Supreme Court of Illinois summarized the results as follows: 
[It] is apparent to this court . . . that the General Assembly has 
shown remarkably poor self-discipline in policing itself. Indeed, 
both parties agree that ignoring the [constitutional] three-
readings requirement has become a procedural regularity. This 
is quite a different situation than that envisioned by the Framers, 
who enacted the enrolled bill doctrine on the assumption that 
the General Assembly would police itself and judicial review 
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would not be needed because violations of the constitutionally 




The court added that ―plaintiffs make a persuasive argument‖ that EBD should 
be abandoned ―because history has proven that there is no other way to enforce 
the constitutionally mandated three-readings requirement.‖118 Several later 
decisions by Illinois courts reaffirm this conclusion.
119
 
Professor Williams‘s research about state legislatures also indicates that 
legislators often do not follow the lawmaking requirements of state 
constitutions, particularly where courts do not enforce the constitutional 
restrictions,
120
 and suggests that increased judicial enforcement would likely 
result in greater legislative compliance with constitutional requirements.
121
 
Some scholars even argue that EBD not only permits, but also ―no doubt 
encourages‖ ―cut[ting] procedural corners‖ in the enactment process.122 Even 
one of the federal appellate courts in the DRA cases seemed to concede that 
―the enrolled bill rule has come to serve as an incentive for politicians to avoid 
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the rigors of constitutional law-making.‖123 Undeniably, further research is 
required in order to determine the empirical soundness of these arguments and 
the applicability of the state examples to the federal system. However, the 
existing examples do demonstrate, at the very least, that the doctrine permits 
deliberate, habitual, and blatant disregard of the Constitution in the legislative 
process (even if it does not necessarily lead to this result). These examples also 
suggest that the assumption that judicial review of the legislative process is not 
needed because defects in this process are rare, or because the legislature can 
be relied upon to police itself, may require reexamination.  
 
E. Reconsidering the ―Comparative Probative Value‖ Argument 
Section III.A suggested that legislative records today are significantly 
more reliable than in the times of Field and that technological advancements 
provide additional reliable sources that did not exist in the nineteenth century. 
Sections III.B to III.D suggested that the enrolled bill is not necessarily as 
trustworthy and immune from mistakes or mishandling as the Field Court 
assumed. This calls for a reconsideration of the ―comparative probative value‖ 
argument, which justifies EBD strictly on evidentiary grounds.
124
 Indeed, some 
scholars have argued that the whole EBD debate can be ―reduced to an 
evidentiary question: . . . [w]hat is the best evidence of compliance with 
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constitutional [lawmaking] mandates?‖125 Others have argued, in contrast, that 
―the question . . . is not merely evidentiary‖ because ―[b]asic questions of 
justiciability and the judicial function in constitutional interpretation and 
enforcement are involved,‖126 or have stressed the doctrine‘s power to shield 
the legislative process from judicial review in concluding that it ―transcends 
the merely procedural.‖127 While this Article certainly adopts the latter 
position, this section argues that EBD can no longer be justified even from a 
strictly evidentiary point of view.    
Admittedly, some still seem to argue that the enrolled bill constitutes more 
reliable evidence than legislative journals or other evidence.
128
 It is indeed 
possible that, notwithstanding the significant technological and political 
developments described above, the enrolled bill still has greater probative 
value than other evidence. It is also quite possible that, more often than not, the 
enrolled bill is a reliable indication that the bill has properly passed Congress 
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in the manner required by the Constitution. However, even conceding this 
point would not justify a conclusive presumption that the enrolled bill is 
―complete and unimpeachable‖ evidence that a bill has been properly 
enacted.
129
 At most, it will justify considering the enrolled bill as prima facie 
valid and granting it greater weight in assessing the evidence or requiring a 
high evidentiary threshold for impeaching the enrolled bill.  
As Professors Adler and Dorf argue, to be justified on epistemic grounds, 
the doctrine must allow exceptions for epistemic failures (such as incapacity, 
insincerity, corruption, or just simple honest mistakes) on the part of the 
enrolling officers.
130
 As a conclusive presumption, however, it forces courts to 
hold statutes valid based on the attestation of the presiding officers in the 
enrolled bill, even in light of overwhelming and clear evidence that this 
attestation is wrong. As Harwood v. Wentworth demonstrated, the doctrine 
forces courts to rely on the enrolled bill, even when the presiding officers and 
chief clerks of each house themselves testify that the bill as enrolled omitted a 
clause that was in the bill as passed.
131
 And, as several state cases demonstrate, 
the doctrine compels courts to hold statutes valid even when it is openly 
admitted by all parties, and is clear beyond any doubt, that the statute was 
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enacted in violation of the constitutional requirements for lawmaking.
132
 
Indeed, several state supreme courts have pointed out that ―[c]ourts applying 
such a rule are bound to hold statutes valid which they and everybody know 
were never legally enacted‖133 and that the doctrine ―frequently . . . produces 
results which do not accord with facts.‖134 EBD, therefore, is ―contrary to 
modern legal thinking,‖ which does not favor artificial presumptions, 
especially conclusive ones that may produce results that do not accord with 
fact.
135
 It ―disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth.‖136 
From a strictly evidentiary point of view, courts should adopt the 
evidentiary rule that will produce the most accurate and reliable results. In 
order to do so, the most sensible approach seems to be to ―resort to any source 
of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind 
a clear and satisfactory answer . . .; always seeking first for that which in its 
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nature is most appropriate,‖ as the Gardner Court had suggested in 1867.137 
Perhaps when Field was decided, it was plausible to argue that legislative 
journals were so utterly unreliable that the enrolled bill was, as a practical 
matter, the only reliable source of evidence. Today, however, with the 
developments described above, there are certainly additional sources of 
information that are sufficiently reliable for ―conveying to the judicial mind a 
clear and satisfactory‖ picture of what occurred in the legislative process. 
EBD, therefore, can no longer be justified strictly on evidentiary grounds.    
 
IV. THE DOCTRINE‘S SOUNDNESS VIS-À-VIS LATER SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 
An additional recognized consideration for overruling an earlier case is 
when its doctrinal foundations have sustained serious erosion from subsequent 
rulings by the Court.
138
 This Part describes some of the major Supreme Court 
rulings, as well as doctrinal developments, that render Field‘s doctrinal 
underpinnings increasingly incoherent and unstable. 
 
                                                          
137 Gardner v. Collector of Customs, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499, 511 (1867). 
138
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007) 
(―[W]e have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal 
underpinnings,‖ or ―when the views underlying [them] had been eroded by this Court‘s 
precedent‖) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 






A. Nineteenth-Century Decisions 
By the time Field was decided, state courts had already expressed a 
variety of positions on the enrolled bill question.
139
 In fact, before Field, in 
cases that were decided on state law, the U.S. Supreme Court had indicated 
receptiveness to the position that in deciding the question of whether a statute 
was duly and constitutionally passed, ―any . . . accessible competent evidence 
may be considered.‖140 Additionally, in Gardner v. Collector from 1867, the 
Court stated: 
[H]ow can it be held that the judges, upon whom is imposed the 
burden of deciding what the legislative body has done, when it 
is in dispute, are debarred from resorting to the written record 
which that body makes of its proceedings in regard to any 
particular statute? 
 
We are of opinion, therefore, on principle as well as authority, 
that whenever a question arises in a court of law of the 
existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute took effect, 
or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called 
upon to decide it, have a right to resort to any source of 
information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the 
judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question; 
always seeking first for that which in its nature is most 




Moreover, in United States v. Ballin, decided the same day as Field, the 
Court looked beyond the enrolled bill and examined the journal of the House 
                                                          
139
 William H. Lloyd, Pylkinton‘s Case and Its Successors, 69 U. PA. L. REV. 20, 23–29 
(1920). 
140 Walnut v. Wade, 103 U.S. 683, 689 (1880); see also Post v. Kendall County Supervisors, 
105 U.S. 667, 670 (1881); S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260 (1876) (all decided on state law).  
141 Gardner, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 510–11; see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1180; 





of Representatives to determine whether a quorum had been present in the 
House when passing a bill.
142
 Hence, Field seems to be inconsistent even with 
the decisions that existed around the time it was decided. Nevertheless, Field 
was reaffirmed in 1896 in Harwood v. Wentworth,
143
 and EBD became the 




B. Powell v. Mccormack, Ins v. Chadha, Clinton v. New York 
An important modern decision that seems to be at odds with Field is 
Powell v. McCormack,
145
 which held that the House of Representatives did not 
have authority to exclude a member-elect of Congress on grounds other than 
those expressed in the Constitution.
146
 The Court noted that it is ―competent 
and proper for this court to consider whether . . . the legislature‘s proceedings 
are in conformity with the Constitution . . . .‖147 The Court added that ―it is the 
province and duty of the judicial department to determine . . . whether the 
powers of any branch of the government, and even those of the legislature in 
                                                          
142
 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1892); see also ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 
29, at 386; Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181. But see Grant, supra note 70, at 381–82; 
OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 205–06 (2d Cir. 2007). 
143 Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 558–62 (1896). 
144 Lloyd, supra note 34, at 22; Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d 1342, 1351–52 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d 109, 120–21 (D.D.C. 2006). 
145
 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
146
 Id. at 550; cf. Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1712–13 (citing Powell v. McCormack as 
―the best federal example of the model of procedural regularity‖).  





the enactment of laws, have been exercised in conformity to the Constitution; 
and if they have not, to treat their acts as null and void.‖148  
The Powell Court also held that the case was justiciable and not barred by 
the political question doctrine.
149
 Rejecting the claim that judicial resolution of 
the case would produce a ―potentially embarrassing confrontation between 
coordinate branches of the Federal Government,‖ the Court found that a 




Other important decisions include INS v. Chadha,
151
 invalidating the 
legislative veto, and Clinton v. New York,
152
 striking down the line-item 
veto.
153
 In both cases, the Court invalidated statutes that authorized an exercise 
of legislative power in a process that is inconsistent with the constitutional 
procedural requirements for lawmaking. The Court emphasized in these cases 
that the power to enact statutes must be exercised in accord with the procedure 
set out in the Constitution, and that Congress cannot alter this procedure 
                                                          
148 Id. (quoting Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 199). 
149 Id. at 516–49.  
150 Id. at 548 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
151 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
152 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).  





without amending the Constitution.
154
 Clinton v. New York also lends support 
to the proposition that the ―Constitution explicitly requires‖ that the procedural 
steps prescribed in Article I, Section 7 (including the requirement that 
―precisely the same text‖ be passed by both chambers of Congress) must be 
followed in order for a bill to ―become a law,‖ and to the argument that a 
statute whose enactment violated these procedural requirements is not a 
―law.‖155 
In INS v. Chadha the Court also rejected arguments that the case presented 
a political question.
156
 The Court emphasized that ―[n]o policy underlying the 
political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both 
acting in concert . . . can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a 
decision for the courts,‖157 and that ―[r]esolution of litigation challenging the 
constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by 
courts because the issues have political implications . . . .‖158  
                                                          
154 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945–46, 951, 954; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438–40, 446, 448–49; see also 
ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., supra note 29, at 383. 
155 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448–49. 
156 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940–43. 
157 Id. at 941–42. 
158 Id. at 943. The Court also held, inter alia, that Article I provides ―judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards‖ for resolving the case, that there is no ―showing of disrespect for a 
coordinate branch‖ in resolving the case, and that ―since the constitutionality of [the] statute is 
for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of multifarious pronouncements on this 





To be sure, these decisions did not directly address EBD. Their central 
holdings, however—that the power to enact statutes may only be exercised in 
accord with the precise procedure set out in Article I,
159
 and that it is the 
Court‘s duty to ensure that Congress did not violate this procedure and to 
determine the constitutionality of statutes—are certainly in tension with Field. 
EBD, which effectively bars judicial enforcement of the Constitution‘s 
lawmaking provisions, renders these holdings practically meaningless.  
 
C. The Decline of the Prudential Political Question Doctrine 
Some scholars argue that Powell v. McCormack is part of a larger trend in 
the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence: the decline of the ―prudential political 
question doctrine.‖160 While the ―classical‖ political question doctrine holds 
that the doctrine applies only when the Constitution itself commits an issue to 
another branch of government,
161
 the ―prudential‖ doctrine is not based on an 
interpretation of the Constitution, but on a set of prudential considerations 
―that courts have used at their discretion to protect their legitimacy and to 
                                                          
159
 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439–40; Bradford R. Clark, Separation 
of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1381, 1387 (2001) (noting that 
Chadha and Clinton made clear that Article I, Section 7 establishes the exclusive procedure by 
which Congress may legislate).  
160
 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 268–69 (2002).  
161





avoid conflict with the political branches.‖162 In identifying the factors that 
characterize a political question, Baker v. Carr has famously adopted both 
factors that represent the classical approach and factors that represent the 
prudential approach, including ―the respect due coordinate branches of 
government‖ from Field.163 
This Article expresses no opinion about the political question doctrine, 
which has been sufficiently debated in legal scholarship.
164
 The relevant point 
for present purposes is that as a descriptive matter, many scholars seem to 
agree that in the forty-five years since Baker, the Court has indicated that 
prudential considerations such as ―respect due coordinate branches‖ are no 
longer favored. According to these scholars, in the vast majority of the cases 
since Baker, the Court has, in effect, followed the classical doctrine, both when 
rejecting political question claims and in the rare cases in which the Court 
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 Id. at 253. 
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 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Barkow, supra note 160, at 265. 
Interestingly, the Baker Court adopted ―the respect due coordinate branches‖ consideration 
directly from Field and seemed to view EBD as a type of political question doctrine. See 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 214. In fact, several lower courts seemed to perceive EBD as ―closely 
related to—if not inherent in—the political question doctrine‖ or as ―an application of the 
political question doctrine.‖ See Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and 
decisions cited therein. 
164
 See, e.g., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 218–24 (1990); Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181–88; 
Barkow, supra note 160, at 330–35; Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term 
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Henkin, supra note 11, at 622–
25; Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the ―Political Question,‖ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 
1033, 1059–60 (1985); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 





found a political question.
165
 Some scholars argue, moreover, that Powell and 
Chadha effectively eliminated Baker‘s ―respect due coordinate branches‖ 
factor,
166
 and that the Court refrained from expressly relying on it in 
subsequent decisions.
167
 Hence, the Court‘s contemporary political question 
jurisprudence seriously undermines the major basis of EBD.  
 
D.  United States V. Munoz-Flores 
The most important decision that eroded Field and rendered it doctrinally 
unstable is the 1990 decision of United States v. Munoz-Flores.
168
 Munoz-
Flores challenged a statute on the ground that its enactment process violated 
the Constitution‘s Origination Clause requiring that ―[a]ll Bills for raising 
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.‖169 He argued that the 
Act was a bill for raising revenue and that it had originated in the Senate and, 
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 Barkow, supra note 160, at 267–72; see also Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1182–85; 
Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and 
Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1206–14 (2002); cf. 
Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 112–13 (2007). But see 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL 
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166 See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM 
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167 Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 369 (2006). 
168  United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).   





thus, was passed in violation of the Clause.
170
 The Government countered that 
the ―most persuasive factor suggesting nonjusticiability‖ is the concern that 
courts might express a lack of respect for the House of Representatives.
171
 It 
argued that the House‘s passage of a bill conclusively established that the 
House had determined that the bill originated in the House (or that it is not a 
revenue bill), and therefore, a ―judicial invalidation of a law on Origination 
Clause grounds would evince a lack of respect for the House‘s 
determination.‖172  
This argument was expressly rejected by the Court. The Court stated that 
the Government ―may be right that a judicial finding that Congress has passed 
an unconstitutional law might in some sense be said to entail a ‗lack of respect‘ 
for Congress‘ judgment.‖173 The Court held, however, that this cannot be 
sufficient to render an issue nonjusticiable.
174
 ―If it were,‖ the Court added, 
―every judicial resolution of a constitutional challenge to a congressional 
enactment would be impermissible.‖175 The Court noted that Congress often 
explicitly considers whether bills violate constitutional provisions, but adopted 
                                                          
170 Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 387–88. 




 Id.    
175





Powell v. McCormack‘s position that ―‗[o]ur system of government requires 
that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at 
variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The 
alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts‘ 
avoiding their constitutional responsibility.‘‖176  
In his solitary concurrence, Justice Scalia invoked Field in concluding that 
the Court may not look behind the enrolled bill to examine whether the bill 
originated in the House or in the Senate.
177
 Justice Scalia quoted Field and 
stated that the ―same principle, if not the very same holding, leads me to 
conclude that federal courts should not undertake an independent investigation 
into the origination of the statute at issue here.‖178 Noting that the enrolled bill 
of the Act in question bore the indication ―H.J. Res.,‖ which attests that the 
legislation originated in the House, Justice Scalia observed: 
The enrolled bill‘s indication of its House of origin establishes 
that fact as officially and authoritatively as it establishes the fact 
that its recited text was adopted by both Houses.  With respect 
to either fact a court‘s holding, based on its own investigation, 
that the representation made to the President is incorrect would, 
as Marshall Field said, manifest a lack of respect due a 





                                                          
176
 Id. at 390–91 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969)). 
177
 Id. at 408.   
178 Id. at 409 (Scalia, J., concurring). 





In rejecting Justice Scalia‘s argument, the Court stated that Congress‘s 
determination in the enrolled bill that the bill originated in the House did not 
foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny of the law‘s constitutionality and 
emphasized that ―this Court has the duty to review the constitutionality of 
congressional enactments.‖180 The Court added in a footnote that Justice 
Scalia‘s argument could not be supported by Field.181 The Court further noted, 
citing Field, that ―[i]n the absence of any constitutional requirement binding 
Congress . . . ‗[t]he respect due to coequal and independent departments‘ 
demands that the courts accept as passed all bills authenticated in the manner 
provided by Congress. Where, as here, a constitutional provision is implicated, 
Field does not apply.‖182 
There have been various opinions as to the impact of this footnote on the 
applicability of Field‘s EBD.183 It seems plausible to read this passage as 
limiting the applicability of this doctrine to cases where there is no purported 
violation of constitutional lawmaking requirements, such as in cases where it is 
only argued that the legislature violated its own internal procedural rules.
184
 
                                                          
180 Id. at 391.  
181 Id. at 391 n.4. 
182 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
183
 See, e.g., Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181; Amar, supra note 55; Goldfeld, supra 
note 96, at 417 n.173. 
184 See Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 221 
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Other scholars argue that Munoz-Flores limits EBD to the bicameralism 
provision rather than other constitutional requirements.
185
 Others still suggest 
that Munoz-Flores created a distinction between binding constitutional 
provisions with respect to valid enactment (such as bicameralism and the 
Origination Clause) and constitutional provisions that do not affect valid 
enactment (such as the Journal Clause, which requires Congress to keep 
journals of its proceedings).
186
 According to this interpretation, Munoz-Flores 
limits EBD to constitutional provisions of the second kind.
187
 Some even argue 
that Munoz-Flores ―effectively overruled‖ Field.188  
The district and appellate courts in the DRA cases, however, held that 
Munoz-Flores does not overrule or limit the holding of Field.
189
 The position 
of the lower federal courts seems to be that Munoz-Flores has, at most, 
                                                                                                                                                         
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n.4)); Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 417 n.173 (―The Court [in 
Munoz-Flores] has stated that the enrolled bill rule of Field v. Clark is inapplicable when ‗a 
constitutional provision is implicated.‘‖ (quoting Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 391 n.4)); Adrian 
Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 426 
n.209 (2004) (―The Court clearly limited the enrolled-bill rule in Munoz-Flores, saying that the 
rule does not apply when ‗a constitutional provision is implicated.‘‖ (quoting Munoz-Flores, 
495 U.S. at 391 n.4)).  
185
 See, e.g., Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1181. 
186 This was the Appellant‘s argument in Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d 1342,1353 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
187 Id. 
188 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 55. 
189 See, e.g., Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d at 1354–55; OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., 
496 F.3d 197, 206–07 & n.7 (2d Cir. 2007); Conyers v. Bush, No. 06-11972, 2006 WL 






declined to extend EBD to Origination Clause cases and that in all other cases 
EBD ―remains in full effect today.‖190 This position can perhaps be explained 
by Agostini v. Felton, which warned lower courts not to assume that an earlier 
precedent has been overruled by implication, even if it appears to rest on 
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions.
191
 Some of the lower courts in 
the DRA cases explicitly stated that ―[t]here are suggestions in Munoz-Flores 
that, if the Supreme Court were to reconsider the enrolled bill rule of Marshall 
Field today, it might reach a different result. . . . But this Court does not have 
the discretion to find that a Supreme Court case has been overruled by 
implication.‖192 
At any rate, it is clear that Munoz-Flores is hard to reconcile with Field. 
As Professor Vikram Amar argued, these two decisions ―cannot peacefully 
coexist,‖ for it makes no sense for courts ―to police Article I‘s Origination 
Clause requirement (which focuses on where a bill started, not whether it was 
ever passed), but not to police Article I‘s requirement of bicameral approval as 
                                                          
190
Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 116; see also Public Citizen II, 486 F.3d at 1354–55; 
OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 206–07; Conyers, 2006 WL 3834224, at *4; Cal. Dep‘t of Soc. 
Servs. v. Leavitt, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096–97 (E.D. Cal. July 18, 2006).  
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a precondition for lawmaking.‖193 Moreover, as at least one lower court 




In rejecting Justice Scalia‘s position, as well as the government‘s 
nonjusticiability claim, the Munoz-Flores Court rejected the most important 
justification for EBD, both in Field and in contemporary sources: that it is 
required by the respect due to coequal branches.   
The Munoz-Flores Court also rejected another modern argument in favor 
of EBD—that judicial review of the enactment process is not needed because 
Congress and the President can be relied upon to police themselves.
195
 The 
Court noted that the fact that the other branches of government have both the 
incentive and institutional mechanisms to guard against violations of the 
Origination Clause does not ―obviate the need for judicial review‖ and ―does 
not absolve this Court of its responsibility to consider constitutional challenges 
to congressional enactments.‖196 
 The Court also rejected the Government‘s argument that judicial 
intervention is unwarranted because the case does not involve individual 
                                                          
193 Amar, supra note 55; see also OneSimpleLoan, 496 F.3d at 207 n.7 (―[W]e do agree with 
plaintiffs that the Supreme Court has been less than clear in explaining why courts may probe 
congressional documents when adjudicating some types of constitutional claims [Origination 
Clause claims] but not others.‖). 
194 Public Citizen I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 124. 
195
 See supra section I.C. 







 Significantly, the Court seemed to suggest that judicial review of the 
legislative process is essentially no different than substantive, Marbury-type 
judicial review, and that courts should equally enforce the lawmaking 
provisions of the Constitution as they enforce the Bill of Rights provisions. 
Relying on Marbury v. Madison, the Court stated that ―the principle that the 
courts will strike down a law when Congress has passed it in violation of [a 
constitutional] command has been well settled for almost two centuries.‖198 
The Court also stated: 
To survive this Court‘s scrutiny, the ―law‖ must comply with all 
relevant constitutional limits. A law passed in violation of the 
Origination Clause would thus be no more immune from 
judicial scrutiny because it was passed by both Houses and 
signed by the President than would be a law passed in violation 




 Considering the merits, the Court held that the statute in question did 
not violate the Origination Clause, as it was not a revenue bill.
200
 However, 
given Munoz-Flores‘s reasoning, it is difficult to see how Field‘s EBD can 
continue to exist.   
 
                                                          
197 Id. at 392–96.  
198 Id. at 396–97 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–80 (1803)). 
199 Id. at 397. 





E. The Doctrine and Textualism 
This section makes the (perhaps counterintuitive) argument that EBD is 
also inconsistent with textualism, the legislative interpretation theory advanced 
by Justice Scalia and other members of the Court. Formally, EBD is distinct 
from textualism, for, as the Supreme Court has expressly clarified, EBD does 
not apply to statutory interpretation.
201
 However, examining the relationship 
between EBD and textualism is worthwhile because the greatest supporter of 
EBD on the Court, Justice Scalia,
202




At first glance, textualism and EBD seem perfectly compatible because 
they share reluctance to give legislative records any weight in determining the 
validity or meaning of the law. Moreover, both seem to base this reluctance, at 
least in part, on mistrust of the reliability of legislative records. Justice Scalia 
and other textualists argue that legislative records and committee reports are 
untrustworthy because they are subject to manipulation by legislators, or even 
worse, by congressional staff, lobbyists, and interest groups.
204
 Indeed, several 
                                                          
201  U.S. Nat‘l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 n.7 
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scholars have argued (in a slightly different context) that examining the 
legislative record to determine the validity of legislation is inconsistent with a 




Statutory interpretation scholars, on the other hand, argue that Justice 
Scalia‘s theory of statutory interpretation is hard to reconcile with his support 
of EBD, and, specifically, with his argument that this doctrine is required by 
the respect due to a coequal branch. Professor Peter Strauss, for example, 
argued that ―respect due to a coordinate branch‖ is ―hard to square with 
realpolitik concerns for possible legislative manipulations,‖ and criticized 
textualism as ―grounded in disdain for the internal procedures of a coordinate 
branch.‖206 Similarly, Professor Bernard Bell argued that Justice Scalia‘s 
―deference to legislative judgments when legislative procedures are directly 
challenged clashes with the antipathy for legislative judgments reflected in 
                                                                                                                                                         
by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff 
member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not 
primarily to inform the Members of Congress . . . but rather to influence judicial 
construction.‖); SCALIA, supra note 203, at 32–34.  
205 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 87, 148–53 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 80, 136–41 (2001); Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1750–51; see also Eric F. Citron, 
Note, Sudden Death: The Legislative History of Future Dangerousness and the Texas Death 
Penalty, 25 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 143, 147–48 & nn.21–22 (2006) (linking textualism and its 
rejections of legislative history to EBD); cf. Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 419 (noting that ―some 
have argued that legislative record review seems inconsistent with a textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation, which discounts the use of legislative history,‖ but rejecting the 
argument). 
206 Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political 





[his] interpretative approach.‖207 In addition, if indeed the textualists‘ 
arguments ―are deeply rooted in a suspicion of legislators and their 
motives,‖208 this general suspicion seems to be at odds with total and 
unquestioning trust in the enrolled bill. The enrolled bill is also a legislative 
document that is prepared by congressional clerks, so theoretically the 
textualists‘ general mistrust of legislators, congressional staff, and the 
legislative documents they produce should also apply to this legislative 
document. The object here is not to express an opinion about the merits of 
textualism. Rather, this section argues that some of the major arguments of 
Justice Scalia and the new textualists in support of textualism are in fact 
equally applicable as arguments against treating the enrolled bill as conclusive 
and unimpeachable evidence of due enactment. 
The textualists‘ constitutional argument against using legislative history in 
statutory interpretation is particularly germane for our purpose. In arguing 
against judicial reference to legislative history, Justice Scalia and other 
textualists argue that courts must only treat as ―law‖ the statutory text that has 
actually passed bicameralism and presentment according to Article I, Section 
7.
209
 In the context of defending textualism, Justice Scalia has argued, for 
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example, that ―[t]he Constitution sets forth the only manner in which the 
Members of Congress have the power to impose their will upon the country: by 
a bill that passes both Houses and is either signed by the President or repassed 
by a supermajority after his veto‖210 and that ―‗[t]he law as it passed is the will 
of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken 
is in the act itself . . . .‘‖211  
However, the same argument can in fact serve as a strong argument 
against EBD. It is important to remember that the ―enrolled bill‖ is not in itself 
the ―law‖ (that is, the statute that has actually been passed by Congress). It is 
merely a legislative document prepared by congressional clerks and signed by 
the presiding officers. It is not voted upon by the two Houses and is not passed 
according to the requirements of Article I, Section 7.
212
 As Professor Wigmore 
aptly elucidated, the enrolled bill ―is only somebody‘s certificate and copy, 
because the effective legal act of enactment is the dealing of the legislature 
with the original document . . . The legislature has not dealt by vote with the 
enrolled document; the latter therefore can be only a certificate and copy of the 
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Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)) (emphasis omitted); see also W. Va. Univ. Hosps. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991) (Scalia J., writing the opinion of the Court). 





transactions representing the enactment.‖213 In this sense, it is no different than 
legislative journals or committee reports.
214
 It can perhaps serve as an 
important source of information about the content of the law that was actually 
passed by Congress or about the events that took place in the legislative 
process. However, treating it as the ―law‖ itself and favoring it over the actual 
text passed by Congress is, in principle, as unconstitutional as replacing the 
law passed by Congress with the committee report. While even intentionalist 
and purposivist approaches of statutory interpretation do not suggest giving 
legislative records such a binding status,
215
 EBD does exactly that by treating 
the enrolled bill as ―conclusive in every sense‖216 and excluding any evidence 
to show a divergence between it and the actual law passed by Congress. 
Abandoning EBD, on the other hand, will enable courts to ensure that only the 
statutory text that has actually passed bicameralism and presentment according 
to Article I, Section 7 is treated as law.  
A similar argument can be made about Justice Scalia‘s nondelegation 
argument in favor of textualism: that the use of legislative history materials by 
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courts in effect permits Congress to engage in delegation of its authority to 
subunits of the legislature, in violation of the separation of powers.
217
 
Emphasizing the Constitution‘s decree that ―[a]ll legislative Powers . . . shall 
be vested in a Congress . . . which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives,‖218 Justice Scalia argues that ―[i]t has always been assumed 
that these powers are nondelegable . . . that legislative power consists of the 
power ‗to make laws, . . . not to make legislators.‘‖219 Hence, argues Justice 
Scalia, Congress may not leave to its committees the details of legislation or 
the formation of Congress‘s intent.220 ―The only conceivable basis for 
considering committee reports authoritative,‖ he concludes, ―is that they are a 
genuine indication of the will of the entire house—which, as I have been at 
pains to explain, they assuredly are not.‖221 However, as will be elaborated in 
the next Part, EBD can similarly be seen as permitting an impermissible 
delegation of Congress‘s lawmaking authority to the presiding officers of 
Congress.
222
 The only conceivable basis for considering the enrolled bill 
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authoritative, to paraphrase Justice Scalia, is that it is a genuine indication of 
the will of the entire Congress. When there is sufficient evidence that the 
enrolled bill is not a genuine indication of the will of Congress, judicial 
adherence to EBD amounts to an acceptance that the will of the legislative 
officers (or their clerks), rather than ―the will of the majority of both 
houses,‖223  should be treated as ―law.‖     
Finally, Justice Scalia‘s textualism can in fact be seen in itself as a type of 
―due process of lawmaking‖ approach, for it is based, in part, on ―his view of 
the judiciary‘s role in encouraging lawmakers to improve the quality of 
decisionmaking and drafting.‖224 Some scholars argue that textualism is 
―intended to change congressional behavior in the future as much as [it is] used 
to reach decisions about the meaning of a statute in the immediate case.‖225 
Indeed, in arguing for textualism, Justice Scalia seemed to suggest that judicial 
resort to legislative history may ―produce [an improper] legal culture‖ in the 
congressional legislative process, and argued that the Court should prefer 
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textualism because ―we have an obligation to conduct our exegesis in a fashion 
which fosters that democratic process.‖226 Hence, in arguing for textualism, 
Justice Scalia seemed to accept one of the arguments also raised by supporters 
of judicial review of the legislative process: that there are defects in the 
legislative process and that the courts can and should cure such process 
failures.
227
 This Article focuses on other justifications for judicial enforcement 
of the Constitution‘s lawmaking provisions. The important conclusion for 
present purposes, however, is that some of the major arguments raised by 
textualists such as Justice Scalia seem to be equally applicable as arguments 
against EBD.  
 
V. THE DOCTRINE AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE DELEGATION 
Section V.A argues that the doctrine entails an impermissible delegation 
of judicial power to the presiding officers of Congress, whereas section V.B 
argues that the doctrine permits an impermissible delegation of Congress‘s 
lawmaking authority to these presiding officers. 
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A. The Doctrine as an Impermissible Delegation of Judicial Authority 
EBD requires complete judicial deference to the determination of the 
Speaker of the House and the President of Senate in the enrolled bill that a 
statute has been validly enacted in compliance with the Constitution. The 
practical result, therefore, is that the Court has de facto relinquished its power 
to interpret and enforce the constitutional provisions of lawmaking and its 
authority to determine the validity of legislation. The Court ceded these 
judicial powers not to Congress as a whole, but to the exclusive and final 
authority of the legislative officers of Congress. 
This argument can be illustrated by considering Professor Mitchell 
Berman‘s suggestion of conceptualizing EBD as a ―constitutional decision 
rule.‖228 Professor Berman distinguishes between constitutional doctrines that 
are ―constitutional operative propositions‖ and doctrines that are 
―constitutional decision rules.‖229 The former are constitutional doctrines that 
represent the ―judiciary‘s understanding of the proper meaning of a 
constitutional power, right, duty, or other sort of provision‖ (judicial 
determinations of what the Constitution means).
230
 ―Constitutional decision 
rules,‖ on the other hand, are ―doctrinal rules that direct how courts—faced, as 
they inevitably are, with epistemic uncertainty—are to determine whether [a 
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constitutional operative proposition] has been complied with.‖231 Under this 
distinction, the following judicial proposition, adapted from Clinton v. City of 
New York, would be an example of a ―constitutional operative proposition‖: 
The Constitution explicitly requires that each of those three 
steps [(1) a bill containing its exact text was approved by a 
majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2) 
the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text 
was signed into law by the President] be taken before a bill may 
―become a law.‖ If one paragraph of that text had been omitted 





EBD, on the other hand, can perhaps be conceptualized as a 
―constitutional decision rule,‖ for it directs courts how to decide whether this 
―constitutional operative proposition‖ was satisfied in a concrete case.233 
However, even if we accept that EBD is simply a ―constitutional decision 
rule,‖ it is a highly problematic decision rule which inevitably leads to 
delegation of judicial powers to the legislative officers. EBD directs courts to 
conclusively presume that a bill signed by these legislative officers was passed 
in accordance with all the procedural requirements of Article I. As the 
discussion of the ―comparative probative value‖ argument demonstrated, this 
decision rule is a deficient epistemic rule which ―frequently . . . produces 
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results which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions.‖234 As a 
conclusive presumption, which does not allow exceptions for epistemic 
failures, this rule cannot be justified merely as a rule of epistemic deference to 
the legislative officers.
235
 More fundamentally, however, the question of 
whether a bill has been properly enacted in compliance with the Constitution 
inevitably raises both questions of constitutional interpretation and questions of 
fact. This point was accepted, in essence, in several decisions that were 
decided on state law prior to Field. For example, Walnut v. Wade held (in a 
slightly different context) that the question whether an alleged statute was duly 
and constitutionally passed was a question of law, not of fact, and hence, a 
judicial one, ―to be settled and determined by the court and judges.‖236 The 
questions of what exactly are the procedural requirements set forth in Article I 
and what constitutes compliance with these requirements (for example, what 
constitutes ―passage‖) are undeniably questions of legal interpretation rather 
than questions of fact.
237
 The problem is that EBD takes the authority to 
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answer these two questions away from the courts and places it exclusively in 
the hands of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate. Hence, 
it delegates the authority to determine what the Constitution means—to make 
―constitutional operative propositions‖—from the courts to the legislative 
officers. In essence, it is the practical equivalent of a doctrine that would 
require courts to accept as conclusive the presiding officers‘ attestation that an 
Act does not violate the Bill of Rights. The result, therefore, is an abdication of 
the courts‘ authority to interpret the Constitution and to enforce it according to 
the judicial understanding of what the Constitution means.
238
 This result is in 
sharp contrast with the prevailing judicial position that this authority is 
―emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,‖239 and seems 
out of place in an age when this position enjoys widespread approbation by 
judges, lawyers, politicians, the general public, and the majority of law 
professors.
240
 To clarify, this Article does not argue for judicial exclusivity or 
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even supremacy in the interpretation and enforcement of the Constitution.
241
 It 
concedes that Congress and the President may have an important role to play in 
constitutional interpretation.
242
 The problem with EBD, however, is that it 
designates the legislative officers as the only interpreters and enforcers of the 
lawmaking provisions of the Constitution.    
Furthermore, EBD is not only a judicial doctrine that ―takes the 
Constitution away from the courts.‖243 It is also at odds with the courts‘ 
inherent and inevitable role of determining the validity (or authenticity) of 
legislation. As Professor H.L.A. Hart has argued, if one accepts that courts are 
empowered to make authoritative determinations of the fact that a primary rule 
(such as a statute) has been broken, it is unavoidable that they will make 
authoritative determinations of what the primary rules are.
244
 Hence, 
determining the validity of primary rules, in the sense of recognizing them as 
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passing the tests provided by the rule of recognition, is an inherent and 
inevitable part of the judicial work in any legal system (even without a written 
Constitution).
245
 Professor Hart established, moreover, that secondary rules 
that specify the persons who are to legislate and define the procedure to be 
followed in legislation are inevitable in any legal system (even without a 
written constitution, and, in fact, even in nondemocratic legal systems)
246
 and 
that these rules ―vitally concern the courts, since they use such [rules] as a 
criterion of the validity of purported legislative enactments coming before 
them.‖247 Indeed, several scholars in England and the British Commonwealth 
have relied on a similar logic in concluding that judicial review of the 
enactment process for the purpose of determining the authenticity of a putative 
Act of Parliament is legitimate and inevitable even under a system of 
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Professors Adler and Dorf developed a similar argument in the American 
constitutional context, in the following straightforward way:  
If (1) the judge is under a legal duty to take account of some 
type of nonconstitutional law [such as statutes] in reaching her 
decisions, then (2) she is under a legal duty to determine 
whether putative legal propositions of that type, advanced by 
the parties, really do have legal force. Yet this entails (3) a legal 
duty to determine whether these putative legal propositions 





Professors Adler and Dorf developed this idea into a comprehensive theory 
that provides a novel justification for both judicial review of the legislative 
process and substantive judicial review in the United States. The relevant point 
for our purposes, however, is their claim that even if Marbury v. Madison and 
its arguments were to be overruled, it would still be the inevitable legal duty of 
judges to determine the validity of legislation, in the sense of determining 
whether a putative statute satisfied the ―existence conditions‖ of lawmaking.250 
As these scholars point out, Article I, Section 7 is ―the clearest case of a 
constitutional existence condition.‖251 Even under the most minimalist rule of 
recognition in the United States, a ―proposition constitutes a federal statute if 
                                                          
249 Adler & Dorf, supra note 13, at 1123–24.  
250 Id. at 1107–08, 1123–25.  





and only if it satisfies the procedures for promulgating statutes set forth in . . . 
Article I, Section 7.‖252  
Finally, it is fascinating to note that as early as 1852—long before 
Professors Adler and Dorf, and even Professor Hart, expounded their 
arguments—the Supreme Court of California rejected EBD, based in part on 
the following argument: 
I hold the authority to inquire beyond the . . . [enrolled] act for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the same has a constitutional 
existence to be incident to all courts of general jurisdiction, and 
necessary for the protection of public rights and liberties . . . . 
Courts are bound to know the law, both statute and common. It is 
their province to determine whether a statute be law or not . . . . 
[I]t must be tried by the judges, who must inform themselves in 
any way they can . . . .
253
   
 
To be sure, EBD can theoretically be reconciled with the inevitable 
judicial duty of determining the validity of legislation by suggesting that the 
rule of recognition in the United States is that a proposition constitutes a 
federal statute if it has been signed by the presiding officers and approved by 
the President. This, however, inevitably entails a delegation of the power to 
interpret and enforce the Constitution‘s lawmaking provisions, and to 
determine the validity of legislation, to the presiding officers. Worse still, it 
amounts to recognition that statutes may be created by the signatures of these 
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two individuals, rather than by the whole Congress following the procedure of 
Article I, Section 7.        
 
B. The Doctrine as an Impermissible Delegation of Lawmaking Authority 
EBD can also be seen as enabling an impermissible delegation of 
Congress‘s lawmaking authority to the presiding officers. To be sure, the Field 
Court acknowledged that ―[t]here is no authority in the presiding officers . . . to 
attest by their signatures . . . any bill not [duly] passed by congress.‖254 
However, in practice, EBD permits them to do exactly that. If the allegations in 
the DRA cases are true, this is precisely what the congressional officers (and 
the President) have done: they were aware that the bill presented to the 
President reflected the Senate bill but was never passed in the same form by 
the House, and yet they ―signed it into law.‖255 It is possible that they believed 
in good faith that the difference between the bill passed by the Senate and the 
bill passed by the House was merely a matter of clerical error. The problem, 
however, is that the presiding officers (and, in fact, a Senate clerk) took it upon 
themselves to ―correct‖ the error and determine the ―real will‖ of both houses 
on their own. This is a violation of Senate and House rules, which clearly state 
that only the two houses, by concurrent resolution, may authorize the 
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correction of an error when enrollment is made.
256
 These rules ensure that the 
correct and genuine will of both houses, rather than the will of the enrolling 
clerks or legislative officers, is enacted into law. Hence, their violation is 
problematic in itself. More importantly, however, it amounts to an assumption 
of an authority that even the Field Court emphasized the legislative officers 
may not constitutionally assume.  
Theoretically, one can argue that Congress had acquiesced to such an 
exercise of ―discretionary legislative power‖ by the legislative officers. One 
can argue that Congress is surely aware of Field‘s EBD and is free to change 
its bill-enrollment and authentication procedure. Hence, the fact that Congress 
has not changed this procedure, and even codified it in a statute,
257
 serves as an 
indication that Congress tacitly accepted that the legislative officers will, from 
time to time, assume the authority they allegedly assumed in the DRA case. 
One can further argue that by entrenching its enrollment procedure in a statute, 
Congress has, in effect, instructed courts to treat as ―law‖ any document 
attested by the legislative officers and signed by the President, regardless of 
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This, however, amounts to an impermissible delegation of Congress‘s 
lawmaking power. The Court has repeatedly held (in other contexts) that 
―Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to its own agents or to its 
own Members,‖259 and that ―Congress may not exercise its fundamental power 
to formulate national policy by delegating that power . . . to an individual agent 
of the Congress such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives . . . .‖260 
These decisions clearly perceived ―legislative self-delegation‖ by Congress to 
its own components as more objectionable than conventional delegations of 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies.
261
 A major reason for this 
distinction is that ―[i]f Congress were free to delegate its policymaking 
authority . . . to one of its agents, it would be able to evade ‗the carefully 
crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.‘‖262 This concern is 
particularly applicable here. By treating any bill signed by the presiding 
officers and the President as ―law,‖ and designating the presiding officers as 
the sole judges of the validity of laws, EBD allows, in effect, the creation of 
―law‖ through Congress‘s enrollment procedure, rather than by Congress as a 
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whole through the procedure mandated by Article I, Section 7. The problem 
here is less that EBD allows an abduction of Congress‘s lawmaking power by 
the legislative officers, but rather that it permits Congress to abdicate some of 
its lawmaking authority to the legislative officers, in order to circumvent the 
procedure set out in Article I Section 7. 
Imagine, for example, that Congress is interested in passing an extensive 
piece of legislation and that the House and Senate are able to agree on all of its 
provisions, save one specific issue. The Constitution provides the houses of 
Congress only two options: either agree on an identical form of the bill or not 
pass the bill at all. In certain situations the choice between succumbing to the 
other house and sacrificing the entire bill presents a real dilemma. Both options 
might carry heavy costs, such as sacrificing important policy preferences, 
antagonizing voters, losing prestige, and so forth. In such situations, EBD 
provides, in effect, a tempting third option: instead of choosing between these 
two evils (and taking responsibility for this choice), each house can pass its 
own version and effectively delegate the authority to choose between them to 
the legislative officers. This scenario is less imaginary than one might assume. 
According to some accounts, a similar scenario occurred in the DRA case. 
Some argue that the discrepancy between the bill passed by the Senate and the 
bill transmitted to the House was discovered before the House vote, but its 
resolution was intentionally left to the presiding officers at the enrollment 





about how to resolve the difference from the Senate version . . . .‖263 Although 
a bill that does not satisfy the bicameral requirement of Article I, Sections 1 
and 7 does not become a law, under EBD, the signatures of the presiding 
officers effectively turn invalid law into valid law. Consequently, EBD 
recognizes and permits, in effect, an ―alternative lawmaking procedure,‖ which 
is inconsistent with the Court‘s constant avowals that Congress ―must follow 
the procedures mandated by Article I of the Constitution—through passage by 
both houses and presentment to the President‖ in order to legislate.264  
 
VI. THE DOCTRINE AND LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY 
This Part argues that EBD is intimately (if not inseparably) related to the 
traditional English concept of legislative sovereignty (or supremacy), which 
views lawmaking as an absolute sovereign prerogative and the legislative 
process as a sphere of unfettered legislative omnipotence. Section VI.A 
establishes the link between the doctrine and the traditional English view of 
legislative supremacy. Section VI.B argues that while the doctrine was never 
explicitly linked to legislative supremacy in the United States, the American 
doctrine still amounts, in effect, to a view of the legislative process as a sphere 
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of unfettered legislative supremacy. Section VI.C argues, therefore, that EBD 
is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution. 
 
A. Establishing the Link between the Doctrine and Legislative Supremacy 
The historical origins of the American EBD are rooted in English common 
law.
265
 Although these origins can perhaps be traced back to the time of Henry 




the most cited articulation of the English 
rule was stated in the 1842 decision of Edinburgh & Dalkeith Railway v. 
Wauchope: 
All that a Court of Justice can do is look at the Parliamentary roll 
[the practical equivalent of the ―enrolled bill‖]: if from that it 
should appear that a bill has passed both Houses and received the 
Royal assent, no Court of Justice can inquire into the mode in 
which it was introduced into Parliament, nor into what was done 
previous to its introduction, or what passed in Parliament during 




This rule is based, to a large extent, on the traditional English view of 
parliamentary supremacy (or sovereignty).
268
 According to the orthodox view 
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of parliamentary supremacy, associated with thinkers such as Austin and 
Dicey, Parliament, as the legal sovereign, is the source of all law, and 
therefore, there can be no legal limitations on its legislative competence, and 
no person or body may override or set aside its legislation.
269
 The orthodox 
English view considers lawmaking as a sovereign prerogative and the 
legislative process as a sphere of unfettered omnipotence.
270
 Under this view, 
there can be no legal restrictions on the legislative process, and even the 
omnipotent Parliament cannot create restrictions—substantive or procedural—
that would limit its future ability to legislate.
271
  
Following the orthodox view, English courts interpreted the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy as banning courts from questioning the validity of 
Parliament‘s legislation on any ground, including defects in the enactment 
process.
272
 A good example is the oft-quoted 1870 decision of Lee v. Bude & 
Torrington Junction Railway Co.: 
We sit here as servants of the Queen and the legislature. Are we 
to act as regents over what is done by parliament with the 
consent of the Queen, lords and commons? I deny that any such 
                                                                                                                                                         
362–64. However, even if the principle of parliamentary supremacy is a later historical ground 
for EBD, it has surely become the most dominant foundation for the English doctrine. 
269 On this orthodox view of parliamentary sovereignty, see, for example, Elliot, supra note 
268, at 221–22; Waldron, supra note 246, at 375. 
270 Waldron, supra note 246, at 375. 
271 Elliot, supra note 268, at 221–22.  
272 See Lord Irvine of Lairg, Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in 





authority exists. If an Act of Parliament has been passed 
improperly, it is for the legislature to correct it by repealing it; 





Over a century later, English courts still rejected procedural challenges to the 
validity of Parliamentary Acts on the ground that: 
The idea that a court is entitled to disregard a provision in an 
Act of Parliament on any ground must seem strange and 
startling to anyone with any knowledge of the history and law 
of our constitution . . . . [S]ince the supremacy of Parliament 
was finally demonstrated by the Revolution of 1688 any such 




Hence, based on the orthodox view of parliamentary supremacy, the English 
courts concluded that courts must enforce every putative Act of Parliament 
(unless it is apparent on its face that it is not an authentic Act of Parliament), 
and may not inquire into the enactment process.
275
  
The contemporary House of Lords still cites the rule of conclusiveness of 
the Parliamentary Roll (the English EBD) in tandem with the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy and seems to consider them as interlinked.
276
 Indeed, 
this rule is still so much tied to the principle of parliamentary supremacy in 
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British and Commonwealth thinking, that Wauchope (the most commonly 
cited articulation of the rule) is often cited as one of the major ―judicial 
precedent[s] that firmly established the principle of Parliament‘s 
supremacy.‖277 Even scholars from the British Commonwealth that challenge 
the link between EBD and the principle of parliamentary supremacy 
acknowledge the doctrine‘s effect in the development and entrenchment of 
parliamentary supremacy in England
278
 and concede that EBD ―is inextricably 
related to . . . parliamentary sovereignty.‖279 
Hence, the origins of EBD establish the historical link between this 
doctrine and the orthodox view of parliamentary supremacy. The link between 
this doctrine and legislative supremacy goes far beyond the historical 
connection, however. The modern discussions of this doctrine in England and 
the Commonwealth—as well as the development of judicial review of the 
enactment process in several countries—demonstrate that the doctrine is 
viewed as logically contingent upon the orthodox view of parliamentary 
supremacy.   
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The view that EBD is contingent upon the English principle of 
parliamentary supremacy—and that it is, consequently, not justified in legal 
systems that have a written constitution—seems to be widely accepted in 
England and the Commonwealth. Since the 1930s, several courts in 
Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and South Africa, distinguished 
the English doctrine that ―a court has no jurisdiction to go behind a statute‖280 
and held that: 
The principle that the courts may not examine the way in which 
the law-making process has been performed has no application 
where a legislature is established under or governed by an 
instrument which prescribes that laws . . . may only be passed if 
the legislature is constituted or exercises its functions in a 




This position was also accepted by the English judges in the Privy Council.
282
 
Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, for example, distinguished the English 
authorities by stating that ―in the Constitution of the United Kingdom there is 
no governing instrument which prescribes the law-making powers and the 
forms which are essential to those powers.‖283 In legal systems where such an 
instrument does exist, however, ―a legislature has no power to ignore the 
                                                          
280 Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 C.L.R 81, 163 (Austl.) (Gibbs, J.). 
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conditions of law-making that are imposed by the instrument which itself 
regulates its power to make law.‖284 Stressing the judicial ―duty to see that the 
Constitution is not infringed and to preserve it inviolate,‖285 the Privy Council 
enforced procedural (or ―manner and form‖) lawmaking restrictions on 
Commonwealth legislatures in this and other cases.
286
 As the High Court of 
Australia summarized the decisions of the Privy Council and of courts in 
Commonwealth countries, ―[t]he distinction is between legislatures which are, 
and those which are not, governed by an instrument which imposes conditions 
on the power to make laws.‖287  
Interestingly, moreover, EBD has been attacked recently even in England. 
Some scholars argue that recent changes in British constitutional law (such as 
membership in the European Union, devolution, and the incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights) have eroded the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy in England
288
 and that this erosion warrants a 
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see, for example, Mark Elliott, United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty Under Pressure, 2 
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reconsideration of the English EBD.
289
 In the recent House of Lords decision 
regarding the validity of the Hunting Act,
290
 at least some of the judges 
indicated receptiveness to the argument about the erosion of parliamentary 
supremacy, albeit stressing that ―the supremacy of Parliament is still the 
general principle of our constitution.‖291 While holding that the case can be 
resolved without looking behind the face of the Act, the House of Lords 
seemed to indicate that it is not prepared to overrule the English EBD for the 
time being.
292
 Significantly, however, the House of Lords also seemed to 
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290 The Hunting Act 2004—which outlawed hunting a wild mammal with a dog—was passed 
through a special legislative procedure that bypassed the House of Lords. The claimants 
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reaffirm the Privy Council and Commonwealth courts‘ position that judicial 
enforcement is justified, and indeed required, where legislatures are governed 
by an instrument which imposes conditions on their power to make laws.
293
 
Indeed, this position seems to be accepted even by supporters of the orthodox 
English view of parliamentary supremacy. As Professor Jeffrey Goldsworthy 
noted, ―even those who most staunchly defend Dicey‘s thesis . . . do not extend 
it to any Parliament whose powers derive from some higher law, that is, some 
(logically and historically) prior law not laid down by itself.‖294  
Some scholars in England and the Commonwealth argue, furthermore, that 
EBD is not warranted even under the principle of parliamentary supremacy or 
sovereignty, based on the ―rapidly emerging ‗new view‘ of parliamentary 
sovereignty.‖295 The orthodox English view of lawmaking as a sovereign 
prerogative (and its claim that there could be no legal limitations on the 
legislative process) has been increasingly challenged in the twentieth century, 
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on several fronts, by legal philosophers and constitutional scholars.
296
 The 
relevant point for our purposes is the ―new view‖ scholars‘ argument that 
―legal sovereignty‖ ―is merely a name indicating that the legislature has . . . 
power to make laws of any kind in the manner required by the law.‖297 
According to this argument, parliamentary supremacy entails an unlimited 
lawmaking power regarding the subject matter of legislation, whereas rules 
that simply define the procedures for enactment are not fetters on power and do 
not constitute limits on sovereignty.
298
 These scholars argue that lawmaking 
cannot be understood except as a law-governed process.
299
 Hence, the 
existence of procedural requirements for lawmaking (as opposed to substantive 




Based on this ―new view‖ of parliamentary sovereignty, several scholars 
in the British Commonwealth have argued that judicial review of the 
                                                          
296 For a good overview, see OLIVER, supra note 248, at 76–107. See also HART, supra note 
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legislative process is consistent with parliamentary sovereignty.
301
 Some have 
argued, for example, that parliamentary supremacy requires courts to enforce 
every Act of Parliament, but, in so doing, they have a duty to examine the 
enactment process to ensure that Parliament has really acted.
302
 In order to 
ensure the authenticity of a putative Act, courts must determine compliance 
with those rules that are necessary ―for the identification of the sovereign and 
for the ascertainment of [its] will.‖303 Such judicial review does not interfere 
with the exercise of the sovereign‘s will; it is a necessary condition for 
effectuating this will.
304
 In the words of Professor Denis Cowen, ―in exercising 
jurisdiction to inquire into the authenticity of an alleged Act of Parliament, the 
courts plainly do not set themselves up as regents over Parliament. They do not 
seek to control the legislature. On the contrary, the inquiry is simply: has 
Parliament spoken?‖305 These scholars argue that parliamentary sovereignty 
should be understood as limiting only substantive, Marbury-type judicial 
review, but not judicial review based on procedural flaws in the enactment 
process.
306
 This view was aptly summarized by Professor Heuston:  
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(1) Sovereignty is a legal concept: the rules which identify the 
sovereign and prescribe its composition and functions are 
logically prior to it. 
(2) There is a distinction between rules which govern, on the 
one hand, (a) the composition, and (b) the procedure, and, on 
the other hand, (c) the area of power of a sovereign legislature. 
(3) The courts have jurisdiction to question the validity of an 
alleged Act of Parliament on grounds 2(a) and (b), but not on 




The English courts have long preferred the orthodox view of 
parliamentary sovereignty,
308
 although some judges in the House of Lords have 
recently demonstrated some receptiveness to the ―new view.‖309 Courts in 
other common-law countries, at any rate, have been more receptive to the ―new 
view‖ of legislative sovereignty. The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, 
relied, at least in part, on the ―new view‖ of legislative sovereignty in 
concluding that courts may enforce not only constitutional lawmaking 
provisions, but also self-imposed statutory requirements for lawmaking.
310
 The 
Israeli example is also interesting because, until the 1980s, Israeli courts 
followed the orthodox English view of parliamentary sovereignty quite 
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 Just like in England, the principle of parliamentary supremacy was 
long thought to be one of the fundamentals of the Israeli legal system, and, 
consequently, the enactment process and other parliamentary proceedings were 
considered nonjusticiable.
312
 However, in the late 1980s, the Supreme Court of 
Israel changed its position and recognized its authority to exercise judicial 
review of the enactment process.
313
 This transition is particularly interesting 
for two reasons. First, it occurred several years before Marbury-type judicial 
review was established in Israel and before the Basic Laws that (arguably) 
mandated such substantive judicial review were enacted.
314
 Second, and more 
significantly, the Israeli Court seemed to derive its authority to review the 
legislative process, to a large extent, from the idea that ―[t]he legislative 
process, like any other governmental proceeding,‖ is a law-governed 
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 At least one justice, moreover, explicitly derived this authority from 
the ―new view‖ of legislative sovereignty, while holding that substantive 
judicial review authority does not exist.
316
 
The argument that rejection of the orthodox view of legislative supremacy 
should lead to rejection of EBD also finds support in the development of 
judicial review of the legislative process in civil-law countries. In several 
European constitutional democracies, such as Germany and Spain, judicial 
review of the enactment process is viewed as deriving from the ―transition 
from the model of parliamentary supremacy to the model of constitutional 
supremacy.‖317 Historically, these countries also had doctrines (such as the 
traditional interna corporis acta doctrine) that viewed the enactment process 
and other parliamentary proceedings as immune from judicial scrutiny, based 
on the English ideas of the sovereignty and independence of Parliament.
318
 As 
part of their post-World-War-II transition into constitutional democracies, 
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however, these countries rejected the view of Parliament as supreme, or as 
sovereign, in favor of constitutional supremacy and ―constrained 
parliamentarianism.‖319 Constitutional courts in several of these countries (and 
most notably in Spain) concluded that these changes require reconsideration 
and reinterpretation of the doctrines that viewed the legislative process and 
other parliamentary proceedings as nonjusticiable.
320
 These courts concluded 
that, in constitutional democracies, legislative autonomy and independence 
should be balanced with the principle of constitutional supremacy, which 
requires that the legislature exercise all its powers (including in the legislative 
process) in accordance with the constitution.
321
 Recognizing the judicial duty 
to ensure the legislature‘s adherence to the constitution, courts in Spain, 
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Germany, and other constitutional democracies gradually but dramatically 
expanded their review of the legislative process.
322
 In short, judicial review of 
the legislative process was simply viewed as ―a natural outgrowth of the 
explicit rejection of the English model [of] parliamentary supremacy.‖323  
The historical origins of EBD; the contemporary discussions of this 
doctrine in England and the Commonwealth; and the development of judicial 
review of the legislative process in common-law and civil-law countries all 
seem to yield a similar conclusion: EBD appears to be contingent upon the 
orthodox view of legislative supremacy. Judicial review of the legislative 
process is considered to be a natural consequence of rejecting this view, either 
in favor of the ―new view‖ of legislative sovereignty, or in favor of 
constitutional supremacy and the principle that the legislature is constrained by 
a judicially enforceable Constitution.  
 
B. The American Doctrine and Legislative Supremacy 
The American EBD was never explicitly grounded on the principle of 
legislative supremacy. However, this section argues that the American doctrine 
did not completely divorce from its historic English origin. It argues that the 
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American doctrine shares, in effect, the orthodox English view of the 
legislative process as a sphere of unfettered legislative supremacy, immune 
from judicial review. 
Field‘s EBD effectively insulates the legislative process from judicial 
review and, consequently, establishes Congress‘s unfettered power to control 
this process.
324
 This doctrine has properly been characterized as ―a 
prophylactic rule, which blocks all inquiry into the alleged procedural flaws in 
a bill‘s adoption‖325 or as ―insulating legislative enactments from challenges 
based on faulty enactment procedures.‖326 The doctrine represents, therefore, a 
judgment that the legislature may operate in the legislative process without any 
judicial oversight at all and, consequently, without any meaningful legal (as 
opposed to political) constraints. 
Furthermore, EBD requires courts to shut their eyes even on the most 
obvious and egregious violations of the Constitution‘s lawmaking 
requirements and ―to hold statutes valid which they and everybody know [sic] 
were never legally enacted.‖327 The doctrine compels courts to hold statutes 
valid even when it is clear beyond doubt and openly admitted that the statute 
was enacted in blatant violation of the constitutional requirements for 
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 To be sure, EBD leaves courts with the theoretical power to 
invalidate a statute when it is clear from its face that it was not validly enacted. 
However, violations of the lawmaking requirements set forth in the 
Constitution will rarely be discoverable from merely examining the enrolled 
bill.
329
 Thus, the practical result of EBD is non-enforcement of the procedural 
lawmaking requirements of the Constitution. Consequently, these 
constitutional requirements become ―binding only upon the legislative 
conscience.‖330 This permits habitual and flagrant disregard of the 
constitutional requirements in the legislative process.
331
 Some state supreme 
courts have even argued that the consequence of EBD is that ―the wholesome 
restrictions which the Constitution imposes on legislative and executive action 
become a dead letter . . . .‖332 
To be sure, critics of ―court-centered‖ constitutional law argue that ―it is a 
mistake to assume that constitutional prohibitions are somehow unreal unless 
                                                          
328 See D & W Auto Supply, 602 S.W.2d at 422–24; Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P.2d 173, 
180–81 (Wash. 1951).  
329 SINGER, supra note 27, § 15:2, at 815 (―The failure to comply with procedures prescribed in 
the constitution for enactment of statutes is rarely discoverable from the face of an act itself.‖). 
In the states, in contrast, there are some restrictions on the legislative process (such as title and 
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supra note 29, at 798–99.    
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 Huntley, 235 P.2d at 180–81.  
331 See Geja‘s Café v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. 1992); see 
also supra section III.D. 





backed up by judicial review.‖333 It should be clarified, therefore, that this 
section does not contest the theoretical view that under-enforced and non-
enforced constitutional provisions maintain their legal status as supreme 
law.
334
 Nor does it deny that Congress and the President have an independent 
obligation to abide by such constitutional provisions, and that the political 
branches might have independent incentives and mechanisms to do so.
335
 The 
question of whether these branches can be relied upon to enforce the 
lawmaking provisions without any judicial review, however, requires further 
research. Such research requires complex examination of institutional 
competence, incentives, and mechanisms,
336
 as well as further empirical 
                                                          
333 Vermeule, supra note 184, at 436; see also J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political 
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branches have no constitutional obligations other than those courts enforce and asserting that 
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334 Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
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 Linde, supra note 37, at 243–44 (supporting judicial review of the legislative process, but 
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on legality in lawmaking‖); Williams, supra note 29, at 825–27 (same).  
336 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 543, 577–82 (2007) (comparing the institutional competence of Congress, the President, 
and the courts to enforce a specific type of procedural rule of the legislative process (timing 
rules) and concluding that although none of these institutional actors would be perfect 
enforcers, courts are the most competent and promising of the three; arguing, moreover, that 
―judicial competence is better tailored to the enforcement of procedural restraints . . . than to 
substantive review of legislation‖ and that ―courts could do so cheaply and effectively‖); 
Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. 
REV. 587, 609–10 (1983) (doubting Congress's competence to support and defend the 
Constitution); Barbara Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted with the Constitution? The Effects of 
Incentives and Procedures, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 293, 294, 296 (Neal Devins 
& Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) (arguing that Congress has the incentives and procedures 
to interpret and uphold the Constitution, but conceding, in effect, that the possibility of judicial 







 which are beyond the scope of this Article. At any rate, the 
resolution of this question is not required here, for this section merely argues 
that the doctrine leaves the legislative process entirely to the control of the 
political branches. Whether this necessarily leads to constitutional violations is 
a separate question.   
The important points for this section are that EBD amounts to a judicial 
declaration that the enactment process is completely beyond the reach of 
courts, that courts may not question the validity of legislation, and that the 
lawmaking provisions of the Constitution are (judicially) non-enforceable. This 
position comes very close to the orthodox English view of parliamentary 
supremacy, according to which there are no legal (as opposed to political) 
limitations on the legislative process and courts may not question the validity 
of legislation. Both American and English doctrines, moreover, share a view of 
the enactment process as a special sphere of governmental activity that is 
completely immune from judicial review.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
desire to promote public policy have ―instrumental reasons‖ to take into account the 
constitutionality of their legislation if they want it to survive judicial review). 
337
 See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT 
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argument that constitutional considerations are generally given little weight in drafting, 
considering, and passing legislation in Congress, and that judicial review is required to 
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C. The Doctrine‘s Incongruity with the U.S. Constitution 
Legislative sovereignty and the idea of a supreme, omnipotent legislature 
are, of course, entirely foreign to the U.S. Constitution.
338
 It is widely 
recognized that the Framers of the American Constitution rejected the 
traditional idea that sovereignty is lodged in parliament, or in any other 
governmental body, in favor of the idea that ―in America, the only legitimate 
sovereign was the People, who could delegate different powers to different 
governments in any way.‖339 It is likewise acknowledged as ―axiomatic‖ that 
the Framers rejected the idea of a supreme, omnipotent legislature in favor of 
the principle of limited government and the idea of a legislature that is 
constrained by a supreme Constitution which is prior and superior to the 
powers of the legislature.
340
 Marbury v. Madison has famously taken the 
additional step of holding that constitutional supremacy and the principle that 
the legislature is constrained by the Constitution requires judicial enforcement 
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 See Lord Irvine, supra note 272, at 5. 
339 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 216–17 (1991); see also Prakash & 
Yoo, supra note 237, at 914 (―According to the theory of popular sovereignty prevalent at the 
time of ratification, the Constitution is a creation of the people . . . . This understanding of 
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government that the existence and authoritative capacity of governmental instrumentalities for 
making law, their powers, and the methods by which their powers may legally be exercised, 
are subject to the higher law of the constitution.‖); see also Lord Irvine, supra note 272, at 5; 







 Academic criticism of Marbury notwithstanding, 
constitutional supremacy and judicial review are as central and well-settled in 




In treating lawmaking as a sovereign prerogative and the legislative 
process as a sphere of unfettered power immune from judicial review, EBD 
deviates from Marbury and from the fundamental and well-settled principles of 
American constitutionalism. In fact, the words of Chief Justice Marshall in 
Marbury rejecting the view that ―courts must close their eyes on the 
Constitution‖ are strikingly applicable to EBD as well: 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written 
constitutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to 
the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void; is 
yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare, that if 
the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, 
notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It 
would be giving to the legislature a practical and real 
omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict 
their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and 




As the previous section demonstrated, EBD forces courts to ―close their eyes‖ 
on constitutional violations and to enforce unconstitutional and invalid statutes; 
it amounts to a declaration that constitutional limits on the enactment process 
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342 See Lord Irvine, supra note 272, at 5; see also Henkin, supra note 11, at 600 (―Judicial 
review is now firmly established as a keystone of our constitutional jurisprudence.‖).  





may, in fact, ―be passed at pleasure,‖ and consequently, it gives the legislature 
―a practical . . . omnipotence‖ in the legislative process.  
Scholars, such as Professor Henkin, have argued that under American 
constitutionalism (at least since Marbury), there can be no domains of 
unlimited power or spheres of governmental activity that are completely 
exempt from judicial review.
344
 Others have similarly argued that courts may 
not carve exceptions to Marbury and abdicate their duty to enforce the 
Constitution, unless the Constitution itself has (explicitly or implicitly) 
committed the issue to another branch.
345
 This Article expresses no opinion 
about judicial abstention from reviewing other areas of governmental activity. 
Rather, it argues that there is no basis for exempting the legislative process 
from judicial review. This Part argues that there is no basis in the Constitution 
itself for committing the enforcement of Article I, Section 7 to the legislative 
officers of Congress. The next Part considers (and rejects) the major prudential 
argument underlying EBD.  
The view that the legislative process is a sphere of legislative 
omnipotence, immune from judicial review, is at odds with the Constitution‘s 
                                                          
344 Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Foreign Affairs, 67 IND. L.J. 879, 885–86 
(1992); Henkin, supra note 11, at 600; cf. Redish, supra note 164, at 1033, 1059–60 (arguing 
abandonment of political question doctrine and judicial review in each case).  
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lawmaking provisions, their text, and their original understanding. As the 
Court noted in INS v. Chadha, the Constitution ―defines [the legislative] 
powers and . . . sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.‖346 It 
contains, inter alia, ―[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions‖ which ―prescribe 
and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the 
legislative process.‖347 Moreover, that these provisions were meant to bind 
Congress is clear from the text of Article I, Section 7.  This Section states that 
―[e]very Bill . . . shall‖ follow certain procedures in order to ―become a Law,‖ 
and indicates that if its procedural requirements are not met, the bill ―shall not 
be a Law.‖348 The Supreme Court has interpreted the text of this Section as 
―explicitly requir[ing] that each of [its procedural] steps be taken before a bill 
may ‗become a law.‘‖349 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted 
the lawmaking provisions as binding, and as establishing the principle that the 
power to enact statutes may only be exercised in accord with the precise 
procedure set out in the Constitution.
350
 This conclusion, moreover, is 
buttressed by the lawmaking provisions‘ underlying purposes and history. 
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Again, this was already recognized in INS v. Chadha, which examined the 
history and purposes of these provisions and concluded:  
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious that 
the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses would 
serve essential constitutional functions. . . . It emerges clearly 
that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 
represents the Framers‘ decision that the legislative power of 
the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, 




Thus, EBD ―is difficult to square with the . . . text and other sources of 
constitutional meaning‖ of Article I, Section 7.352 
 Nor is EBD required by any other constitutional provision.
353
 
Admittedly, Professors Roberts and Chemerinsky suggested that EBD can be 
linked to the Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5, which states: ―Each 
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.‖354 Even they conceded, 
however, that this requires an expansive interpretation of this Clause which is 
―not easily apprehended from the words alone‖355 and apparently has no 
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support in sources about original intent and understanding.
356
 As several other 
scholars have suggested, ―plausibly the best reading‖ of this Clause is that its 
purpose is not to insulate the legislative process from judicial review, but 
rather to establish ―cameral autonomy‖—the authority of each house to enact 
procedural rules, independent of the other house and of Congress as whole.
357
 
Furthermore, as Powell and Nixon established, a claim that a certain provision 
provides a constitutional commitment of unreviewable authority is defeated by 
the existence of a separate provision specifying ―identifiable textual limits‖ on 
how this authority can be carried out.
358
 It is clear that Article I, Section 7 is 
―an identifiable textual limit‖ on Congress‘s lawmaking authority and that it 
specifies how this authority should be carried out. Hence, even under the most 
expansive reading of the Rulemaking Clause, it cannot shield constitutional 
violations in the enactment process from judicial review. 
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357 Vermeule, supra note 184, at 384, 430; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative 
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note 13, at 1179 (rejecting the possibility that the Rulemaking Clause makes the legislative 
officers authoritative as to compliance with Article I, Section 7); Goldfeld, supra note 96, at 
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Significantly, moreover, the Field Court itself did not base EBD on 
constitutional interpretation or argue that it is required by the Rulemaking 
Clause or any other constitutional clause.
359
 On the contrary, it stressed that the 
Constitution itself does not resolve the issue ―either expressly or by necessary 
implication.‖360 Instead, it concluded that prudential considerations—most 
notably, the respect due to a coequal branch—require EBD.361 
 
VII. RESPECT DUE TO A COEQUAL BRANCH AS PROXY TO PARLIAMENTARY 
SUPREMACY? 
Lord Carswell of the English House of Lords has recently written on the 
English EBD: ―[T]he sovereignty or supremacy of Parliament and the 
conclusiveness of the Parliamentary Roll . . . are judicial products of that 
carefully observed mutual respect which has long existed between the 
legislature and the courts.‖362 In the American justification of the doctrine, 
legislative supremacy disappears, but the argument remains that ―[m]utual 
regard between the coordinate branches‖363 or ―[t]he respect due to coequal 
and independent departments‖ (and other prudential considerations) require 
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 As the previous Part demonstrated, despite the difference in 
justifications, the English and American doctrines demand the same degree of 
deference: complete immunity of the legislative process from judicial review. 
This Part argues that EBD represents excessive deference to the legislature, 
which is (perhaps) appropriate in a system of parliamentary supremacy, but not 
in a legal system in which the legislature is a coequal branch, operating under a 
supreme written Constitution. Section VII.A discusses the proper balance 
between respect to the legislature and respect to the Constitution. Section 
VII.B challenges the assumption that judicial review of the legislative process 
manifests disrespect to the legislature.  
 
A. Respect to the Legislature and Respect to the Constitution 
The English courts based EBD on the fact that they ―sit . . . as servants of 
the Queen and the [supreme] legislature‖365 and that in the ―United Kingdom 
there is no governing instrument which prescribes the law-making powers and 
the forms which are essential to those powers.‖366  In the United States, in 
contrast, the courts—and the coequal legislature—are ―servants‖ of the 
supreme Constitution. Hence, in contrast to their English counterparts, the 
American courts must balance their duty to respect the legislature with their 
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duty to uphold the Constitution. Unlike in England, in the United States, 
deference to the legislature in certain situations may carry a heavy cost: 
judicial disrespect to the Constitution. The next Part will argue that there are 
ways to alleviate the tension between these competing considerations. 
However, in the face of clear evidence that a statute was enacted in flagrant 
violation of the Constitution, collision between respect to the legislature and 
disrespect to the Constitution is unavoidable. This point was nicely put by the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: 
     To preserve the delicate balance critical to a proper 
functioning of a tripartite system of government, this Court has 
exercised restraint to avoid an intrusion upon the prerogatives of 
a sister branch of government. 
 
. . . . 
 
     . . . The countervailing concern is our mandate to insure that 
government functions within the bounds of constitutional 
prescription. We may not abdicate this responsibility under the 
guise of our deference to a co-equal branch of government. 
While it is appropriate to give due deference to a co-equal 
branch of government as long as it is functioning within 
constitutional constraints, it would be a serious dereliction on 




Other state supreme courts have similarly rejected ―the premise that the 
equality of the various branches of government requires that we shut our eyes 
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to constitutional failings . . . of our coparceners in government.‖368 As we have 
seen in the previous Part, courts in several constitutional democracies, both in 
common-law and civil-law systems, reached the same conclusion and held that 
EBD (or its continental equivalent) is not applicable to constitutional 
violations.
369
 The ―duty of the judicial department to determine . . . whether the 
powers . . . of the legislature in the enactment of laws have been exercised in 
conformity to the Constitution‖ was also recognized in Kilbourn v. Thompson 
and Powell v. McCormack, based on the notion that ―living under a written 
constitution, no branch or department of the government is supreme.‖370 Even 
the English courts have recognized that in constitutional legal systems ―a 
legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that are 
imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power to make law,‖371 
and that courts, in turn, may not abdicate their ―duty to see that the 
Constitution is not infringed and to preserve it inviolate.‖372  
Hence, due deference to a coequal legislature in a constitutional system 
cannot amount to the same degree of deference due to a supreme sovereign 
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369  See supra section VI.A. 
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legislature; it cannot amount to absolutism and unfettered legislative power.
373
 
Judicial review of the legislative process is, therefore, ―consistent with the 
doctrine of the separation of powers [and mutual regard between coequal 
branches], construed, as it must be, to accommodate the doctrine of judicial 
review and the supremacy of the Constitution.‖374 
 
B. Judicial Review of the Legislative Process Does Not Manifest Disrespect 
This section argues that the separation of powers and ―lack of respect‖ 
concern underlying EBD rests, in effect, on two assumptions: (1) that 
questioning the enrolled bill manifests mistrust in the integrity of the 
legislative officers who signed it; or (2) that it entails a judicial ―intrusion‖ into 
the internal workings of Congress. The section challenges both assumptions.  
Field‘s holding that the EBD is required by the respect due to coequal 
branches rested, to a very large extent, on the first premise—that questioning 
the validity of the enrolled bill necessarily manifests mistrust in the integrity of 
the presiding officers. The Field Court held that ―the official attestations‖ of 
these presiding officers represent their ―solemn assurance‖ that a bill was duly 
passed.
375
 Hence, it concluded that ―[t]he respect due to coequal and 
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that 
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assurance.‖376 Furthermore, the Field Court assumed that the argument that 
EBD may lead to enforcement of laws that were never duly passed by 
Congress necessarily ―suggests a deliberate conspiracy [by] the presiding 
officers . . . to defeat an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed 
by the constitution.‖377 It concluded, therefore, that ―[j]udicial action, based 
upon such a suggestion, is forbidden by the respect due to a co-ordinate branch 
of the government.‖378 Justice Scalia‘s argument—that ―a court‘s holding . . . 
that the representation made to the President [in the enrolled bill] is incorrect 
would . . . manifest a lack of respect due a coordinate branch‖379—also seems 
to rest on the assumption that such judicial holding necessarily suggests a 
deliberate misrepresentation.   
Indeed, ―respect due to a coordinate branch‖ is perhaps ―hard to square 
with realpolitik concerns for possible legislative manipulations.‖380 However, 
judicial review of the enactment process need not rest on mistrust in the 
integrity of the legislative officers, nor does it necessarily evince such distrust. 
In contrast to Field‘s assumption, an incorrect representation in the enrolled 
bill need not necessarily result from a ―deliberate conspiracy‖ by the presiding 
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officers or the legislative clerks. There is certainly evidence both at the federal 
and state level that simple, honest mistakes can also lead to signing enrolled 
bills that do not accurately represent the real bill passed by Congress. Indeed, a 
realistic view of the contemporary legislative process and of the modern 
enrollment process must lead to the conclusion that ―an occasional error is 
certain to occur.‖381 In fact, several state supreme courts have based their 
decision to overrule or modify EBD not on mistrust of the legislative officers, 
but on the need ―to avoid elevating clerical error over constitutional law.‖382 
―To hold otherwise‖ stated the Supreme Court of Texas, ―would raise form 
over substance, fiction over fact, and amount to government by clerical 
error.‖383  
Furthermore, there are additional reasons for judicial review of the 
enactment process that have nothing to do with the integrity of the legislative 
officers. For example, it is quite possible that the legislative officers will attest 
in good faith that a bill was constitutionally enacted, and that courts will still 
find that it was passed in violation of the Constitution, due to differences in 
their interpretation of the Constitution‘s lawmaking requirements. As the Court 
noted in Powell and Munoz-Flores, ―[o]ur system of government requires that 
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federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance 
with the construction given the document by another branch.‖384 Contrary to 
Field‘s assumption, therefore, questioning the validity of the enrolled bill does 
not necessarily entail doubting the personal integrity of the legislative officers; 
nor does judicial invalidation necessarily amount to a declaration that the 
presiding officers deliberately conspired to violate the Constitution. 
To be sure, Field may also be interpreted as holding that courts must ―act 
upon‖ the assurance of the legislative officers that the bill was enacted in full 
compliance with the Constitution and may not independently determine the 
constitutionality of enactment.
385
 The argument, in other words, is that 
doubting the legislative officer‘s constitutional judgment also evinces lack of 
respect. This argument, however, was effectively rejected already in Munoz-
Flores, which held that ―such congressional consideration of constitutional 
questions does not foreclose subsequent judicial scrutiny of the law‘s 
constitutionality. On the contrary, this Court has the duty to review the 
constitutionality of congressional enactments.‖386 Furthermore, as the Munoz-
Flores Court noted, this argument would mean that ―every judicial resolution 
of a constitutional challenge to a congressional enactment would be 
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impermissible‖387 because Congress often considers whether bills violate 
constitutional provisions and in all these cases it could theoretically be argued 
that a judicial determination entails ―a lack of respect for Congress‘ [sic] 
judgment.‖388 Indeed, in criticizing Baker‘s ―lack of the respect‖ factor, 
political-question scholars similarly argued that ―[a]ll cases reversing a 
political judgment of constitutionality express a similar ‗lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government.‘‖389 Some even asked, ―why assume . . . 
that judicial review does not often—or perhaps even always—express ‗lack of 
respect‘ for the other branches of government;‖390 or argued that this argument 
has ―the potential for swallowing judicial review entirely.‖391  
Nevertheless, some still object to judicial review of the legislative process 
because they assume that it entails a judicial ―intrusion‖ into the internal 
workings of Congress.
392
 Justice Scalia, for example, assumed that compliance 
with the constitutional requirements for lawmaking constitutes a ―matter[] of 
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internal process.‖393 He concluded, therefore, that ―[m]utual regard between 
the coordinate branches‖ demands judicial acceptance of the enrolled bill‘s 
―official representations regarding such matters of internal process . . . at face 
value.‖394 
Compliance with the constitutional requirements for lawmaking, however, 
should not be seen as a ―matter of internal process.‖ ―Matters of internal 
process,‖ which deserve judicial deference, should be limited to truly internal 
legislative matters—that is, matters of ―internal housekeeping‖ and intra-
legislative proceedings that have an effect only inside Congress. Judicial 
deference cannot extend to legislative proceedings that have substantial 
external legal effects or to constitutional violations. This distinction is widely 
accepted in foreign scholarship about judicial review of legislative 
proceedings.
395
 This is also the well-established rule in the jurisprudence of the 
Rulemaking Clause:
396
 judicial deference to the power of each house to 
determine its rules of proceedings does not extend to cases where the rules 
violate constitutional restraints or affect rights of persons outside Congress.
397
 
                                                          
393 Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
394 Id. 
395
 See, e.g., Navot, supra note 318, at 749–53; Swinton, supra note 248, at 390–400, 405. 
396 US CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
397 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1892); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 
(1932); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 87–90 (1949); Yellin v. United States, 374 





Hence, judicial deference to internal legislative proceedings cannot apply to 
violations of Article I, Section 7.  The legislative process, moreover, is clearly 
not an intra-legislative proceeding because its product—legislation—has far-
reaching legal effects outside Congress. Its effects are first and foremost 
external. Constitutional violations in the legislative process affect the entire 
citizenry. They infringe upon the people‘s right not to be governed by ―laws‖ 
which were not really passed by their elected legislature, or which were not 
enacted in accord with the ―finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure‖ set out in the instrument in which the people delegated the 
lawmaking power to the legislature.
398
 Indeed, ―citizens are constitutionally 
entitled to a certain process in the enactment of statutes.‖399 Thus, unlike 
judicial review of some purely internal legislative matters, judicial review of 
the legislative process does not constitute an intrusion into the internal 
workings of Congress. 
Moreover, arguments about judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere 
are often leveled against judicial intervention in the enactment process while it 
is still in progress,
400
 or against judges creating and imposing on Congress 
                                                          
398 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).  
399 Williams, supra note 29, at 826.   
400 Swinton, supra note 248, at 400–02, 405 (―While an injunction to prevent further action 
with a bill is an interference with Parliament . . . relief in the form of a declaration after 





lawmaking requirements beyond those mandated by the Constitution.
401
 
Judicial review of the legislative process can be limited, however, to an 
inquiry, exercised after the enactment is complete, whether the bill was enacted 
in compliance with Constitutional requirements. This mode of judicial review 
is no more intrusive than any other Marbury-type judicial review which 
examines the constitutional validity of the completed product of the legislative 
process. 
In fact, in several countries, judicial review of the legislative process has 
preceded substantive judicial review and is considered much less intrusive.
402
 
Indeed, there are several features of judicial review of the lawmaking process 
that make it less intrusive and less problematic in terms of separation of 
powers than substantive judicial review. Unlike substantive judicial review, 
judicial review of the enactment process does not involve any intervention in 
the policy choices of the legislature. Judicial review of the enactment process 
does not interfere with the exercise of the legislature‘s will; it is a necessary 
condition for effectuating this will—for determining whether Congress ―has 
spoken.‖403 Moreover, unlike the American ―strong-form‖ version of 
substantive judicial review, in which the courts‘ constitutional judgments are 
                                                          
401  Bryant & Simeone, supra note 392, at 373–75 (arguing that courts may not impose 
procedural requirements on Congress beyond those set forth in Article I, Section 7). 
402
 Linde, supra note 37, at 243; see also Gottfried Dietze, Judicial Review in Europe, 55 
MICH. L. REV. 539, 541 (1957); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. 
Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–21.  





considered final and unrevisable,
404
 judicial review of the legislative process 
simply remands the invalidated statute to the legislature, which is free to 
reenact the same legislation, provided that a proper legislative process is 
followed. Hence, ―invalidating a statute on procedural grounds, and thus 
permitting legislative reconsideration, seems much less intrusive than 
invalidating the substance of a statute on constitutional grounds.‖405    
Finally, EBD itself can be seen as incompatible with the separation of 
powers because it entails an impermissible delegation of powers to the 
presiding officers and permits the concentration of judicial and lawmaking 
powers in the hands of these two individuals.
406
 As the Supreme Court of 
California articulated forty years before Field: 
It is no sufficient answer that we must rely on the integrity of 
the executive, or other officers . . . . Our notions of free 
institutions revolt at the idea of placing so much power in the 
hands of one man, with no guard upon it but his integrity; and 
our constitution has so wisely distributed the powers of 
government as to make one a check upon the other, thereby 
preventing one branch from strengthening itself both at the 




                                                          
404 Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and-
Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 817–18 (2003) (citing Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519, 529 (1997)). 
405 Williams, supra note 29, at 825 (emphasis omitted); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 551 & n.28 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Linde, supra note 37, at 243. 
406 See supra Part V. 





Furthermore, to the extent that it is grounded on mistrust of legislative 
journals and concerns for their manipulation, EBD is itself hard to square with 
respect due to a coordinate branch.
408
 Judicial review of the legislative process, 
in contrast, manifests respect to Congress and to the view that the lawmaking 
power may only be exercised by Congress itself and ensures that it is truly the 
will of Congress that is treated as law. 
 
VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE 
Separation of powers, due respect to the legislature, and other prudential 
concerns (such as the interest of certainty and stability of the law) are 
important and legitimate considerations. However, these considerations should 
not lead to complete non-enforcement of the Constitution‘s lawmaking 
provisions and to turning the legislative process into a sphere of unfettered 
legislative omnipotence. Instead, these concerns counsel self-restraint and 
caution in exercising judicial review of the legislative process, which can be 
effectively achieved by other judicial means. 
 The Field Court seemed to assume that ―[e]very other view 
subordinates the legislature, and disregards that coequal position in our system 
of the three departments of government,‖409 and ―would certainly result‖ in the 
                                                          
408 See supra section IV.E. 
409 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 676 (1892) (quoting Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 





―evils‖ EBD aims to avoid.410 Consequently, it favored these prudential 
considerations over judicial ―fidelity to the Constitution.‖411 However, there 
are, in fact, alternatives to EBD that represent a better balance between these 
competing considerations. These alternatives enable enforcement of the 
Constitution while being mindful of the respect due to the legislature and of 
other prudential and institutional considerations. Instead of carving an 
unjustified exception to Marbury and to the most fundamental principles of 
American constitutionalism, they provide flexibility for prudence and greater 
attention to the legitimacy of judicial action in the circumstances of every 
case.
412
 Rather than providing a complete taxonomy of the alternatives to EBD, 
this Part will only briefly mention some examples from the wide range of 
possible alternatives. 
 Most discussions about alternatives to EBD tend to focus on alternative 
evidentiary rules.
413
 Indeed, the different evidentiary rules in the states provide 
a wide spectrum of alternatives that range from limited and defined exceptions 
to EBD to its complete rejection, and from rules that allow only a specific type 
of evidence (such as legislative journals) to the ―extrinsic evidence rule,‖ 
                                                          
410 Id. at 673. 
411 Id. at 670. 
412 Cf. Henkin, supra note 11, at 617–22 (arguing that federal courts traditionally used broad 
discretion to deny remedies on equitable grounds and such denials were conceptually different 
from exceptions to judicial review). 
413





which permits consideration of any authoritative source of information.
414
 
Even courts that follow the ―extrinsic evidence rule‖ can adequately take into 
account the ―comparative probative value‖ argument and other considerations 
underlying EBD by according the enrolled bill a prima facie presumption of 
validity and establishing a heavy burden of proof.
415
 Kentucky, for example, 
requires ―clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence‖ in order to overcome the 
prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid,
416
 and New Jersey 
follows a similar rule.
417
 
The possible alternatives to EBD are not limited, however, to the 
evidentiary question. The prudential concerns underlying EBD can also be 
addressed by other means that range from the justiciability stage to the 
remedial stage. One example in the justiciability stage is standing. Some 
scholars have already argued, in the context of criticizing the political question 
doctrine, that ―interests . . . such as judicial respect for the processes of the 
coordinate branches . . . can be protected adequately by thoughtful adherence 
                                                          
414
 For a detailed discussion of these alternatives, see SINGER, supra note 27, §§15:2, 15:4–
15:7; Williams, supra note 29, at 816–24. 
415 See supra section III.E. 
416 D & W Auto Supply v. Dep‘t of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Ky. 1980); see also 
Williams, supra note 29, at 822. 
417 In re An Act Concerning Alcoholic Beverages, 31 A.2d 837, 838 (1943) (requiring ―clear 






to the principles of standing.‖418 ―Thoughtful adherence‖ to standing 
requirements can also address other concerns expressed by supporters of EBD, 
such as excessive litigation and misuse of judicial review of the legislative 
process by ―an undeserving but resourceful litigant,‖ especially when this 
litigant is a legislator seeking a ―judicial windfall‖ after losing in the 
legislature.
419
 The current federal standing requirements, especially where 




Another option in the justiciability stage is limiting the timing of judicial 
review. New Jersey, for example, adopted a mechanism for judicial review that 
allows the Governor or any two or more citizens of the state to challenge 
legislation on procedural grounds, and permits courts to go well beyond the 
enrolled bill to examine journals, testimonies, and other evidence.
421
 Instead of 
                                                          
418 Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other Nixon v. 
United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 127, 143–44; see also Linda Sandstrom Simard, 
Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 303, 
306 (1996). But see Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1214–22.  
419  Linde, supra note 37, at 245; Williams, supra note 29, at 824. 
420
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto? Legalities, Practicalities, and Some 
Puzzles, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 447, 490–92 (2008) (discussing the current federal legislator 
standing requirements); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the ―Passive Virtues‖: Rethinking 
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1853–57 (2001) (noting that the federal 
standing doctrine imposes strict entry requirements on litigants and particularly on elected 
representatives which are significantly more demanding than in many of the states and in some 
European countries); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). For an application in the 
context of the DRA cases, see Conyers v. Bush, No. 06-11972, 2006 WL 3834224 at *2–3 
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006).  
421 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:7-1–1:7-7 (West 1992); see also In re Low, 95 A. 616 (N.J. 1915); 





EBD and standing, New Jersey adopted other limitations, such as limiting 
procedural challenges to one year after the law has been filed with the 
Secretary of State.
422
 This limitation is aimed at alleviating Field‘s concerns 
about certainty and stability of the law and reliance interests.
423
 Timing 
limitations can also alleviate concerns about excessive judicial intervention in 
the legislative process by limiting judicial review to the post-enactment 
stage.
424
 Such timing limitations can be supplemented by the usual ripeness 
and mootness rules.  
The remedial stage also provides ample means to address prudential 
considerations. As Professor Henkin argued in another context, such 
considerations can be adequately addressed through the courts‘ broad powers 
of equitable discretion to withhold relief for ―want of equity.‖425 There are 
several remedial tools that can effectively address, for example, Field‘s fear 
from ―the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged . . . to 
declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and private interests of 
vast magnitude . . . did not become a law.‖426 One example is the doctrine of 
―relative voidability,‖ which instead of treating any unconstitutional law as 
                                                          
422  §§ 1:7-1–1:7-7. 
423 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670, 675–77 (1892); see also Grant, supra 
note 103, at 416. 
424
 Swinton, supra note 248, at 400–02, 405.   
425 Henkin, supra note 11, at 617–22 (internal quotation marks omitted).      





null and void, allows judicial discretion in choosing the remedy according to 
the essence (or degree) of the unconstitutionality and to the circumstances of 
the case.
427
 In the context of judicial review of the legislative process, courts 
that follow this doctrine examine considerations such as the severity of the 
defect in the legislative process, whether the statute would have been passed 
had it not been for the defect, the degree of reliance on the statute, the extent of 
the reasonable expectations that it created, and the consequences that will arise 
from declaring it void.
428
 
Other remedial tools that can address the concerns underlying EBD 
include severability (that is, the judicial power to strike down only parts of the 
statute when the valid and invalid portions are severable from each other);
429
 
the court‘s authority to grant its decisions only prospective application;430 or to 
give suspended declarations of invalidity.
431
 The latter is particularly fitting for 
judicial review of the legislative process that is in its nature a remand to the 
                                                          
427 See Navot, supra note 313, at 226–29. 
428 HCJ 4885/03 Isr. Poultry Farmers Ass‘n v. Gov‘t of Isr. [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14, 41 (English 
translation available at [2004] IsrLR 388); Navot, supra note 318, at 226–29. 
429 Ernest E. Means, Spurious Legislation and Spurious Mandamus in Florida, 37 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1, 29–30 (1982). See generally Dorf, supra note 242 (discussing constitutional and other 
limits on severability and other ―fallback‖ provisions). 
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 See, e.g., Ex parte Coker, 575 So. 2d 43, 51–53 (Ala. 1990); Williams, supra note 29, at 
827.  
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 See, e.g., Peter W. Hogg et al., Charter Dialogue Revisited – or ―Much Ado about 
Metaphors,‖ 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 14–18 (2007); Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, 
and International Dialogues about Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 537, 





legislature, which can reenact the same statute, provided the proper procedure 
is followed. The Manitoba Language Rights case provides one of the most 
striking examples.
432
 In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the 
province of Manitoba had for almost a century violated the constitutional 
manner-and-form requirement to enact and promulgate its laws in both English 
and French.
433
 The Court was well aware of the consequences of invalidating 
over ninety years of law in Manitoba, but did not shirk from its duty to enforce 
the Constitution. Instead, the Court gave the unconstitutional laws temporary 
effect and used the remedy of a suspended declaration of invalidity, thereby 
allowing the legislature sufficient time to translate, reenact, print and publish 
all its laws in both languages.
434
 
Finally, prudence and self-restraint can also be incorporated in judgments 
on the merits.
435
 For example, courts can limit their review according to the 
severity of the defect in the legislative process. As the following examples 
illustrate, courts that exercise judicial review of the legislative process employ 
different formulations for the same idea that not every violation and flaw in the 
enactment process will justify judicial intervention, and that judicial review 
                                                          
432
 Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (Can.) (per curiam). 
433
 Id. at 5–10. 
434 E.g., id. at 71–122; Newman, supra note 298, at 240–46; Roach, supra note 431, at 546.  
435 Cf. Tushnet, supra note 165, at 1233–34 (discussing, in a different context, the position that 






would be limited only to severe defects. New Jersey courts, for example, 
emphasized that they will set aside legislation only when ―the 
unconstitutionality of what has been done is manifest‖ and will therefore not 
set aside legislation for ―immaterial trivialities.‖436 Similarly, according to the 
German Constitutional Court‘s case law, ―only a legally evident error in the 
legislative procedure leads to the nullity of the legal provisions in question.‖437 
The Spanish Constitutional Court also held that only a flaw in the legislative 
process that ―substantively impede[s] the crystallization of the House‘s will‖ 
will lead to the invalidation of the law,
438
 and the Israeli Supreme Court will 




                                                          
436 In re Fisher, 194 A.2d 353, 357 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (quoting In re McGlynn, 
155 A.2d 289, 303–04 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)), aff‘d per curiam, 204 A.2d 841 (N.J. 
1964). 
437
 BVerfG, 2 BvF 1/02 of 12/18/2002, para.176 (JJ. Osterloh & Lubbe-Wolf, dissenting), 
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Nickel, Federalism Revisited: Constitutional Court Strikes Down New Immigration Act For 
Formal Reasons, 4 GERMAN L.J. 72, 82 & n.46 (2003). 
438 Navot, supra note 313, at 212 (quoting S.T.C. 99/1987). 
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not every . . . defect in the legislative process . . . will lead to the intervention of this 
court. . . . [T]he court should examine each case on the merits as to whether a ‗defect that 
goes to the heart of the process‘ occurred in the legislative process . . . and only a defect 
that involves a severe and substantial violation of the basic principles of the legislative 






Courts may also limit the grounds for judicial review of the legislative 
process according to the status of the norm violated in the enactment process 
(for example, limiting their review to violations of constitutional requirements, 
as opposed to violations of lawmaking requirements in statutes and internal 
rules,
440




All these are means that courts in the states or in other countries 
successfully employ to address the same concerns underlying Field. New 
Jersey is an excellent example for the effectiveness of alternatives to EBD in 
addressing Field‘s prudential concerns. New Jersey adopted its mechanism for 
judicial review of the legislative process in 1873.
442
 From 1873 to 2005, there 
were apparently only sixteen reported procedural challenges, and only four of 
them were successful.
443
 According to Professor Grant, the ―reason for so few 
petitions‖ and the success of this mechanism in New Jersey is the heavy 
burden of proof the courts employed and their general ―judicious self-




 See Navot, supra note 313, at 201–10. 
441
See Swinton, supra note 248, at 373–87, 404–05; see also Consumer Party of Pa. v. 
Commonwealth, 507 A.2d 323, 332–33 (Pa. 1986) (discussing the distinction between 
directory and mandatory constitutional provisions as a form of self-restraint in judicial review 
of the legislative process).  
442 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1:7 (West 1992); Martinez, supra note 98, at 570 n.75. 





restraint.‖444 Moreover, evidence from several other states also seems to 
suggest that even without the constraint of EBD, state courts generally exercise 
self-restraint and only rarely invalidate legislation based on defects in the 
lawmaking process.
445
 Similarly, while recognizing their authority to review 
the legislative process in the late 1980s, to this day Israeli courts did not strike 
down even a single statute based on defects in its enactment process.
446
 The 
reason for this telling fact is that ―the court has created and built around itself 
reservations, restraints and constraints, when it is asked to exercise a power of 
review over the [legislature].‖447 These examples suggest that the concerns 
underlying EBD can be adequately addressed by other means. 
Admittedly, some of these alternatives will be more easily applicable to 
the federal system than others.
448
 This Article does not necessarily recommend 
wholesale adoption of all the alternatives described above, nor does it prescribe 
a specific solution. The aim is merely to demonstrate that there is a wide range 
                                                          
444 Grant, supra note 103, at 411, 415. 
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 Even challenges based on state constitutional lawmaking provisions that are not blocked by 
EBD, such as cases involving single subject, clear title, or original purpose (which can be 
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of possible means that are significantly less costly (at least in the sense of 
infidelity to the Constitution) and apparently no less effective in addressing the 
justifications for EBD. This in itself also suggests that it is becoming 
increasingly hard for EBD to meet Justice Cardozo‘s challenge and ―justify 
[its] existence as means adapted to an end.‖449     
 
CONCLUSION 
EBD has been consistently followed by federal courts for over a century 
and its common-law roots can perhaps be traced back to the time of Henry VI. 
Hence, reluctance to reconsider this time-honored doctrine is understandable. 
However, this Article has demonstrated that the grounds upon which this 
doctrine was laid down no longer justify its existence. Thus, having started this 
Article with the words of Justice Cardozo, it is only fitting to end it with the 
forceful words of another great Justice: 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
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LAWMAKERS AS LAWBREAKERS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? Can lawmakers 
be trusted to police themselves? When it comes to ―the law of congressional 
lawmaking‖—the constitutional, statutory, and internal rules that govern 
Congress‘s legislative process1—this question is not merely theoretical. 
Federal courts have consistently refused to enforce this body of law,
2
 leaving 
its enforcement entirely to Congress.
3
 This largely overlooked area of law is 
therefore a useful laboratory for evaluating Congress‘s behavior in the absence 
of judicial review.  
 This Article examines whether Congress has the capacity and incentives to 
enforce upon itself the law of congressional lawmaking. It explores the major 
                                                          
1
 For an overview of the rules that govern Congress‘s legislative process, see infra Part I.A. 
2
 See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-71 (1892); OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of 
Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. OneSimpleLoan v. Spellings, 
552 U.S. 1180 (2008); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 486 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1076 (2007); Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). 
3
 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the Enrolled 
Bill Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 373 (2009) (stating that Field v. Clark‘s enrolled bill doctrine 
―effectively insulates the legislative process from judicial review and, consequently, 
establishes Congress‘s unfettered power to control this process‖); see also Stanley Bach, The 
Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 731 (1989) (―No outside force compels 
Congress to abide by its rules. If these rules are enforced rigorously and consistently, it is only 
because Congress chooses to do so.‖); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark 
Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 526 (2009) (―[A]t present, 





―political safeguards‖4 that can be garnered from the legal, political science, 
political economy, and social psychology scholarship about self policing and 
rule following. It then evaluates each safeguard by drawing on a combination 
of theoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress. This Article‘s 
main argument is that the political safeguards that scholars and judges 
commonly rely upon to constrain legislative behavior actually have the 
opposite effect: these ―safeguards‖ in fact motivate lawmakers to be 
lawbreakers.  
 This Article also explores Congress‘s capacity to enforce upon itself the law 
of congressional lawmaking by examining Congress‘s enforcement 
mechanisms and presenting three cases that demonstrate the circumstances 
under which these mechanisms can fail. The Article argues that congressional 
enforcement is fallible both in terms of lawmakers‘ capacity to police 
themselves and in terms of their incentives to do so. 
 This examination has crucial importance for at least three areas of legal 
scholarship. The first is the debate about judicial review of the legislative 
process. The question of whether courts should enforce the rules governing 
lawmaking and other principles of ―due process of lawmaking‖ is ―currently 
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 This phrase was famously coined in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 





the subject of vigorous debate ... in the scholarly literature.‖5 One of the 
prominent objections to judicial enforcement is ―the argument that judicial 
review of the enactment process is not needed because Congress (coupled with 
the inherent check of the presidential veto power) can be relied upon to police 
itself.‖6 Indeed, opponents of judicial oversight claim that Congress has 
―adequate incentives‖ and ―numerous, effective techniques‖ to enforce 
compliance with the law of lawmaking.
7
 This assumption is also at least partly 
responsible for the Supreme Court‘s reluctance to enforce this body of law.8 In 
some states, this assumption even contributed to the enactment of 
constitutional amendments barring judicial review of the legislative process.
9
 
Hence, although this Article expresses no opinion on other arguments 
underlying the debate about judicial review of the legislative process, by 
                                                          
5
 Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model 
to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 465 (2003). 
6
 Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note , at 331. 
7
 Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 
1505-07 (2005). 
8
 See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 403-04 & n.2 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating that courts should not enforce Article I, Section 7‘s Origination Clause 
because the House can be relied upon to protect its origination power); see also infra Part 
III.E; cf. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672-73 (1982) (assuming that because Congress‘s 
enrollment procedure involves the committees on enrolled bills, the presiding officers and the 
clerks of the two houses, and the President, this constitutes a sufficient institutional check 
against enactment of legislation in violation of constitutional lawmaking requirements). 
9
 See, e.g., Geja‘s Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. 1992) 
(suggesting that the framers of Illinois‘s 1970 Constitution ―enacted the enrolled bill doctrine 
on the assumption that the General Assembly would police itself and judicial review would not 





refuting the prevalent underlying assumption of judicial review opponents, it 
contributes to a crucial aspect of this debate. 
 Second, this Article‘s examination also contributes to the debate about 
whether political safeguards can reduce or eliminate the need for judicial 
review in other areas. Assumptions about political safeguards and about 
Congress‘s incentives and capacities have long been influential in normative 
debates about federalism,
10
 and are becoming increasingly influential in 
broader debates about judicial review, judicial supremacy, and congressional 
constitutional interpretation.
11
 This Article‘s examination may be particularly 
helpful to these debates,
12
 responding to the need for scholarship examining 
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 For an overview of this vast scholarship, see generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. 
Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459 
(2001).  
11
 Examples of this burgeoning scholarship include Barbara Sinclair, Can Congress Be Trusted 
with the Constitution? The Effects of Incentives and Procedures, in CONGRESS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 293 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) [hereinafter Sinclair, Can 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 355 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) [hereinafter 
Tushnet, Interpretation in Legislatures]. For a recent overview of this debate, see generally 
Michael J. Gerhardt, Judging Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 525 (2009). Assumptions about 
congressional capacity are also important in arguments against judicial intervention in other 
areas of congressional activity. See, e.g., Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of 
Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1086, 1152-53 (2009) (arguing that legislative-executive 
disputes over the contempt power should be nonjusticiable, in part because Congress has 
sufficient tools to enforce compliance with its contempt findings); Josh Chafetz, Politician, 
Police Thyself, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, at A15 (making a similar argument in favor of 
congressional, rather than legal, enforcement in the context of ethics rules). 
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areas of congressional activity that are ―outside the [s]hadow [c]ast by the 
[c]ourts.‖13 
 Third, this Article‘s examination is fundamental for the burgeoning new 
scholarship about legislative rules. After many years of largely neglecting the 
rules that govern the legislative process, legal scholars are increasingly 
realizing that these rules ―are at least as important a determinant of policy 
outcomes and of the quality of legislative deliberation as are electoral rules, 
substantive legislative powers, and other subjects studied exhaustively by 
constitutional lawyers.‖14 Indeed, a flurry of recent scholarship lauds such 
rules as a solution to a wide array of pathologies in the legislative process and 
as a means to achieve procedural ideals as well as better substantive 
outcomes.
15
 Given the lack of external enforcement, however, it is essential to 
evaluate Congress‘s capacity and incentives to enforce these rules on its own 
in order to assess the viability of these solutions. 
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 Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and 
Two Informal Case Studies, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note , at 269, 271-73. 
14
 Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361, 362 (2004).  
15
 See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a 
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Process]; Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-
Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 962; Chad W. Dunn, Playing by the Rules: 
The Need for Constitutions To Define the Boundaries of the Legislative Game with a One-
Subject Rule, 35 UWLA L. REV. 129, 131 (2003); Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the 
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Krishnakumar, Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution to a Legislative Process 





 Part I provides a brief overview of the rules that regulate the legislative 
process. It then establishes the practical and normative importance of these 
rules, integrating the insights of political scientists, democratic theorists, legal 
philosophers, and social psychologists. Part II reveals the fallibility of 
congressional enforcement of these rules by examining Congress‘s 
enforcement mechanisms and the circumstances under which they can fail. 
 Part III explores political safeguards and their projected impact on 
congressional compliance with the law of congressional lawmaking, arguing 
that these safeguards‘ overall impact is in fact a motivation to violate the rules. 
Although the Article refutes several assumptions that are widely held by judges 
and scholars alike, it does not go so far as to argue that Congress will never 
follow the rules. Instead, Part IV offers some observations about the types of 
rules that are more susceptible to violations and the circumstances in which 
violations are more likely. 
 
I. THE LAW OF CONGRESSIONAL LAWMAKING
 
A.  The Rules Governing Lawmaking 
 The congressional legislative process is governed by a variety of normative 







 while authorizing each house to ―determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings.‖17 The majority of the rules that govern the congressional 
legislative process are therefore enacted under this authority, either as statutory 
rules
18
 or as standing rules by each chamber independently.
19
 These enacted 
rules are complemented by the chambers‘ formal precedents, which ―may be 
viewed as the [chambers‘] ‗common law‘ ... with much the same force and 
binding effect,‖20 and by established conventional practices.21  
 Although Congress may not alter the constitutional rules,
22
 both chambers 
have procedures that allow for amendment of the nonconstitutional rules, as 
well as procedures to waive or suspend virtually any statutory or internal 
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 For an overview of the constitutional rules that govern the legislative process, see Matthew 
D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1105, 1145-50, 1172-81 (2003); Vermeule, supra note , at 386-427. 
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 Nevertheless, the subconstitutional rules are also widely accepted as 
binding and enforceable law, in the sense that they have ―come to be 
recognized as binding on the assembly and its members, except as it may be 
varied by the adoption by the membership of special rules or through some 
other authorized procedural device.‖24  
 This large body of constitutional, statutory, and internal rules regulating the 
congressional lawmaking process can be described as ―the law of 
congressional lawmaking.‖ This Article focuses on a particular part of this law: 
the constitutional and various subconstitutional rules that set procedural 
restrictions on the legislative process.
25
  
 This includes rules that stipulate the procedural requirements that must be 
satisfied for a bill to become law, such as the constitutional bicameralism and 
presentment requirements,
26
 the constitutional quorum requirement,
27
 and the 
subconstitutional requirement that every bill receive three readings prior to 
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 See Bach, supra note , at 737-39; Bruhl, Statutes To Set Legislative Rules, supra note , at 
363-65. 
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 WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE 
RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 825 (2003); see also Reynolds, supra 
note , at 487. 
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 Hence, excluded from the present inquiry are rules that do not directly regulate the process 
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 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (stipulating that for proposed legislation to become law, the 
same bill must be passed by both houses of Congress and be signed by the President, or 
repassed by a supermajority over the President‘s veto); see also Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448. 
27







 It additionally includes rules that limit the pace of the legislative 
process, for example the House rule prohibiting floor consideration of a bill 
reported by a committee until the third calendar day after the committee report 
on that bill becomes available to House members.
29
 Also included are rules 
that set more specific limitations, such as the constitutional rule that bills for 
raising revenue originate in the House
30
 and the chamber rules that prohibit the 
enactment of substantive law through appropriation bills.
31
  
 All these rules impose restraints or create hurdles in the legislative process, 
thereby constraining Congress‘s ability to pass legislation.32 Nevertheless, 
neither courts nor any other external body enforce any of these rules—whether 
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constitutional, statutory, or internal.
33
 These rules present, therefore, a 
particularly fascinating test case for Congress‘s ability to police itself. 
 
B.  The Value of Lawmaking Rules 
 Legal scholarship has traditionally overlooked the rules that govern the 
legislative process.
34
 In recent years, however, legal scholars who heed the 
insights of political scientists are increasingly realizing that these rules have 
―immense practical importance.‖35 As political scientist Gary Cox explains, 
―[r]ules can change the set of bills that ... the legislature consider[s]; they can 
change the menu of amendments to any given bill considered[;] ... they can 
affect how members vote; and—putting the first three effects together—they 
can affect which bills pass.‖36 Indeed, a growing body of theoretical, 
experimental, and empirical research by political scientists demonstrates that 
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 In addition to their crucial impact on legislative outcomes, legislative 
procedures are also instrumental in ensuring the legitimacy of Congress and of 
the laws it produces. As proceduralist democratic theorists point out, 
legislative procedures are an especially important means to establish the 
legitimacy of law, because, in the current reality of a ―great deal of substantive 
moral and ethical dissensus,‖ no normative substantive standard can 
appropriately be used in justifying collective political choices.
38
 If, however, 
―justification for the force of law can be found in the generally accepted ... 
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 See BRYAN W. MARSHALL, RULES FOR WAR: PROCEDURAL CHOICE IN THE US HOUSE OF 
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208, 210-13 (Frank Jackson & Michael Smith eds., 2005); David Estlund, Introduction to 





processes whence contested laws issue, then no number of intractable 
disagreements over the substantive merits of particular laws can threaten it.‖39 
 Experimental and survey-based research by social psychologists and 
political scientists confirms that public perceptions about congressional 
procedure—particularly the belief that Congress employs fair decision-making 
procedures in the legislative process—significantly impact Congress‘s 
legitimacy, as well as individual‘s willingness to obey the law.40 These studies 
show, moreover, that although there are widespread differences in evaluations 
of the favorability or fairness of outcomes, ―to a striking degree‖ there is 
common agreement across ethnic, gender, education, income, age, and 
ideological boundaries on the criteria that define fair decision-making 
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 In addition to their practical and instrumental significance, the importance of 
the rules that regulate the legislative process also stems from their underlying 
democratic values and principles.
42
 These rules embody, and are designed to 
ensure, essential democratic principles, such as majority rule, transparency and 
publicity, deliberation, procedural fairness, and participation.
43
  
 Furthermore, the rules that regulate the legislative process are an essential 
component of the rule of law. As Joseph Raz noted in one of the most 
influential formulations of the ―rule of law,‖ ―[i]t is one of the important 
principles of the doctrine that the making of particular laws should be guided 
by open and relatively stable general rules.‖44 The procedural rules that instruct 
lawmakers how to exercise their lawmaking power play a vital role in ensuring 
that ―the slogan of the rule of law and not of men can be read as a meaningful 
political ideal.‖45  
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 To be sure, the rules that constrain the legislative process are not without 
cost: they hinder, and sometimes frustrate, the majority party‘s ability to 
govern effectively and to translate its policy agenda into legislative action. 
Moreover, by creating multiple ―vetogates‖ in the legislative process, these 
rules make defeating legislation easier than passing it,
46
 thereby 
―systematically favor[ing] the legal status quo.‖47  
 It appears, however, that the Framers were well aware of this cost. 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, acknowledged that bicameralism and 
presentment will sometimes frustrate the enactment of good legislation, but 
believed that ―[t]he injury that may possibly be done by defeating a few good 
laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a few bad 
                                                          
46
 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND 
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66-67 (3d ed. 2001). 
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Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 
1496 n.7 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of 





ones.‖48 Moreover, as the Court concluded in INS v. Chadha, ―it is crystal clear 
from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, 
that the Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency.... There is 
unmistakable expression of a determination that legislation by the national 
Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.‖49 
 At the end of the day, ―[m]ost participants and outside experts agree ... that, 
to function well, a legislative process needs to strike a balance between 
deliberation and inclusiveness, on the one hand, and expeditiousness and 
decisiveness, on the other, even if there is no consensus about what the optimal 
balance is.‖50 Normative evaluations of the current body of rules that make up 
the law of congressional lawmaking, as well as evaluations of the optimal level 
of enforcement of these rules, may vary depending on one‘s view about the 
appropriate balance between these competing values. What is clear, however, 
is that these rules are not mere formalities; they have crucial practical and 
                                                          
48
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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50
 Barbara Sinclair, Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and 
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normative significance, which merits a detailed evaluation of Congress‘s 
ability to enforce them on itself.  
 
II. THE FALLIBILITY OF CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
 Opponents of judicial enforcement of the rules that govern the legislative 
process emphasize Congress‘s ―numerous, effective techniques‖ to enforce 
these rules.
51
 This Part, however, reveals the fallibility of congressional 
enforcement.  
 
A.  Congress‘s Enforcement Mechanisms 
 The rules that govern the enactment process are not self-enforcing.
52
 They 
must be actively invoked in order to be enforced, and consequently, in practice, 
―the House and Senate are free to evade their rules simply by ignoring them.‖53 
The presiding officer of each chamber may take the initiative and rule that 
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amendments, motions, or other actions are out of order.
54
 Usually, however, 
the presiding officers do not take the initiative to prevent rule violations.
55
 
 Instead, it is up to individual members to identify actions that violate the 
rules and raise a timely ―point of order.‖56 In the House, the Speaker or the 
Chair rule on all points of order, while in the Senate certain questions of order 
are voted on by the Senators themselves.
57
 In both chambers, almost all 
―[r]ulings of the [presiding officers] may be appealed by any member and 
usually reversed by a majority vote of the membership.‖58 In practice, 
however, such appeals are relatively rare, and very seldom successful, 
especially in the House, in which ―the chair never loses.‖59 
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 Chris Den Hartog & Nathan W. Monroe, Partisan Support for Chairs‘ Rulings in the House 
and Senate 10-11 (Oct. 23, 2009) (unpublished paper prepared for presentation at the 






 With some exceptions, there are limitations in both chambers concerning 
when points of order may be raised.
60
 When a point of order is not timely 
raised, it is ―effectively waived,‖ and the violation of the rule can no longer be 
challenged.
61
 In the Senate, unanimous consent may also preclude points of 
order.
62
 In the House, points of order may be waived by unanimous consent, 
via suspension of the rules, or by a special rule reported from the Rules 
Committee.
63
 In practice, many bills in the House are considered under special 
rules that expressly waive ―one or more—or indeed all—points of order‖ 
against the entire bill or parts of it.
64
 Hence, while points of order are 
Congress‘s main mechanism for enforcing the rules that regulate lawmaking, at 
least in the House, this mechanism is severely limited.
65
  
 A less formal enforcement mechanism is legislators‘ power to refuse to vote 
in favor of a bill that is enacted in violation of the rules.
66
 For example, if a bill 
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for raising revenue originates in the Senate—thus violating the Origination 
Clause—the House always has the power to refuse to pass such a bill.67 This 
power may be exercised by the majority in each chamber during the final vote 
on the bill, or by individual ―gatekeepers‖ who have the power to block the 




 Finally, the ―enrollment process‖ provides the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate—the legislative officers— with another opportunity to 
block procedural violations. After a bill passes both chambers in identical 
form, the final version of the bill, or the ―enrolled bill,‖ is prepared for 
presentment to the President. The legislative clerks examine the accuracy of 
the enrolled bill and send it to the legislative officers for signature. The 
enrolled bill is then signed by the legislative officers in attestation that the bill 
has been duly approved by their respective houses, and presented to the 
President.
69
 As ―[t]here is no authority in the presiding officers ... to attest by 
their signatures ... any bill not [duly] passed by Congress,‖70 the presiding 
officers have the duty, and the opportunity, to refuse to sign such bills.  
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 Once the presiding officers sign the enrolled bill, courts treat these 
signatures as ―complete and unimpeachable‖ evidence that a bill has been 
properly enacted.
71
 Consequently, a distinctive feature of the enforcement of 
lawmaking rules is that the enforcement takes place before the fact: all these 
congressional enforcement mechanisms are designed to prevent rules from 
being violated before the bill becomes a law.
72
 Given the absence of judicial 
enforcement of these rules,
73
 once the President signs the bill into law, or 
Congress passes the bill over his veto, no other enforcement mechanism exists. 
 Hence, the enforcement of rules that regulate lawmaking relies entirely on 
Congress‘s capacity and willingness to enforce these rules. In particular, in 
order for these rules to be enforced, two conditions must be met: (1) some 
participant in the legislative process, either individual legislators or legislative 
officers, must identify the rule violation in time; and (2) those participants who 
have the power to enforce the rule—the legislative officers, the majorities in 
each chamber, or other gatekeepers—must be willing to exercise their 
enforcement power. As the following cases demonstrate, when one of these 
conditions fails, congressional enforcement fails. 
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B.  Congressional Capacity To Enforce: The Farm Bill 
―We haven‘t found a precedent for a congressional blunder of this 
magnitude.‖ 74 
―What‘s happened here raises serious constitutional questions—very 
serious.‖ 75
 
 The enactment of the original $300 billion Food, Conservation, and Energy 
Act of 2008 (better known as the Farm Bill) has prompted divergent reactions. 
The version of the bill presented to the President omitted a significant part 
from the version of the bill that was actually passed by both chambers of 
Congress. In fact, the bill that was presented to the President was missing an 
entire 34-page section—all of Title III of the bill.76 And yet, this massive 
omission was discovered only after President Bush vetoed the bill and 
Congress passed it over his veto.
77
 
 This case is not the first in which provisions that passed both houses of 
Congress were omitted from the bill presented to the President; nor is it the 
first time in which breaches of constitutional requirements were discovered 
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 Mary Clare Jalonick, Congressional Error Snarls Effort To Override Bush‘s Farm Bill Veto, 
STAR-LEDGER, May 22, 2008 (quoting Scott Stanzel, a White House spokesperson). 
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 Problems with Congress Override of Farm Bill, CNN, May 22, 2008, http://www.cnn. 
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only after the faulty bill was approved and published as law.
78
 It is also not the 
first case to illustrate that the length, scope, and complexity of omnibus bills 
(and the highly accelerated pace of their enactment) often make it impossible 
for legislators, or even legislative leaders, to be aware of all the provisions in 
the bill;
79
 nor is it the first case to demonstrate that this reality often creates 
errors,
80
 as well as enables individual members ―to perpetuate a good deal of 
statutory mischief.‖81 
 The Farm Bill is particularly interesting, however, because of the magnitude 
of the discrepancy in this case between the bill passed by Congress and the bill 
presented to the President. Indeed, the fact that no one in Congress—or the 
White House—was able to notice such a conspicuous discrepancy suggests 
that less noticeable procedural violations may often go undetected. Hence, this 
case clearly illustrates that massive omnibus bills increase the risk of violations 
                                                          
78
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of lawmaking rules, deliberate or inadvertent, and significantly undermine the 
ability of Congress to detect these violations. 
 More generally, this case suggests that a will to enforce lawmaking rules is a 
necessary but insufficient condition: even if Congress is genuinely motivated 
to enforce these rules, due to legislative practices such as omnibus legislation, 




C.  Congressional Will To Enforce: The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
―It‘s grade school stuff: To become law, a bill must pass both houses of 
Congress in identical form and be signed by the president or approved 
over his veto.... Unless, that is ... complying with the Constitution would 
be really, really inconvenient to President Bush and Republican 
congressional leaders.‖ 83
 
 The enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) has been 
described by some as ―‗a conspiracy‘ to violate the Constitution,‖84 or as a 
―legally improper arrangement among certain representatives of the House, 
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 See Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note , at 339-40.  
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WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at A16. 
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Senate, and Executive Branch to have the President sign legislation that had 
not been enacted pursuant to the Constitution.‖85 
 In this case, the House passed a bill that was identical to the bill passed by 
the Senate in all but one provision.
86
 In budgetary terms, this seemingly minor 
difference had significant fiscal consequences, amounting to an estimated $2 
billion.
87
 More importantly, this discrepancy constituted a violation of Article 
I, Section 7‘s bicameral requirement. 
 The Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate 
were apparently well aware of this discrepancy.
88
 Nevertheless, they allegedly 
chose to sign the enrolled bill in attestation that the bill was duly enacted by 
Congress, and to knowingly present to the President a bill that was never 
passed in identical form by both houses.
89
 President Bush was also allegedly 
aware of this constitutional violation, but signed the bill into law nonetheless.
90
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 The DRA is a clear example of a case in which Congress identified the rule 
violation in time, but those in the position to enforce the constitutional rule 
intentionally chose to ignore their obligation. It demonstrates that mechanisms 
and opportunities to enforce the rules may not suffice if the will to employ 
these enforcement mechanisms is lacking.  
            
D.  When the Enforcers Are the Violators: The 2003 Medicare Bill 
―Never have I seen such a grotesque, arbitrary, and gross abuse of 
power.... It was an outrage. It was profoundly ugly and beneath the 
dignity of Congress.‖ 91
 
 Under House rules, electronic voting is the preferred method to conduct 
record votes.
92
 Generally, members may cast their votes through voting 
machines or manually, and may change their vote any number of times until 
the vote is closed.
93
 The vote is directed and controlled by the Chair, who must 
exercise her power according to the applicable rules, precedents, and practices 
of the House and in a nonpartisan and impartial manner.
94
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 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note , at 3. 
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 HOUSE RULES, supra note , R. XX(2)(a). 
93
 For a much more detailed explanation, see SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 
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 One of the important powers of the Chair is the authority to close the vote 
and announce the vote‘s result.95 The House rules state that there is a fifteen-
minute minimum for most electronic votes;
96
 and according to established 
House practice, once the minimum time for a vote has expired, the Chair 
should close the vote as soon as possible.
97
 The Chair may hold the vote open 
for an additional minute or two to allow latecomers to cast a vote; however, 
since electronic voting began in 1973, it has been an established and clear 
norm that the Chair may not keep the vote open beyond fifteen minutes in 
order to change the outcome of the vote.
98
 For over two decades, this norm was 
apparently breached only once.
99
  
 All this changed, however, in the enactment of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (the Medicare Bill). 
When the time for debate on the Medicare Bill had ended, at 3 a.m., the Chair 
announced that ―Members will have fifteen minutes to record their votes.‖100 
When the official time expired, at 3:15 a.m., it was clear that a majority of the 
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House had voted against the bill.
101
 Although the majority of the House clearly 
expressed its will, the Chair held the vote open for nearly three hours until the 
majority party‘s leadership was able to convince enough members to switch 
their votes.
102
 At 5:53 a.m., after almost three hours in which the official tally 
of the votes had consistently shown a majority against the bill, the majority 
party was finally able to secure a majority in favor of the bill. At this point, 




 This case illustrates that even seemingly technical rules can serve important 
objectives, such as ensuring that the will of the chamber rather than the will of 
its legislative officer is enacted into law, and that violations of such rules can 
significantly impact the outcome of the legislative process. Indeed, although 
other process abuses occurred in the enactment process of the Medicare Bill,
105
 
it was this act that particularly outraged House members who opposed the bill. 
One member complained, ―They grossly abused the rules of the House by 
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 Id. at 2. 
104
 149 CONG. REC. 30855 (2003) (statement of Speaker pro tempore). 
105
 Other abuses included, inter alia, exclusion of minority party members from the House-
Senate conference committee, insertion of major provisions that were rejected during earlier 
floor debates into the conference report, and even allegations that the majority party tried to 
secure the necessary votes for passing the bill through threats and bribes. See MANN & 
ORNSTEIN, supra note , at 1-4, 6, 137-38; Oliver A. Houck, Things Fall Apart: A 





holding the vote open. The majority of the House expressed its will, 216 to 
218. It means it‘s a dictatorship. It means you hold the vote open until you 
have the votes.‖106  
 After this incident, stretching out the vote until the majority party ―could 
twist enough arms to prevail‖ became a recurring problem.107 To solve this 
problem, in January 2007 the new House majority amended the House rules, 
adding the following explicit rule: ―[a] record vote by electronic device shall 
not be held open for the sole purpose of reversing the outcome of such 
vote.‖108  
 Nevertheless, violations of this rule continued.
109
 Furthermore, any real 
possibility of congressional enforcement was soon undermined. When minority 
party members tried to raise a point of order, the Chair held that this rule does 
not establish a point of order and does not have an immediate procedural 
                                                          
106
 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note , at 3. Some majority party members argued, however, that 
holding votes open was not, ―technically speaking,‖ a violation of the rules, because House 
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 The rule was also interpreted as focusing entirely on the Chair‘s 
intent and as prohibiting only cases in which the Chair‘s exclusive motivation 
for holding the vote open was to change the outcome.
111
 It was further stated 
that it would be inappropriate to require the Chair to declare her reasons for 
delaying a vote.
112
 The practical result was that it became ―impossible for the 
House to determine whether the Chair had the requisite intent necessary to find 
a violation of the rule.‖113  
 Eventually, following a case in which the Chair closed a vote before the 
required minimum time expired, allegedly to preclude the minority party from 
winning the vote,
114
 a select committee, which investigated voting 
irregularities in the House, concluded that although the new rule ―was enacted 
with a noble intent,‖ it was ―at best, difficult to enforce.‖115 Consequently, in 
January 2009, the new House majority deleted this rule from the House 
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 Jonathan Weisman & Elizabeth Williamson, House Forms Special Panel Over Alleged 
Stolen Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/08/03/AR2007080300878.html. 
115
 REPORT ON VOTING IRREGULARITIES, supra note , at 22 (quoting Investigative Hearing 
Regarding Roll Call 814, Day 1: Hearing Before the Select Comm. to Investigate the Voting 
Irregularities of August 2, 2007, 111th Cong. 4 (2008) (opening statement of Rep. William 
Delahunt, Chairman of the Select Committee)). The Select Committee also found that the rule 








 The select committee emphasized that ―striking the sentence in 
question‖ from the rules should not reduce the Chair‘s obligation to refrain 
from holding the vote open in order to change the outcome of the vote,
117
 but 
seemed to conclude that ultimately ―[t]he dignity and integrity of the 
proceedings of the House are dependent upon the dignity and integrity of its 
Speaker and those she appoints to serve in the Chair.‖118 
 The failure to enforce this rule, which was supposed to curb abuses by the 
Chair during votes, reveals the fallibility of Congress‘s enforcement 
mechanisms, especially with regard to rules that are supposed to control the 
behavior of the presiding officers. Legislative officers are the primary and final 
enforcers of lawmaking rules.
119
 This case illustrates that the legislative 
officers can also be the primary violators of these rules. When the legislative 
officers—or other chamber and committee leaders that are essential in 
enforcing lawmaking rules—are the ones perpetrating the rule violations, the 
congressional enforcement mechanisms are particularly likely to fail.
120
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 See supra Part II.A. 
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 In sum, enforcement of lawmaking rules is entirely contingent upon 
legislators‘ and legislative leaders‘ motivation to enforce these rules. 
Furthermore, because Congress‘s capacity to detect violations is limited, 
congressional compliance with these rules also largely depends on legislators‘ 
incentives to follow the rules in the first place. The crucial question, therefore, 
is: what are the political safeguards that may motivate legislators to engage in 




III. THE MYTH OF POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS 
 One of the dominant arguments against judicial review of the legislative 
process is that Congress has sufficient incentives to enforce the law of 
congressional lawmaking on its own.
122
 Arguments that ―legislators have 
greater incentives [to act as responsible constitutional decision makers] than 
scholars typically assert‖ are also prominent among critics of judicial review 
and judicial supremacy in other areas.
123
 Their common argument is that legal 
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scholarship tends to rely on the public choice theory‘s over-simplified and 




 This Article‘s inquiry begins, therefore, with the assumption that legislators 
are motivated by a combination of self-interest and public-regarding 
motivations,
125
 and that they simultaneously pursue multiple goals, such as 




 Based on this premise, and drawing on a combination of sources from a 
wide array of theoretical perspectives, including legal, political science, 
political economy, and social psychology scholarship, I have identified seven 
major political safeguards that are supposed to induce congressional self 
policing and rule following: (1) reelection motivations and electoral controls; 
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 See sources cited supra note ; see also Krishnakumar, supra note , at 39 (arguing that 
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(2) interest groups; (3) policy motivations; (4) political parties and party 
leaders; (5) institutional rivalry and institutional interests; (6) the threat of a 
presidential veto; and (7) ethical and noninstrumental motivations.
127
 
 Part III systematically evaluates each of these safeguards‘ projected impact 
on Congress‘s compliance with the rules that set procedural restrictions on the 
legislative process,
128
 in light of theoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies 
about Congress and its legislative process. 
 Close consideration of these safeguards is crucial for rebutting a number of 
misconceptions about legislative rule following. The following examination 
refutes the widely held assumption that political safeguards can obviate the 
need for judicial enforcement of lawmaking rules. It argues that some of these 
political safeguards actually induce lawbreaking rather than law-following 
behavior, whereas others are too weak to outweigh this impact. 
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A.  Reelection Motivations and Electoral Controls 
 There is widespread agreement in the congressional decision-making 
literature, even among scholars who hold the multiple-goal view, that 
reelection is an important goal for legislators.
129
 The connection between 
legislators‘ reelection motivation and rule following is straightforward: 
legislators will refrain from violating rules if such violations increase the 
likelihood of electoral defeat.
130
 Of course, the reelection motivation is an 
ineffective control mechanism over legislators who are seeking retirement and 
are not interested in reelection.
131
 However, Part III.A argues that even for 
reelection-seeking legislators there are significant obstacles in harnessing their 
strong reelection motivation into an effective control mechanism over their 
behavior in the legislative process. 
 
1. Voters‘ Inattention and (Rational) Ignorance 
 In order for violations of lawmaking rules to increase the likelihood of 
electoral defeat, voters must be aware of these violations. However, most rule 
violations in the legislative process are likely to escape voters‘ attention. 
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 Due to the high cost of obtaining the relevant information, voters‘ negligible 
incentive to obtain it, and free-rider problems, it is rational for voters to remain 
largely ignorant of legislators‘ behavior in the legislative process.132 Political 
economists term this phenomenon voters‘ ―rational ignorance.‖133 
Notwithstanding other disagreements over political economists‘ assumptions 
about voters,
134
 political scientists seem to agree that there is indeed 
―widespread voter inattention‖ to the legislative process:135 ―The vast majority 
of voters do not pay much attention to most of the roll calls that occur on 
Capitol Hill; much less the more insulated activities that occur in committee. 
As a result, House members and Senators have significant discretion about 
how to conduct their legislative work.‖136 
 Surveys consistently confirm that the vast majority of the public does not 
regularly ―follow what‘s going on in government and public affairs,‖137 and 
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that people are largely unaware of congressional actions.
138
 In fact, one study 
found that people were rarely aware of even a single policy position taken by 
their district representatives,
139
 and there is reason to believe that voters‘ 




 Surveys have consistently shown, moreover, that voters‘ ignorance is not 
limited to specific congressional actions.
141
 For example, 45 percent of 
American adults cannot name either of their state‘s U.S. senators;142 and, ―at 
any given time, approximately 40 to 65 percent do not know which party is in 
control of the House of Representatives,‖143 which is particularly remarkable, 
given that ―50 percent should be able to get this answer correct merely by 
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 Id. at 474. 
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guessing.‖144 Ignorance about the rules that govern the legislative process is 
even greater.
145
 A recent survey found, for example, that 74 percent of the 
public do not know that it takes sixty votes to break a filibuster in the Senate, 
perhaps the most well-known and hotly-debated of all legislative rules.
146
 
These findings significantly undermine the assumption that the public can hold 
lawmakers accountable for violating lawmaking rules. 
 
2. Voters‘ Electoral Choices 
 Even if some rule violations do receive public attention, legislators would 
not be deterred from rule violations unless such violations significantly 
influence their constituency‘s voting decision.147 It is highly unlikely, however, 
that a significant percentage of voters use conformity with lawmaking rules as 
a key criterion in their electoral choice.
148
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 To be sure, studies by social psychologists and political scientists suggest 
that people do care about process and procedural fairness in the legislative 
process;
149
 and yet, this does not mean that legislators‘ procedural performance 
will significantly determine voters‘ decisions. As two of the leading scholars in 
the field explain: 
[I]t would be erroneous to expect process perceptions to help people 
decide whether they are Democrat or Republican or whether to 
support candidate A or candidate B.... [P]rocess factors are of little 
use in such tasks as voting decisions.... Assessments of individual 
officeholders also are not likely to be affected by process concerns 
.... We expect process concerns to play a much larger part in such 
broad variables as whether people approve of government and 
whether they view it as legitimate and therefore are willing to 




 That voters do care about the integrity of the legislative process but are 
nevertheless unlikely to base their voting decisions on this preference 
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decision that the voters disagree with, conceding that the primary direct influence on 





underscores the weakness of elections as an enforcement mechanism. In 
making their voting decisions, voters must make up their mind based on a 
complex combination of potentially competing considerations, such as the 
candidates‘ records, party affiliations, personalities, and other qualities, as well 
as their policy positions on a variety of different issues.
151
 At the same time, 
however, ―[e]ach voter has just one vote per election.... There is simply no way 
for a voter to vote for Smith on the economy and health reform while voting 
for Jones on [his rule-following performance].‖152 Consequently, voting ―is 
simply too blunt an instrument to be an effective means for‖ punishing 




3. Uncompetitive Elections and Incumbents‘ Electoral Security 
 Even if voters were fully informed about legislators‘ rule violations and had 
strong rule-following preferences that influenced their voting decisions, other 
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factors in the contemporary political system significantly hinder ―voters‘ 
ability to strip incumbents of their power.‖154  
 Over the past several decades, a combination of factors has dramatically 
increased incumbents‘ electoral advantages in congressional elections, and 
created progressively rising barriers to electoral competition.
155
 Some scholars 
have noted, for example, that the dramatic growth in the costs of running for 
Congress and the increasing financial advantages of incumbents have 
undermined the financial competitiveness of challengers.
156
 Other scholars 
highlight advantages that derive from holding office, such as increasing 
governmentally funded resources for constituency-service and constituency-
contact activities
157
 or the introduction of television cameras in the legislature, 
which affords incumbents television exposure that would be expensive for 
political challengers to replicate.
158
 Others argue that computer-driven 
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gerrymandering has made the vast majority of districts noncompetitive.
159
 
Finally, some studies emphasize demographic changes, including growing 
partisan polarization within the electorate
160
 and voters‘ increasing reliance on 
incumbency as a voting cue.
161
  
 At any rate, there seems to be significant agreement that the result of these 
factors ―is a pattern of reinforcing advantages that leads to extraordinarily 
uncompetitive elections.‖162 In fact, only 11 percent of the congressional races 
in 2008 had a sufficiently small victory margin—10 percent or lower—that 
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could be categorized as competitive.
163
 In 2002, only 8.7 percent of the races 
were competitive;
164
 in 2004, only 5.2 percent of the races were competitive;
165
 
and even in the 2006 congressional elections, which were the most competitive 
in a decade, only 13.7 percent were competitive.
166
 
 Empirical studies about ―incumbency advantage‖ show that incumbency 
significantly raises the probability of electoral success, with some studies 
finding that congressional incumbents enjoy an 11 percent increase in expected 
vote share merely for being an incumbent candidate.
167
 Reelection data also 
confirms that members of Congress in both houses enjoy significant electoral 
safety, with over 90 percent reelection rates for incumbents in recent years,
168
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and with the vast majority of incumbents winning by a landslide.
169
 In fact, in 
each of the recent congressional elections, dozens of incumbents went 
completely unchallenged.
170
 With such levels of electoral safety and lack of 
electoral competition in Congress, especially in the House, some have argued 
that ―[a]s a general matter, congressional accountability appears to be dead.‖171  
 Some scholars maintain, however, that the indisputably high levels of 
electoral safety in Congress do not necessarily undermine the ―electoral 
connection‖ theory of congressional behavior.172 They claim that ―[m]embers 
of Congress do not behave as if they are invulnerable to electoral defeat ... 
because they subscribe to the idea that they are ... ‗unsafe at any margin.‘‖173 
The argument, in effect, is that congressional behavior is less determined by 
the objective measures of electoral safety, but rather by legislators‘ subjective 
feelings of electoral insecurity.
174
 Consequently, they claim that 
notwithstanding objective electoral safety, legislators are in fact attentive to 
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 However, even if we accept the argument that congressional behavior is 
mostly influenced by legislators‘ subjective beliefs about electoral insecurity, it 
appears that when it comes to lawmaking rules, members of Congress feel 
relatively secure from electoral retribution. As political scientist Gary Cox 
suggests, ―[i]n a world in which the effects of [lawmaking] rules on final 
outcomes are obscure to voters, members fear electoral retribution from their 
constituents less than they would on straightforward votes on substance.‖176  
 This claim is confirmed by empirical evidence that ―members increasingly 
act very differently when they vote on procedure and when they vote on 
substance.‖177 Thus, for example, legislators often vote in favor of a procedure 
that facilitates the passage of a bill—such as restrictive rules that sharply 
curtail the ability to offer amendments on the floor—and then vote against the 
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 The explanation to this seemingly puzzling behavior is that 
―members increasingly listen to their party on procedure and to their 
constituents on substance,‖179 based on their widely held belief that ―few 
people outside the Capitol Beltway pay attention to procedural votes.‖180 
Indeed, many legislators, political consultants, and candidates share the belief 
that most voters do not care about procedural issues and that procedural votes 
are much less visible to voters.
181
  
 The bottom line is that from both the perspective of objective electoral 
safety and legislators‘ subjective perceptions of electoral security, violations of 
lawmaking rules are largely insulated from electoral accountability. Hence, the 
prospect that voters will effectively police legislators‘ rule-following behavior 
in the legislative process, or induce reelection-minded legislators to police 
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themselves, seems grim. Furthermore, as Parts III.B-H explain, to the extent 
that the reelection goal motivates legislators to satisfy special interest groups, 
to make public policy, or to follow their party leaders‘ instructions, all of these 
considerations may in fact induce rule violations. 
 
B.  Interest Groups 
 Although political unawareness and organization problems plague the vast 
majority of voters, there are subsets of the constituency, such as organized 
advocacy groups, that are politically aware and relatively well organized.
182
 
Political scientists James Snyder and Michael Ting argue that some ―activist 
groups,‖ such as the Sierra Club or NAACP, ―have the attention of large 
numbers of voters in many constituencies,‖ and therefore may potentially 
provide ―the link between desired punishment strategies and voter actions.‖183 
They argue that ―[b]y coordinating voting behavior through publications, 
advertisements, or endorsements, such groups can tune the responses of voters 
to incumbent behavior over multiple elections.‖184 Undeniably, activist groups 
may solve some electoral accountability deficiencies—particularly, voters‘ 
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political unawareness, indifference, and coordination problems—in certain 
areas, and legislators do seem to pay attention to such groups.
185
  
 However, activist groups are unlikely to serve as a significant force in the 
lawmaking rules context. First, it is unlikely that there are many activist groups 
whose agendas focus on ensuring compliance with the procedural rules 
constraining the legislative process. Because organized voter groups are highly 
susceptible to free-rider problems that can undermine their effectiveness, 
activist groups tend to be most effective when focused on specific, narrow 
issues.
186
 As examples like the National Education Association, the Sierra 
Club, and the NAACP illustrate, these narrow issues are more likely to revolve 
around specific ideological and policy issues.
187
 Even activist groups such as 
Common Cause or the Center for Responsive Politics that are more generally 
interested in the political process typically focus on areas such as elections, 
                                                          
185
 Evans, Middle Doesn‘t Rule, supra note , at 7 (arguing that members of Congress ―pay 
particular attention to the preferences of issue publics,‖ advocacy groups, ―and organized 
interests because they are an important source of campaign resources,‖ and because 
―[a]dvocacy groups engage in grassroots mobilization efforts that potentially can sway the 
attitudes of less politically aware constituents‖). 
186
 Block-Lieb, supra note , at 822-23. 
187
 Cf. Evans, Middle Doesn‘t Rule, supra note , at 6-7 (suggesting that the organized 
advocacy groups tend to form around specific policy areas). This conclusion is also 
corroborated by research about the forces that influence congressional reform, which indicates 
that ―advocacy organizations are activated by reform initiatives that directly affect the ability 
of individual groups to achieve their political and policy goals.‖ See Evans, Politics of 





lobbying, and campaign finance, rather than on floor procedures and 
procedural rule following in the legislative process.
188
  
 Second, as public choice scholars argue—in a different context —―voters‘ 
ignorance of politicians‘ behavior is not exclusively a function of their 
negligible incentive to obtain such information .... It is also a function of the 
cost of obtaining the relevant information, which may be prohibitive even for 
[those] who have a much higher benefit of obtaining this information.‖189 
Unlike special interest groups that represent industries, activist groups 
typically have relatively limited financial resources.
190
 Furthermore, due to the 
prevalence of legislative practices such as omnibus legislation, monitoring 
procedural rule violations may require particularly high monitoring costs.
191
  
 The combination of monitoring costs, limited financial resources, and 
narrow policy interests inevitably means that activist groups are likely to focus 
their resources on monitoring legislators‘ policy votes, and in only a limited set 
of policy areas.
192
 It is therefore unlikely that activist groups will spend their 
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scarce monitoring resources on detecting violations of procedural rules in the 
legislative process. 
 Special interest groups representing corporate business interests, for 
example, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
193
 tend to 
have greater resources to monitor legislators‘ behavior, but are also unlikely to 
solve the monitoring problems regarding rules governing lawmaking. On the 
contrary, such special interest groups are more likely to favor less transparency 
and electoral accountability in the legislative process.
194
 Indeed, to the extent 
that reelection-minded legislators need to cater to the demands of these interest 
groups,
195
 this circumstance creates a powerful incentive to engage in 
procedural rule violations. In fact, a number of case studies and significant 
anecdotal evidence suggest that rent-seeking interest groups are often the 
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 To be sure, the extent to which interest groups dominate the legislative 
process, and the extent to which activist groups and special interest groups may 
cancel each other out, are matters of intense debate in the political science and 
political economy literature.
197
 This Article expresses no opinion on this larger 
question. Rather, it argues that, in the context of the rules regulating 
lawmaking, interest groups are generally more likely to create an incentive to 




C.  Policy Motivations 
 Advocates of greater trust in Congress‘s aptitude to act as a responsible 
constitutional decision maker often base their claim primarily on legislators‘ 
incentive to pursue good public policy.
199
 This Article accepts the argument 
that legislators‘ policy motivations have an important impact on congressional 
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 It argues, however, that at least in the lawmaking rules 
context, this incentive is more likely to produce rule violations than rule 
following. 
 Legislators‘ motivation to create policy is derived from a wide range of 
personal goals.
201
 In addition to ideology and a desire to make good public 
policy, the motivation to create policy is also induced by a desire to be an 
influential policymaker, to exhibit institutional power and increase one‘s 
prestige, to claim credit and satisfy constituents, and to attract financial support 
from interest groups.
202
 All these interests combine into a powerful incentive to 
create policy and to pass legislation.
203
 The question, therefore, is how this 
strong incentive interacts with lawmaking rules. 
 Research by political scientists suggests that lawmaking rules can 
significantly impact policy outcomes.
204
 There is evidence, moreover, that 
members of Congress themselves are well aware of the important impact of 
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legislative rules on legislative outcomes.
205
 Representative John Dingell, the 
longest-serving member of the House, has expressed—albeit in a slightly 
different context—a cognizance about the impact of procedures perhaps most 
bluntly: ―I‘ll let you write the substance ... and you let me write the procedure, 
and I‘ll screw you every time.‖206 Indeed, scholarship on congressional design 
of lawmaking rules suggests that ―[w]hen lawmakers make decisions between 
rule alternatives, they typically consider the implications for policy.‖207 
Empirical research confirms, moreover, that the majority party indeed uses 
lawmaking rules, such as rules that restrict adding amendments during floor 




 The combination of the factors discussed thus far—legislators‘ strong 
incentive to pass policy, the significant impact of lawmaking rules on policy 
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outcomes, and legislators‘ knowledge of this impact—leads to the conclusion 
that policy incentives should have considerable influence on Congress‘s 
enforcement of these rules. When it comes to the lawmaking rules that 
constrain the legislative process, which by their very nature limit legislators‘ 
ability to translate their policy preferences into legislation, the impact of policy 
motivations is clear: they create a strong incentive to deviate from the rules.
209
 
 Descriptive congressional scholarship suggests that this impact of policy 
interests on rule following may be particularly strong in the modern 
Congress.
210
 As some congressional scholars suggest, in a different context, 
with ―the ever-growing ideological polarization in Congress[,] [m]ore than 
ever before, lawmakers may have hard-and-fast views about the rightness of 
their policy agenda. The question of whether their policy agenda is 
constitutional may matter less to today‘s lawmakers.‖211 
 Even more germane for present purposes is congressional scholars Thomas 
Mann and Norman Ornstein‘s observation that ―[s]harp partisan differences on 
policy created an atmosphere [in Congress, and especially in the House,] in 
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which the legislative ends could justify any procedural means,‖212 and in which 
procedural values are viewed as ―impediments to the larger goal of achieving 
political and policy success.‖213  
 In short, legislators‘ policy goals—even if they originate from purely 
ideological and public-regarding motivations—produce a strong incentive to 
violate lawmaking rules when such rules stand in the way of their policy 
preferences.
214
 Notwithstanding the central impact of policy motivations on 
rule following, however, Part III.D argues that other powerful forces both 
exacerbate and complicate the influence of legislators‘ policy motivations. 
 
D.  Parties and Leaders 
 Some scholars argue that the most promising enforcers of the rules that 
govern lawmaking are the majority party and its leaders.
215
 This Article 
accepts the claim that political parties are a powerful force in Congress, 
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especially in the House,
216
 and that parties have an impact both on 
congressional decision making
217
 and on congressional design of procedural 
rules.
218
 It also agrees that party leaders have significant tools to enforce party 
discipline and to influence members‘ behavior,219 and that this influence is 
particularly evident in members‘ procedural votes.220 This Article concedes, 
therefore, that party leaders can potentially induce compliance with lawmaking 
rules even when rules conflict with individual legislators‘ policy 
preferences.
221
 Furthermore, as explained in Part II, the chambers‘ presiding 
officers, who are always members of the majority party, have a crucial role 
both in the application—or violation—of the rules and in Congress‘s 
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 Thus, the majority party leaders in Congress, 
especially in the House, are arguably the most influential figures in 
determining Congress‘s compliance with lawmaking rules. The question, 
however, is how parties and their leaders use this power.  
 Just like individual legislators, congressional parties also pursue multiple 
goals.
223
 These include passing items on the party‘s agenda, helping members 
accomplish individual goals, achieving and maintaining majority status, and 
enhancing the party‘s image.224 All of these goals lead to a powerful 
motivation to pass legislation. In addition to the obvious collective party goal 
of passing the party agenda, rank-and-file members often pressure their leaders 
to enact legislation because it serves their personal policy and reelection 
goals.
225
 The party goals of maintaining majority status and enhancing party 
image also depend, to a significant extent, upon the party‘s success in enacting 
the legislative program on which it was elected and on fostering a distinct 
―party label‖ in terms of the policies for which the party stands.226 
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 John E. Owens & J. Mark Wrighton, Procedural Control and Majority Party Entrenchment 
in the U.S. House: An Explanation of Rules Restrictiveness Over Time 11 (Apr. 12, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/pdf/csd_owens_ 
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 The combination of these goals creates strong pressures on majority party 
leaders to pass legislation and to push through the party‘s legislative agenda.227 
These pressures result not only from incentives that parties create to induce 
their leaders to internalize the collective goals of the party,
228
 but also from 
party leaders‘ personal goals.229 Although legislative leaders have the same 
personal goals that motivate other legislators, the desire for power and prestige 
tend to be particularly pronounced in congressional and party leaders.
230
 Much 
more than in the case of rank-and-file members, legislative leaders‘ personal 
prestige often hinges on winning legislative victories.
231
 These leaders‘ goal to 
appear effective and successful in passing the party policy agenda creates a 
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 Majority party leaders have several tools to secure the passage of their 
party‘s legislative agenda,233 but a chief tool, particularly in the House, is the 
party leaders‘ control over legislative procedures.234 As John Owens and Mark 
Wrighton put it: 
[M]ajority parties have well-earned reputations for crafting rules 
designed to protect their legislative agendas on the floor. Majority 
leaders can manipulate the consideration of legislation in any way 
that a majority of votes on the floor will support, and they have 
become very creative in writing rules that protect elements of their 




Indeed, significant literature on congressional parties documents the means by 
which majority parties and their leaders manipulate procedural rules to 
facilitate the passage of their party‘s agenda.236  
 Legislative leaders can also advance the majority party‘s agenda through the 
enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of legislative rules.
237
 Decisions about 
the enforcement of lawmaking rules in the House appear to be particularly 
influenced by partisan considerations. Recent empirical research suggests that, 
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in the House, ―perhaps without exception, the chair rules [on points of order] in 
a way favored by the majority party,‖ and that in the relatively few cases in 
which the Chair‘s rulings are appealed, the majority party always prevails.238 
Furthermore, points of order—Congress‘s chief enforcement mechanism for 
lawmaking rules—are often waived in the House by special rules written by 
the Rules Committee.
239
 Since the 1970s, the Rules Committee has 
increasingly served as an ―agent‖ of the majority party,240 including granting 
waivers that circumvent House rules in order to serve the majority party‘s 
policy agenda.
241
 These special rules are typically approved on the floor ―on a 
strictly party line vote.‖242  
 Legislative leaders have strong incentives to enforce the types of rules, such 
as restrictive rules, that serve the majority party‘s policy and political interests, 
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and they often succeed in doing so.
243
 In this regard, scholars who argue that 
majority party leaders can ensure compliance with lawmaking rules are 
correct.
244
 At the same time, however, these scholars seem to overlook the fact 
that party leaders also have considerable power and incentives to violate rules 
that impede the passage of the majority party‘s agenda.245 In fact, the same 
incentives that make party leaders vigorously enforce rules that serve their 
party‘s interests become powerful incentives to violate rules that stand in the 
way of party interests. 
 The 2003 Medicare Bill is a clear example. This bill was the major social 
policy initiative of President Bush,
246
 and Republican leaders in Congress 
―hoped that adoption of the measure would reduce or even neutralize the long-
term Democratic advantage on health issues with the public.‖247 Passing this 
bill was therefore a top priority for the majority party and its leaders.
248
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Consequently, they employed a variety of more or less legitimate strategies to 
pass the bill, including exclusion of minority party members from the House-
Senate conference committee and insertion of major provisions that were 
rejected during earlier floor debates into the conference report.
249
 There were 
even allegations that the majority party leaders tried to secure the necessary 
votes for passing this bill through threats and bribes.
250
 Finally, as Part II.D 
elaborated, when following the established norm that limits votes to fifteen 




 As the DRA example from Part II.C suggests, moreover, party interests may 
create strong incentives to violate even constitutional rules when compliance 
would mean defeat of a bill that is important to the majority party.
252
 The 
DRA‘s passage was highly contentious.253 It passed the Senate through Vice 
President Cheney‘s tie-breaking vote254 and the House by a 216-214 vote 
through heavy pressure by majority party leaders.
255
 Hence, when it was 
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discovered that the bill did not pass both chambers in the same form, majority 
party leaders did not want to take the chance that the bill would not pass 
another vote in the House.
256
 Instead, the legislative leaders simply ignored the 
constitutional bicameralism requirement and signed the enrolled bill in 
attestation that the bill had duly passed both houses, despite their knowledge 
that the bill was never passed in identical form by both chambers.
257
 
 Admittedly, the instances of both the DRA and the Medicare Bill occurred 
during Republican control of Congress, but significant evidence confirms that 
the procedural ―maneuvering behind the Medicare ... legislation was neither 
unique to [this bill] nor to the 108th Congress,‖258 and that since the 1980s 
both parties have been increasingly guilty of deviations from lawmaking rules 
and process abuses when they controlled Congress.
259
 Indeed, the recent 
                                                          
256
 Id. at 52-53. 
257
 See id.; supra Part II.C. 
258
 Houck, supra note , at 14. 
259
 For a detailed account, see MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note , at 7-9, 67-95, 100-07, 169-75, 
212-16, 253-62 (detailing process abuses by both parties between the late 1980s and 2008). For 
more on process abuses by the Democratic majority that controlled Congress in the early 
1990s, see Kimberly Coursen et al., Restoring Faith in Congress, 11 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 
249, 263-64, 266, 269-70 (1993); Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The 
Decline of Deliberative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 321, 321-22, 349, 351-63 (1994). For more on process abuses by the Republican 
majority that controlled Congress between 1994 and 2006, see HOUSE RULES COMM. 
MINORITY OFFICE, 108TH CONG., BROKEN PROMISES: THE DEATH OF DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: A CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON THE UNPRECEDENTED EROSION OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE 108TH CONGRESS 1-2 (2005), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050511221002/ 
http://www.democrats.house.gov/docs/brokenpromises.pdf; Sinclair, Congress Deliberates 
and Legislates, supra note , at 55-56, 59-67, 72, 75-76. Finally, for more on process abuses by 





history of Congress suggests that ―the inclination to pass bills important to the 
majority party quickly trumps previous assurances of openness and fairness 
made by the incoming majority.‖260  
 
E.  Institutional Rivalry and Institutional Interests 
 The assumption about institutional competition and institutional interests is 
illustrated by the government‘s argument in United States v. Munoz-Flores. In 
that case, the government argued that courts should not review Origination 
Clause
261
 challenges because ―the House has the power to protect its 
institutional interests by refusing to pass a bill if it believes that the Origination 
Clause has been violated.‖262 Although the full Court did not embrace this 
position,
263
 this argument was essentially accepted by Justice Stevens in his 
concurring opinion. Justice Stevens opined that ―the House is in an excellent 
position to defend its origination power,‖264 and that ―there is every reason to 
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anticipate that Representatives ... will jealously guard [this] power.‖265 While 
acknowledging that ―the House has an interest in upholding the entire 
Constitution, not just those provisions that protect its institutional 
prerogatives,‖ Justice Stevens added that ―even if the House should mistake its 
constitutional interest generally, it is unlikely to mistake its more particular 
interest in being powerful.‖266 
 Justice Stevens‘s concurrence was carefully limited to only the Origination 
Clause and did not address other lawmaking requirements.
267
 However, some 
opponents of judicial review of the legislative process argue that the 
assumption that institutional rivalry provides Congress sufficient incentives to 
police itself applies to most other constitutional and nonconstitutional 
lawmaking rules as well.
268
 Jesse Choper, for example, argues that lawmaking 
rules ―ordinarily concern protections for one house of Congress,‖ and that the 
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 Part III.E argues, however, that institutional interests and institutional rivalry 
are not an effective mechanism to ensure rule following in the legislative 
process. First, while the Origination Clause and bicameralism requirement 
indeed implicate the House‘s prerogatives vis-à-vis the Senate, many other 
rules have no bearing on the division of powers between the two chambers. 
The violation of rules such as voting and quorum and the three-reading 
requirement in one chamber does not impact the prerogatives and institutional 
interests of the other chamber. Hence institutional rivalry cannot ensure 
compliance with these rules.  
 The major problem with the institutional rivalry argument, however, is that 
it too often treats legislative chambers as an ―it‖ rather than a ―they.‖270 The 
argument assumes that the Senate and the House each act as a ―personified 
rational actor,‖ rather than a large multi-member body, whose members‘ 
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 To be sure, institutional concerns sometimes do converge with individual 
legislators‘ interests.272 A motivation that may potentially reinforce legislators‘ 
interest in protecting their chamber‘s institutional prerogatives is their interest 
in personal power and prestige. This Article does not dispute that personal 
power is an important goal for legislators;
273
 nor does it deny that legislators‘ 
interest in greater personal influence and prestige may theoretically translate 
into an interest in belonging to a stronger, more influential legislative chamber.  
 The problem, however, is that although all of the 435 Representatives 
and 100 Senators have some stake in their chamber‘s institutional standing, 
they also have more direct and powerful personal interests that are often in 
conflict with their institutional interests.
274
 Motivations, such as pursuing 
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policy and reelection, often conflict with institutional interests.
275
 Because it is 
unlikely that voters reward legislators for aggressively protecting their 
chamber‘s power vis-à-vis the other chamber,276 legislators are unlikely to 
block the passage of a law that advances their, or their constituents‘, interests 
in order to defend their chamber‘s prerogatives.277 
 Furthermore, legislators have powerful incentives to prefer party loyalty 
over institutional loyalty because parties significantly impact legislators‘ 
ability to pursue their personal goals. Due to party leaders‘ control over the 
legislative agenda, parties are particularly instrumental to lawmakers‘ ability to 
pursue their policy goals, and there is evidence that party leaders do in fact 
schedule members‘ bills to reward party loyalty.278 By providing campaign 
funds and other essential campaign resources, parties are also important for 
legislators‘ reelection, and party leaders use their influence over these 
resources as well to ensure party loyalty.
279
 Furthermore, ―in the highly 
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polarized two-party system currently dominating national politics, a member‘s 
political success depends more on the fortunes of her particular party than on 
the stature of Congress.‖280  
 Even from the perspective of their personal power and prestige goals, 
lawmakers have a strong motivation to prefer party loyalty over institutional 
loyalty. Legislators‘ personal power goals are more directly, and more often, 
translated into a personal interest in committee assignments and leadership 
positions in their chamber than into concerns about their chamber‘s power.281 
In the modern Congress, assignments to committees and to committee 
leadership positions are very much controlled by party leaders, who use party 
loyalty as a major assignment criterion.
282
 Finally, as Part III.D established and 
as the DRA case illustrates, even chamber leaders have strong incentives to 
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prefer party loyalty over protecting their chamber‘s prerogatives. All this leads 
to the conclusion that ―party loyalty [often] trumps institutional concerns.‖283 
 Indeed, in addition to individual legislators‘ interests, parties and partisan 
interests also complicate and undermine the institutional rivalry argument. As 
Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes argue—in a slightly different context, 
―[i]ntraparty cooperation ... smoothes over branch boundaries.‖284 This, in turn, 
suppresses ―the political dynamics that were supposed to provide each branch 
with a ‗will of its own,‘‖ and undermines the Madisonian assumption that 
departmental ―[a]mbition [will] counteract ambition.‖285 The exceptionally 
strong, cohesive, and polarized parties of the modern Congress make the 
likelihood of cross-chamber, intra-party cooperation that undermines chamber 
rivalry even more likely, at least when both chambers are controlled by the 
same party.
286
 Furthermore, even under a divided government, the sharp 
partisan polarization in Congress makes intra-chamber bipartisan cooperation, 
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which is often necessary to assert the chamber‘s prerogatives vis-à-vis other 
government branches, much less likely.
287
 
 Admittedly, not everyone agrees with Levinson and Pildes‘s strong claim 
that the current American system of separation of powers is more properly 
characterized as ―separation of parties, not powers,‖288 or with Neal Devins‘s 
even bolder conclusion that ―[f]or those who embrace a constitutional design in 
which ... ‗ambition must be made to counteract ambition,‘ today‘s system of 
checks and balances is an abject failure.‖289 However, there is strong support in 
the congressional scholarship at least to the more modest claim that legislators‘ 
willingness to protect their institutional prerogatives is relatively weak in the 
modern Congress,
290
 and that institutional interests ―usually play second fiddle 
                                                          
287
 Devins, supra note , at 406-15. 
288
 Levinson & Pildes, supra note , at 2311, 2315-16, 2329. 
289
 Devins, supra note , at 415; see Posner & Vermeule, supra note , at 1035-36 (agreeing that 
―the separation of powers system functions differently in times of unified or divided 
government,‖ but arguing that ―it goes too far to claim that the American constitutional system 
displays ‗separation of parties, not powers‘; rather, it displays both separation of powers and 
parties in a complicated interaction‖); Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both 
Matter: A Separationist Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210, 213 
(2006), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/epstein.pdf  (conceding that ―[i]t is futile 
to argue that political parties do not influence relations between the legislative and executive 
branches‖ and that ―[t]he greater the political cohesion, the less critical separation of powers 
becomes,‖ but arguing that ―Professors Levinson and Pildes have too much faith that party 
unity renders structural obstacles unimportant‖). 
290
 See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note , at xi-xii, 146-49, 215; Devins, supra note , at 408-15; 
Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 
931-32 (1999); Levinson, supra note , at 926-32, 951-59; Marshall, supra note , at 518-19, 
521; Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: Reflections on 





to more parochial goals, that is, to partisanship or the narrow interests of 
particular members and constituencies.‖291  
 In short, whenever the passage of a bill serves legislators‘ individual or party 
interests, it is unlikely that institutional interests and institutional rivalry are 
sufficiently strong to ensure rule following in the congressional legislative 
process. Furthermore, as Part III.F argues, some institutional rivalry—namely, 
of Congress vis-à-vis the President—may in fact create an incentive to violate 
lawmaking rules. 
 
F.  Presidential Veto Power 
 While this Article focuses on Congress, the President also has the potential 
power to enforce the law of congressional lawmaking. At least as far as the 
constitutional rules are concerned, the President arguably has a duty to refuse 
to sign bills that were enacted in violation of these rules.
292
 Hence, Part III.F 
examines whether fear of a presidential veto might serve as a potential 
motivation for legislators to avoid procedural rule violations. It argues that the 
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presidential veto power is unlikely to induce congressional rule following, and 
may in fact have the opposite effect in certain circumstances. 
 Presidential enforcement of lawmaking rules rests on a single, crude 
enforcement mechanism: the President‘s power to veto the bill. This 
enforcement mechanism is contingent upon the President‘s ability to detect the 
rule violation before signing the bill and on the President‘s willingness to veto 
an entire bill merely for procedural violations in its enactment process. Both of 
these conditions for presidential enforcement can be easily manipulated by 
Congress. 
 First, by enacting massive omnibus bills through expedited procedures, 
legislators can significantly reduce the President‘s capacity to detect violations 
in the legislative process. This possibility is clearly illustrated by the Farm Bill 
example in which the President failed to notice that the bill presented to him 
was missing an entire 34-page section.
293
 
 Second, as the DRA example illustrates, even when the President is well 
aware of the procedural rule violation, the President may lack the will to use 
her veto power to ensure compliance with lawmaking rules.
294
 As long as the 
bill‘s content serves the President‘s policy and political interests, it is unlikely 
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that the President will choose to veto a bill merely for procedural violations.
295
 
Scholarship about presidential vetoes suggests that while a variety of factors 
influence Presidents‘ veto decisions, one of the most important is the extent to 
which the President finds the legislation‘s content objectionable.296 As one 
empirical study found, ―[t]o a substantial degree, presidential vetoes are a 
direct and predictable consequence of congressional behavior and of the kind 
of legislation Congress passes.‖297 Thus, by making the content of legislation 
more attractive to the President, legislators can undercut the President‘s will to 
enforce procedural lawmaking rules.
298
  
 Furthermore, even if legislators fail to undermine the President‘s capacity or 
will to enforce lawmaking rules, the impact of presidential enforcement is also 




 It appears, therefore, that the presidential veto power is not likely to create a 
significant incentive for legislators to avoid procedural rule violations. Instead, 
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the existence of the presidential veto power may motivate legislators to create 
legislative practices that undermine the President‘s ability to veto their 
preferred legislation, whether on content or procedural grounds. These 
practices, in turn, often entail deviating from the rules governing the legislative 
process.
300
 A prime example is lawmakers‘ ―propensity‖ for inserting 
nongermane, substantive riders into omnibus appropriations bills,
301
 despite the 
long-standing rules that prohibit attaching such provisions to appropriations 
bills.
302
 Because a presidential veto of omnibus appropriation bills poses ―the 
specter of government shutdown,‖ and is therefore much less likely, legislators 
have long been using nongermane riders as a means to circumvent the 
President‘s power to veto objectionable legislation.303 Hence, the desire to 
avoid a presidential veto may actually create an incentive to violate lawmaking 
rules. 
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G.  Ethical and Noninstrumental Motivations 
 Parts III.A-F focused mainly on instrumental or goal-seeking motivations; 
however, some scholars argue that legislators‘ ―willingness to play by the rules 
also has an ethical underpinning‖ because legislators ―are constrained by a 
belief system as well as by a purely rational assessment of political cost.‖304 
Others have suggested that internalization is an additional noninstrumental 
force that may potentially influence legislators‘ compliance with rules.305 The 
argument is that, over the course of time, some legal constraints become so 
internalized that ―the necessity of enforcement may, except to guard against 
outliers, disappear.‖306 A related noninstrumental force mentioned in the 
scholarship is canonization. A certain text becomes canonical when the 
relevant community—in this case, the legislature—has ―a certain positive and 
reverential attitude toward that text such that it is largely unthinkable to 
imagine its modification or violation.‖307 
 This Article does not deny that ethical and noninstrumental motivations also 
influence legislators, and that such considerations may induce rule following in 
the legislative process. In fact, this view finds support in social psychology 
research on rule following that argues that people‘s compliance with rules is 
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not merely a function of sanctions and incentives.
308
 This research suggests 
that noninstrumental factors, rooted in social relationships and ethical 
judgments, may also induce people to become self-regulatory and to take 
responsibility for rule following onto themselves.
309
 The question, however, is 
whether these ethical and noninstrumental forces are powerful enough to 
override legislators‘ competing motivations to violate lawmaking rules.  
 One problem with noninstrumental forces such as canonization and 
internalization is that it is unlikely that most lawmaking rules reach a degree of 
internalization and reverence that secures them from violation temptations. As 
for canonization, the only lawmaking rules that may arguably achieve such a 
sacred status are the constitutional bicameralism and presentment 
requirements.
310
 Internalization also probably occurs only with the most time-




 In England, for example, arguments about legislators internalizing the 
parliamentary rules are based on the fact that parliamentary procedures have 
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been a well-entrenched feature of the British political system for many 
centuries.
312
 For example, England‘s three-reading rule has been considered 
―an old-established practice‖ since the sixteenth century.313 Furthermore, a 
distinct feature of the British parliamentary system is that legislators ―are 
socialised into existing procedures. New entrants to a legislature, as various 
studies have shown, undertake a period of apprenticeship and learning, a 
process inculcating support for institutional rules.‖314 And yet, there is 
evidence that even in the ―mother of parliaments‖ the rules are not so 




 If this is the case in the British Parliament, it is hard to believe that the 
situation is much better in the younger, sharply polarized, and partisan U.S. 
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Congress. The House, in particular, is currently characterized, as we have seen, 
by ―an atmosphere in which the legislative ends could justify any procedural 
means.‖316 In the Senate as well, when Senators have to decide whether a 
lawmaking rule has been violated, ―most Senators appear to base their votes 
more on policy and political considerations than on a concern for procedural 
consistency and regularity.‖317 
 Even the filibuster procedure, which is perhaps the most venerated and 
internalized of all Senate rules,
318
 is far from immune to instrumental 
considerations.
319
 One study has found, for example, that ―the votes of 
Senators on proposals to alter Senate Rule XXII [the provision specifying 
cloture requirements for ending filibusters] are driven by short-term policy 
considerations, rather than by broader principles about the deliberative benefits 
of extended debate.‖320  
 Moreover, as the DRA example from Part II suggests, even the 
constitutional bicameralism requirement is vulnerable when the motivation for 
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violation is sufficiently strong.
321
 Congress‘s repeated efforts to create 
lawmaking procedures that circumvent the constitutional bicameralism and 
presentment requirements, such as the legislative veto and the line-item veto, 
also cast doubt as to the extent that these rules are internalized and canonized 
in Congress.
322
 Undeniably, there is a difference between a direct, flagrant 
violation of the rules, such as in the DRA example, and a formal statutory 
attempt to modify the constitutional structure of the legislative process, such as 
in the legislative veto and the line-item veto cases.
323
 However, both types of 
cases illustrate that even the constitutional lawmaking rules have not achieved 
a canonized status in Congress ―such that it is largely unthinkable to imagine 
[their] modification or violation.‖324 
 Admittedly, adherents to a ―functional approach‖ to separation of powers 
may disagree with the Court‘s conclusion that the legislative veto and the line-
item veto violated the Constitution.
325
 This Section‘s argument, however, does 
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not depend on one‘s position on whether Chadha and Clinton v. City of New 
York were correctly decided,
326
 or on whether Congress may adopt different 
constitutional interpretations of Article I, Section 7 than the Court.
327
 As case 
studies about the legislative process of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 and the 
enactment process of a pre-Chadha legislative veto provision suggest, the real 
problem in these cases was not that Congress asserted its right to form an 
independent, informed constitutional judgment.
328
 On the contrary, scholars‘ 
main criticism in both cases was that Congress failed to do so.
329
  
 More importantly for present purposes, the case studies of the legislative 
processes in both cases reveal that although Congress was well aware that the 
legislative proposal may violate Article I, Section 7, constitutional concerns 
                                                          
326
 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
327
 See Tushnet, Interpretations in Legislatures, supra note , at 356-60 (advocating a non-
court-based evaluative standard to examine Congress‘s constitutional performance). For recent 
reviews of the different academic views on whether Congress may or even must adopt its own 
interpretation of the Constitution, see generally Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 303, 342-52 (2007); Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial 
Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1579 & n.227, 1580-82 (2007). 
328
 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Story of Clinton v. City of New York: Congress Can Take Care 
of Itself, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 47, 57-83 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
Garrett, Story] (discussing the legislative process of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996); Abner J. 
Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 
593-600 (1983) (discussing the enactment process of a legislative veto provision in the period 
between the lower court‘s Chadha decision and the Supreme Court‘s Chadha decision). 
329
 Garrett, Story, supra note , at 48-49, 91-98; Mikva, supra note , at 597-600; see also Neal 
Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme 
Court‘s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 351, 355-61 
(1997); Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court‘s Anti-





were apparently not a decisive factor in Congress‘s decision making.330 Hence, 
regardless of one‘s view about the legislative veto and the line-item veto, the 
legislative process in these cases suggests, at the very least, that constitutional 




 Although not focusing on procedural rules, Mitchell Pickerill‘s study is also 
illustrative.
332
 Based on case studies and on interviews with legislators, 
congressional staff, and others involved in the legislative process, Pickerill 
concludes that ―[p]olitics and policy dominate congressional decision making, 
and members of Congress do not systematically consider the constitutional 
authority for their actions.‖333 As one Senator ranked the considerations in the 
congressional legislative process, ―[p]olicy issues first, how [to] get a 
consensus to pass the bill, six other things, then constitutionality.‖334 
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 In sum, ethical and noninstrumental motivations to follow rules surely play 
some part in the legislative process, especially with regard to constitutional 
rules. However, it is unlikely that such motivations will prevail whenever 
strong incentives to violate rules exist.  
 
H.  Summary 
 The following table briefly summarizes the insights gained from analysis in 
Part III of the political safeguards that potentially impact congressional 


















Very weak impact. 
B. Interest Groups Good-government groups are unlikely to have an 
impact; rent-seeking interest groups create incentive 
to violate rules in order to insert special-interest 
provisions into legislation. 
C. Policy 
Motivations 
Very strong impact. Creates strong incentive to 
violate rules that hinder passage of legislators‘ 
policy. 
D. Party and Leaders  Very strong impact. Creates strong incentive to 
violate rules that impede the majority party‘s policy 
and political interests (as well as strong incentive to 
enforce rules that serve majority party policy and 
political interests). 
E. Institutional  
Interests 
Weak impact on procedural rule following (may be 
slightly stronger when divided government). Applies 
only to rules that implicate institutional rivalry. 
F. Presidential Veto Unlikely to induce procedural rule following. Creates 
incentive to violate rules in order to circumvent the 
President‘s veto power. 
G. Ethical and 
Noninstrumental  
Motivations 
Weak to medium impact. Creates some incentive to 
follow rules, particularly constitutional rules (and 
perhaps other internalized, time-honored rules, such 
as filibuster). 
 
 As the table illustrates, the most influential forces on Congress‘s compliance 
with the rules that regulate lawmaking are legislators‘ policy motivations and 
the majority party and its leaders. Although these forces‘ effects do not 





to violate lawmaking rules that impede the majority party‘s ability to pass its 
policy agenda. Electoral controls and good-government groups are expected to 
have little to no impact on procedural rule following, while special interest 
groups create an incentive to violate the rules. Institutional interests and 
institutional rivalry are also expected to have relatively little influence on 
procedural rule following. Furthermore, institutional interests influence only 
those rules that implicate institutional rivalry, such as bicameralism and the 
Origination Clause. The threat of a presidential veto is also expected to have a 
limited impact and may in fact motivate rule violations. The only real 
safeguard that may induce rule following is legislators‘ ethical and 
noninstrumental motivations. Such motivations are expected to have some 
positive impact on rule following, particularly on constitutional rules, but it is 
doubtful that they can counterbalance strong policy and partisan interests. 
 Hence, the overall impact of the ―political safeguards‖ is in fact to induce 
violations of the procedural rules that constrain lawmaking. Nevertheless, this 
Article does not argue that lawmaking rules will never be followed in 
Congress. Rather, as Part IV briefly explains, Congress‘s enforcement of these 
rules depends both on the rule in question and on the circumstances. 
IV. WHEN WILL LAWMAKERS BE LAWBREAKERS? 
 Part IV draws on the insights from the previous Parts to offer some brief 





susceptible to violations, the circumstances in which violations are more likely, 
and the incidence of violations. 
 
A.  Which Rules Are More Susceptible to Violation? 
 The likelihood of rule violations depends, to a large extent, on the rule in 
question. This Article focuses on rules that impose procedural restrictions on 
the legislative process.
335
 Accordingly, its analysis of the political safeguards 
that impact congressional rule following is tailored to this category of 
lawmaking rules. It is important to recognize, however, that the same 
safeguards may operate differently with regard to other types of congressional 
rules. 
 For example, legislators‘ policy motivations and the majority party‘s 
interests are chief forces that induce lawmakers to be lawbreakers of the 
lawmaking rules discussed by this Article.
336
 However, these same powers are 
likely to lead to relatively strong enforcement of other types of rules, such as 
―fast track‖ rules, which are statutory rules that are intentionally designed to 
expedite the legislative process and to curtail the minority party‘s ability to 
obstruct the passage of legislation.
337
 The same is true for special rules that are 
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intentionally written by the House Rules Committee to facilitate the majority 
party‘s ability to pass legislation and to protect party interests.338 
 Even within the subgroup of lawmaking rules discussed in this Article, some 
rules are probably more vulnerable to violation than others. To be sure, all the 
rules in this group hinder the majority party‘s ability to pass its policy agenda 
and therefore are susceptible to violation, but the extent to which they hamper 
the majority party‘s agenda varies from rule to rule. The above analysis 
suggests that this difference should have an important impact on the likelihood 
of violation, since the dominant forces that motivate violations of these rules 
are legislators‘ policy motivations and the majority party‘s interests.339  
 The degree to which the rule obstructs the majority party‘s ability to pursue 
its agenda is not the sole determinant of the likelihood of violations, however. 
For example, as the discussion about noninstrumental, rule-following 
motivations suggests, some rules, such as constitutional rules and the Senate 
rules for ending debate, are more internalized and revered than others and may 
therefore be less vulnerable.
340
 The discussion of institutional interests also 
suggests that rules that implicate one chamber‘s prerogatives vis-à-vis the 
other chamber, bicameralism and the Origination Clause, may be slightly less 
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susceptible to violation than rules that do not involve inter-chamber rivalry—
including three-reading, quorum and voting, and amendment rules.
341
 In short, 
the vulnerability of a certain rule to violation depends on the specific way in 
which each of the safeguards relates to that rule, and on the overall combined 
effect of these safeguards with regard to that particular rule.
342
 
 This conclusion fits nicely with a larger point in recent political science 
research about institutional change in Congress: congressional behavior is not 
determined by a single motivating force, such as reelection motivations or 
party interests, but rather, by a combination of potentially conflicting forces, 
whose overall impact varies across areas of congressional activity.
343
 This 
point does not undercut this Article‘s general claim that the overall impact of 
the political safeguards is a motivation to violate rules that set procedural 
restrictions on the legislative process. Rather, it suggests that although much of 
this Article‘s analysis and many of its claims can contribute to discussions 
about other types of rules and other areas of congressional activity, each area 
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requires individualized analysis that will examine how the safeguards 
discussed in this Article operate in that specific context.  
 
B.  When Are Violations More Likely? 
 Some of the circumstances that impact the likelihood of violations are case-
specific, but this Article‘s analysis does provide some insights as to the type of 
bills that are more likely to produce rule violations, the type of violations that 
are more likely, and more general circumstances that impact the likelihood of 
violations. 
 Perhaps the most influential circumstances are the extent to which the bill‘s 
passage is a priority for the majority party and its leaders, and the strength of 
the opposition that the majority party faces in passing the bill. As the 
discussion of the DRA and Medicare Bill examples illustrated, when the bill is 
particularly important for the majority party, and its passage would be 
particularly difficult or impossible without breaking the rules, the probability 
of violations is, of course, much higher.
344
 
 Furthermore, the likelihood of violations also depends on the means or types 
of violation. Some violations can be easily carried out by an individual 
legislator, committee chair, or chamber leader without the need for other 
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legislators‘ collaboration;345 whereas other violations may require the 
cooperation, or at least acquiescence, of a large group of legislators and are 
therefore harder to accomplish.
346
 Similarly, violations that occur in the final 
stages of the legislative process, and especially in the enrollment stage, are 
likely to be more successful simply because they occur after the stage that most 
enforcement—points of order or refusal to pass the bill—can take place. 
 Some features of the legislative process can also influence the likelihood of 
violations. For example, as the Farm Bill illustrated, omnibus legislation 
makes violations, deliberate or unintentional, more likely.
347
 Generally, as 
Congress‘s use of unorthodox legislative practices such as omnibus legislation 
increases, its capacity to avoid procedural violations diminishes.
348
 While the 
normative debate about the advantages and disadvantages of omnibus 
legislation is beyond the scope of this Article,
349
 this conclusion contributes to 
the debate by revealing an additional cost of this legislative device. 
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 Finally, the likelihood of violations depends on the degree of partisan and 
ideological polarization.
350
 As long as the intense partisanship and ideological 
polarization in Congress, and especially in the House, persist, rule violations 
and procedural abuses are likely to be prevalent. 
 
C.  The Incidence of Violations 
 In the absence of systematic and current empirical data,
351
 it is admittedly 
difficult to assess how often Congress violates the rules in practice. 
Nevertheless, several rough observations in descriptive congressional 
scholarship suggest that there were indeed numerous cases in which Congress, 
especially the House, flagrantly ignored lawmaking rules in recent years.
352
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 This descriptive scholarship indicates, moreover, that the two houses ―do not 
enforce all their rules with the same rigor [or] abide by them with the same 
consistency‖:353 some rules are apparently routinely ignored, while other rules, 
such as ―fast track‖ rules, seem to exhibit ―a strong record of compliance.‖354 
 A review of this scholarship may also suggest that nonconstitutional rules 
are violated much more frequently than constitutional rules. Although 
―Congress‘s disregard of [INS v. Chadha‘s] teachings has been notorious,‖355 
this descriptive scholarship provides very few examples of direct and 
intentional violations of constitutional procedural rules.
356
 That is, if one 
excludes the hundreds of legislative veto provisions that Congress continued to 
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―[a]ctually, the House in the 110th Congress was fairly good about abiding by rules designed 
to give members some time to examine legislation before they were required to vote, but the 
rules and abidance by the rules could be even stricter‖).  
353
 Bach, supra note , at 747; see also Bruhl, Return of the Line-Item Veto, supra note , at 473-
74 (arguing that Congress‘s record of compliance with statutory procedural rules ―presents a 
distinctly mixed bag‖). 
354
 Bruhl, Return of the Line-Item Veto, supra note , at 473-74. 
355
 Cass & Strauss, supra note , at 15. 
356
 Cf. DEAN, supra note , at 51 (claiming that the behavior of the Republican majority in 
Congress between 1994 and 2006 was ―far worse than merely breaking the rules of the House 
(or Senate), for they also [had] no hesitation about cavalierly ignoring the Constitution,‖ but 





enact after the Court ruled such provisions unconstitutional in Chadha,
357
 and 
unintentional violations such as in the Farm Bill example,
358
 examples of 
flagrant constitutional violations such as in the DRA case seem to be harder to 
find.  
 The above may suggest that this Article has slightly underestimated the 
degree to which the constitutional procedural rules are internalized and 
canonized in Congress. An alternative explanation, however, is that direct 
violations of constitutional rules are harder to find both because the 
Constitution places such sparse lawmaking requirements on Congress and 
because even these few limitations have been interpreted and implemented by 
Congress in creative ways that provide much latitude—including, for example, 
an artificial presumption that the constitutionally required quorum is always 
present ―unless and until the presumption is proven incorrect.‖359 It is possible, 
therefore, that constitutional violations are less common because the majority 
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See Cass & Strauss, supra note , at 23 (noting that Congress has included legislative veto 
provisions in its legislation ―numerous times‖ since Chadha); Neal Devins, Congressional-
Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 
109, 115 (1996) (―In the decade after Chadha, 1983-1993, well over 200 legislative vetoes 
have been enacted into law.‖); Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 288 (1993) (―Notwithstanding the mandate in Chadha, 
Congress continued to add legislative vetoes to bills and Presidents Reagan and Bush 
continued to sign them into law. From the date of the Court‘s decision in Chadha to the end of 
the 102nd Congress on October 8, 1992, Congress enacted more than two hundred new 
legislative vetoes.‖). 
358
 See supra Part II.B. 
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 This explanation seems to find support in the experiences of the states, 
whose constitutions place much more procedural limits on lawmaking,
361
 
therefore resulting in many more examples of constitutional violations. Indeed, 
several scholars have observed that state ―legislators often do not follow the 
legislative procedure requirements of the state constitution, particularly where 
the legislative proposal is controversial and the courts do not enforce the 
constitutional restriction.‖362 Some state courts have similarly observed that the 
state legislature has shown ―remarkably poor self-discipline in policing 
itself,‖363 and that violations of some constitutional lawmaking requirements 
have ―become a procedural regularity.‖364 The Supreme Court of Illinois has 
                                                          
360
 Cf. Bach, Senate‘s Compliance, supra note , at 88 (suggesting that the reason for the 
relative paucity of contested questions of order in the Senate is that ―Senate procedures have 
not been a serious obstacle to individualism. Its rules normally are not confining and when 
they do pinch, it is not for very long.... Rarely do senators contend that existing procedures do 
not give them enough latitude.‖). 
361
 Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative 
Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987). 
362
 Id. at 800; see also Denning & Smith, supra note , at 1000 (arguing that ―many state 
legislatures have often seen fit to skirt the edges of their constitutional [lawmaking] 
requirements, or to ignore them entirely‖ and that ―[i]n the experience of the states,‖ the 
presumption that legislatures will comply with procedural constitutional limitations ―seems to 
have been unwarranted‖). 
363
 Geja‘s Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. 1992). 
364
 Id.; see also Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 171 (Ill. 2003); 
Cutinello v. Whitley, 641 N.E.2d 360, 367 (Ill. 1994); McGinley v. Madigan, 851 N.E.2d 709, 





perhaps been the most explicit in its conclusion that ―the assumption that the 
General Assembly would police itself and judicial review would not be needed 
because violations of the constitutionally required procedures would be rare‖ 
has been repeatedly refuted in practice.
365
 Although the applicability of state 
experiences to Congress is not clear, these experiences at least suggest that the 
alternative explanation—that direct violations of constitutional rules are harder 
to find because the Constitution places few lawmaking requirements on 
Congress—may be plausible. 
 In sum, to the extent that the above far-from-scientific observations provide 
any indication, this Article‘s analysis seems to have promising explanatory 
power, at least with regard to nonconstitutional rules. Undeniably, there is a 
great need for much more vigorous and systematic empirical research about 
congressional compliance with the rules that govern lawmaking. Hopefully, 
this Article may contribute to such future research by providing several 
testable predictions for general empirical studies, as well as for case studies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Hans Linde was correct in his observation that ―[o]ther participants than 
courts have the opportunity, and the obligation, to insist on legality in 
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lawmaking.‖366 Duty and opportunity, however, are not enough. Congress‘s 
capacity and incentives to enforce the law of congressional lawmaking upon 
itself are lacking.  
 This Article‘s conclusions refute the widely held assumption that political 
safeguards can obviate the need for judicial review, at least in the procedural 
lawmaking rules context. This does not mean that judicial enforcement of these 
rules is necessarily the proper solution. The impact of judicial review on 
legislative rule-following behavior, and the other costs and benefits of judicial 
oversight, remain to be examined. The starting point for any such examination, 
however, is the recognition that Congress cannot police itself. 
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―The irony of today‘s great American debate‖ in constitutional law and 
theory, Guido Calabresi once observed, ―is that both sides share the same 
approach to judicial review‖1—an approach that ―emphasizes a decisive 
judicial role and requires that . . . judges ultimately be responsible for 
enforcing [rights] against government action.‖2 This Article argues for a 
different model of judicial review, ―judicial review of the legislative process.‖ 
Under this model, the judicial role is neither decisive nor focused on defending 
constitutional rights from legislative action. In fact, this model is not even 
concerned with the content of legislation. Instead, the model requires courts to 
examine the procedure leading to a statute‘s enactment and to enforce the 
procedural requirements for lawmaking.
3
 
The Supreme Court has been persistently reluctant to exercise judicial 
review of the legislative process.
4
 For more than a century, federal courts have 
                                                          
1
 Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-
Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 109-10 (1991). 
2
 Id. at 82, 109-10.  
3
 For a more detailed definition of ―judicial review of the legislative process‖ see Part I.A. 
infra. 
4
 Field v. Clark 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (setting forth the ―enrolled bill‖ doctrine, which 
effectively insulates the legislative process from judicial review); Marci A. Hamilton, 





consistently refused to entertain challenges to legislation based on procedural 
defects in the enactment process,
5
 even when the alleged defects were 
violations of the Constitution‘s lawmaking requirements.6 Indeed, the courts 
refused to recognize an exception to the long-established rule that courts may 
not inquire into the process of enactment, even in ―cases involving allegations 
that the presiding officers of Congress and the President . . . conspired to 
violate the Constitution by enacting legislation that had not passed both the 
House and Senate.‖7  
To be sure, at times the Court has employed what I term 
―semiprocedural judicial review,‖ which entails some form of examination of 
the enactment process as part of the Court‘s substantive constitutional review 
of legislation.
8
 However, even this semiprocedural review provoked vigorous 
objections within the Court,
9
 and ―a flood of scholarly criticism.‖10 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                                                         
Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 493, 545 (1994) (noting ―the Court‘s 
persistent refusal to embrace judicial review of the legislature‘s deliberative process‖). 
5
 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the Enrolled 
Bill Doctrine, 97 GEO. L. J. 323, 325 (2009). 
6
 Id. at 333; id. at 352 (noting that although United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 
(1990) seemed to signal the Court‘s willingness to enforce constitutional lawmaking 
requirements, later district and appellate cases interpreted this decision very narrowly).  
7
 OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., 496 F.3d 197, 208 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub 
nom., OneSimpleLoan v. Spellings, 128 S. Ct. 1220 (2008). 
8
 See part I.C. infra.  
9
 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613-14 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(judicial ―review for deliberateness [in the legislative process] would be as patently 
unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court.‖); Bd. of Trs. 





idea that courts will determine the validity of legislation based on the adequacy 




A striking feature of this resistance to judicial review of the legislative 
process is that it appears that most judges and scholars ―find it improper to 
question legislative adherence to lawful procedures,‖ while ―tak[ing] 
substantive judicial review for granted.‖12 The prevalent view is that judicial 
review of the legislative process is somehow less legitimate than the classic 
model of judicial review, which grants courts power to scrutinize the content of 
legislation and to strike down laws that violate fundamental rights.  
This Article challenges this prevalent view, and establishes the 
theoretical case for judicial review of the legislative process. In the process, the 
Article reveals another great irony in constitutional theory. It argues that some 
                                                                                                                                                         
majority for ―[r]eviewing the Congressional record as if it were an administrative agency 
record‖); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 876-77 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―We 
have in the past studiously avoided… interference in the States‘ legislative processes, the heart 
of their sovereignty. Placing restraints upon the manner in which the States make their laws… 
is not… ours to impose.‖). 
10
 Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency Model 
to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 465-66 (2003). See also A. Christopher Bryant & 
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court‘s New ―On the Record‖ 
Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001); William W. 
Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87 (2001); Ruth 
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH L. REV. 80 (2001); Philip P. Frickey 
& Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An 
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002). 
11
 Staszewski, supra note 10, at 465-66.  
12





of the major arguments of leading constitutional theorists in favor of 
substantive judicial review, and even the arguments in Marbury v. Madison 
itself, are in fact equally—and perhaps more—persuasive when applied to 
judicial review of the legislative process. It further demonstrates that even 
some of the arguments raised by leading critics of (substantive) judicial review 
can actually be employed as arguments for justifying judicial review of the 
lawmaking process. 
Making the theoretical case for judicial review of the legislative 
process has important practical significance. The lower federal courts were 
confronted with this issue in multiple cases in the past few years.
13
 While all 
these cases reiterated the judicial refusal to hear claims that statutes were not 
validly enacted, some of the lower courts conceded that this issue does merit 
                                                          
13
 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 451 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 
2006), aff‘d sub nom., 486 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 823 (2007); 
OneSimpleLoan v. U.S. Sec‘y of Educ., No. 06 Civ. 2979 (RMB), 2006 WL 1596768 
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2006), aff‘d, 496 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2007); Conyers v. Bush, No. 06-11972, 
2006 WL 3834224 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2006); Cal., Dep‘t of Soc. Servs. v. Leavitt, 444 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2006); Cookeville Reg‘l Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, No. 04-1053 (JR), 
2006 WL 2787831 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2006); Zeigler v. Gonzales, No. 06-0080-CG-M, 2007 
WL 1875945 (S.D. Ala. June 28, 2007); Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Miles, No. 06-2899, 2007 WL 1958623, at *1 (7th Cir. July 3, 
2007); United States v. Campbell, No. 06-3418, 2007 WL 1028785, at *1 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 
2007); United States v. Chillemi, No. CR-03-0917-PHX-PGR, 2007 WL 2995726, at *7 (D. 
Ariz. Oct. 12, 2007); United States v. Harbin, No. C-01-221(3), 2007 WL 2777777, at *4–6 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2007); United States v. McCuiston, No. C-04-676, 2007 WL 2688502, at 
*7–8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); United States v. Farmer, 583 F.3d 131, 151-52 (2d Cir.2009); 
United States v. Davis, 375 Fed.Appx. 611, 612 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Collins, 510 
F.3d 697, 698 (7th Cir. 2007); Salomone v. U.S., No. 1:08-CV-1574-JEC., 2009 WL 2957279 
(N.D.Ga. Sept. 15, 2009); see also United States v. Wolford, 
NO. CRIM.A. 08-29, 2009 WL 1346034, at *1-3 (W.D.Pa. May 13, 2009) (citing several 
additional decisions by circuit and district courts, and nothing that ―numerous district courts‖ 







 Many state courts have also confronted this question, and 
several have decided to depart from the traditional nonjusticiability view that 
still prevails in the federal courts.
15
 In fact, even in some of the states that still 
follow the traditional nonintervention view, lower courts have recently 
suggested that this view ―is due for re-examination.‖16 Courts in other 
countries are also increasingly tackling this question, and as one scholar 
observed, this ―dilemma . . . is one of the more difficult questions under 
discussion today in foreign doctrine.‖17 
Most recently, this question came to the foreground once more in the 
dramatic final stages of the enactment of President Obama‘s healthcare reform. 
As the House majority was seeking ways to secure the passage of this historic 
albeit controversial legislation,
18
 it considered procedural maneuvers that 
raised significant debate on the constitutionally required procedures for 
enactment and the role of courts in enforcing them.
19
 This case was eventually 
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 Public Citizen, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 115–16. 
15
 See, generally, Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: 
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987).    
16
 California Taxpayers Ass‘n V. California Franchise Tax Bd., No. 34-2009-80000168, at 9-
11 (Super. Ct. Cal. May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/businesses/Official_Court_Ruling_34-2009-80000168.pdf. 
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 Suzie Navot, Judicial Review of the Legislative Process, 39 ISR. L. REV. 182, 193 (2006). 
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 David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Consider New Moves for Health Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/health/policy/17health.html. 
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 but with the ever-growing partisanship and ideological polarization 




A theoretical examination of judicial review of the legislative process 
may also contribute to broader debates about judicial review and other issues 
in constitutional theory. As recent scholarship suggests, since the traditional 
debates within constitutional theory have been significantly influenced by their 
focus on a single concept of judicial review, drawing attention to other models 




Part I defines ―judicial review of the legislative process‖ and 
distinguishes it from ―substantive judicial review‖ and ―semiprocedural 
judicial review.‖ Part II discusses the arguments underlying the opposition to 
                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/03/deeming-again.html; Josh Gerstein, Is 'Deem & Pass' 
Unconstitutional? It Doesn't Matter, POLITICO (March 17, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0310/Is_deem__pass_unconstitutional_It_doesnt_
matter.html; Amy Goldstein, House Democrats‘ Tactic for Health-Care Bill is Debated, 
WASH. POST, March 17, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2010/03/16/ST2010031603033.html; Michael W. McConnell, The House 
Health-Care Vote and the Constitution, WALL ST. J., March 15, 2010, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704416904575121532877077328.html. 
20
 Lori Montgomery, House Leaders Plan Separate Health Vote, Rejecting ―Deem and Pass,‖ 
WASH. POST, March 20, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/20/AR2010032001651.html. 
21
 Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 867 (2010) 
(―As long as the intense partisanship and ideological polarization in Congress… persist, rule 
violations and procedural abuses [in the legislative process] are likely to be prevalent‖). 
22





judicial review of the legislative process. Part III challenges the view that only 
substantive judicial review is justified, by establishing the crucial practical and 
normative importance of reviewing the legislative process as well. Part IV 
turns to leading constitutional theories‘ justifications for judicial review, as 
well as theoretical arguments against judicial review. It argues that when 
applied to judicial review of the legislative process, the justifications are even 
more persuasive, while the objections to substantive judicial review are 
mitigated or can sometimes even serve as justifications. Finally, Part V 
incorporates the arguments from the previous two parts to establish the 
theoretical case for judicial review of the legislative process.   
Before turning to this discussion, a clarification is in order. Although 
many of this Article‘s arguments juxtapose judicial review of the legislative 
process with substantive judicial review, this Article does not advocate the 
former as an alternative to the latter. It supports the view that judicial review of 
the legislative process should supplement, rather than supplant, substantive 
judicial review. The purpose of juxtaposing these two models of judicial 
review is not to challenge substantive judicial review itself, but rather, the 
dominant position that only substantive judicial review is legitimate and that 






I. DEFINING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Current scholarship employs a wide array of terms to describe judicial 
review models that entail some form of scrutiny of the legislative process. 
Sometimes, different terms are used to describe essentially the same model of 
judicial review.
23
 At other times, the same term—most commonly ―due 
process of lawmaking‖—is used by different scholars to describe a variety of 
dissimilar approaches.
24
 It is therefore essential to begin by elucidating the 
term ―judicial review of the legislative process,‖ and distinguishing it from 
―substantive judicial review‖ and ―semiprocedural judicial review.‖25 
 
                                                          
23 For example, scholars have used a variety of terms to describe the Rehnquist Court‘s 
federalism cases that examined the legislative record for sufficient congressional findings as 
part of their determination of the constitutionality of legislation. Examples include ―on the 
record constitutional review,‖ ―legislative record review,‖ ―the model of due deliberation,‖ and 
―semi-substantive judicial review.‖ See Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due 
Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1281-83 & nn. 
3, 11 (2002).    
24 The term ―due process of lawmaking,‖ was coined in Linde, supra note 9, at 235-55 to refer 
to judicial enforcement of lawmaking procedures required by the constitution, statutes and 
legislative rules. Philip P. Frickey, Honoring Hans: On Linde, Lawmaking, And Legacies, 43 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 157, 170 (2007). However, today the term ―encompasses a variety of 
approaches to the legislative process,‖ well beyond the meaning intended by Linde. WILLIAM 
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 175–8 (3d ed. 2001).  
25
 While this Article focuses on juxtaposing JRLP with substantive and semiprocedural judicial 
review, it is also worth distinguishing it from a fourth category of judicial review that is often 
confused with JRLP. ―Structural judicial review‖—or the ―model of institutional legitimacy,‖ 
as Frickey and Smith term it—constitutes a separate form of judicial review, because it does 
not focus on the enactment procedure, but rather on the identity of the appropriate 
governmental institution for a given decision. Judicial enforcement of federalism, separation-
of-powers, and the nondelegation doctrine can all be seen as falling under this category. See 





A.  Judicial Review of the Legislative Process 
―Judicial review of the legislative process‖ (―JRLP‖) is a form of judicial 
review in which courts determine the validity of statutes based on an 
examination of the procedure leading to their enactment.
26
 The idea is that 
there is a certain minimal threshold of requirements a bill must meet in its 
enactment process in order to become law, and that courts should be given the 
power to determine whether these requirements have been met.  
This broad definition encompasses a variety of specific models of JRLP. 
These models differ, inter alia, in their answer to the question of which 
procedural requirements courts should enforce or, in other words, which 
procedural defects in the legislative process will justify judicial review and 
invalidation of statutes.
27
 Most common is the model that allows courts to 
enforce only the lawmaking requirements mandated by the constitution—such 
as the bicameral passage and presentment requirements set forth in Article I, 
Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution or the three-reading requirement which 
appears in many state constitutions. To be sure, federal courts and some state 
courts refuse to examine the legislative process even in order to determine 
compliance with such constitutional requirements.
28
 However, among the state 
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 See Navot, supra note 17, at 182.  
27
 Cf. id. at 102-12.  
28










In other countries, courts enforce both constitutional and statutory rules 
that specify the steps required in the legislative process;
30
 and in some 
countries courts enforce internal parliamentary rules as well.
31
 Finally, there 
are models which allow courts to also enforce unwritten procedural principles, 
with some versions emphasizing procedural requirements such as due 
deliberation,
32
 while others focus on requirements such as formal equality and 
fair participation.
33
 Some of the arguments developed in this Article lend 
support to JRLP in all its variations. However, this Article focuses on the 
models that enforce the formal rules that govern the enactment process, 
                                                          
29
 Baines v. New Hampshire Senate President, 152 N.H. 124-132 (N.H., 2005) (holding that 
lawmaking procedures required by state Constitution would be enforced by the courts, while 
statutory procedures and internal rules governing the passage of legislation are not justiciable. 
Arguing that this is the case in most state courts); SINGER, supra note 28, at §7:4 ("The 
decisions are nearly unanimous in holding that an act cannot be declared invalid for failure of a 
house to observe its own rules. Courts will not inquire whether such rules have been observed 
in the passage of the act.").  
30
 See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 309–14 (3d ed. 1992); Navot, 
supra note 17, at 202, 207 (discussing Germany).  
31
 HCJ 5131/03 Litzman v. The Knesset Speaker [2004] IsrSC 59 (1) 577, 588 (English 
translation available at [2004] IsrLR 363) (stating that the Israeli Court will enforce even 
internal parliamentary rules and describing the different approaches to this question in several 
countries). 
32
 Victor Goldfeld, Note, Legislative Due Process and Simple Interest Group Politics: 
Ensuring Minimal Deliberation through Judicial Review of Congressional Processes, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 367 (2004). 
33
 HCJ 4885/03 Isr. Poultry Farmers Ass‘n v. Gov‘t of Isr. [2004] IsrSC 59(2) 14 (English 





whether constitutional or subconstitutional,
34
 but not unwritten procedural 
principles such as due deliberation.
35
 
The primary feature of JRLP (in all its variations) is that courts scrutinize 
the process of enactment rather than the statute‘s content. JRLP is indifferent 
to the content of legislation passed by the legislature, focusing exclusively on 
the enactment process. Furthermore, JRLP grants courts the power to examine 
the legislative process regardless of the constitutionality of the statute‘s 
content, and to invalidate an otherwise constitutional statute based solely on 
defects in the enactment process. Another feature of JRLP is that it does not 
preclude legislative reenactment: it simply remands the invalidated statute to 
the legislature, which is free to reenact the exact same legislation (in terms of 




B.  Substantive Judicial Review 
The features of JRLP discussed thus far relate to the questions of what is 
reviewed by the Court (the enactment process rather than content), when is the 
review employed (uniformly on all legislation that was improperly enacted 
                                                          
34
 For an overview of the constitutional and subconstitutional rules that govern the 
congressional legislative process, see Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers, supra note 21, at 811-13.  
35
 In other words, from the various models of ―due process of lawmaking‖ discussed in Frickey 
and Smith, only their ―model of procedural regularity" would satisfy my definition of JRLP. 
See Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1711-13.  





rather than only when constitutional rights or other substantive values are at 
stake), and what is the consequence of judicial invalidation of a statute 
(provisional rather than conclusive). In all these features JRLP is distinctively 
different from the current American model of substantive judicial review. 
―Substantive judicial review‖ examines whether the content of legislation 
is in accordance with the Constitution. Typically, it asks whether the content of 
a certain statute infringes upon individual liberties or rights guaranteed in the 
Bill of Rights. In its ―pure form,‖ substantive judicial review is not interested 
in the way in which the legislature enacted its law; it is interested merely in the 
result or outcome of the enactment process.
37
 Moreover, under the American 
model of substantive judicial review, the Court‘s constitutional judgments are 
considered final and unrevisable.
38
 
To be sure, in many other areas of law there is significant discussion about 
the elusive distinction between substance and procedure.
39
 It should be 
clarified, therefore, that nothing in this Article‘s arguments rests on the claim 
that there is a sharp and clear distinction between process and substance as a 
general conceptual matter. In fact, several of the arguments in the subsequent 
                                                          
37 See Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with 
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1596-97 (2001). 
38
See Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights-and-
Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 817-18 (2003). 
39
 On this discussion, see, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the ―War on 





parts highlight some of the many ways in which substance and process interact. 
Moreover, this Article‘s distinction between JRLP and substantive judicial 
review is not meant to deny that, in practice, there may be many judicial 
doctrines that can be characterized as falling between these forms of judicial 
review.
40
 The next section discusses one such model that merges substantive 
and procedural judicial review. 
  
C.  Semiprocedural Judicial Review 
Under ―semiprocedural judicial review‖ the court reviews the legislative 
process as part of its substantive constitutional review of legislation. The court 
begins by examining the content of legislation, and only if that content 
infringes upon constitutional rights (or other constitutional values such as 
federalism), the court examines the legislative record to ensure the satisfaction 
of some procedural requirements in the legislative process. Under this model, 
defects in the legislative process, such as inadequate deliberation, may serve as 
a decisive consideration in the judicial decision to strike down legislation. 
However, these procedural requirements—and the judicial examination of the 
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 See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STANFORD L. REV. 203, 258 
(2008) (Noting that there is no ―rigid dichotomy between ‗procedural‘ and ‗substantive‘ 










The best example of a decision employing the semiprocedural approach is 
Justice Stevens‘ dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick:42 
Although it is traditional for judges to accord [a] presumption of 
regularity to the legislative process  . . . I see no reason why the 
character of their procedures may not be considered relevant to 
the decision whether the legislative product has caused a 
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. 
Whenever Congress creates a classification that would be 
subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause . . . 
it seems to me that judicial review should include a 
consideration of the procedural character of the decisionmaking 
process. 
 
While this remains the clearest example of a semiprocedural decision, 
in a number of more recent cases—including Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. FCC,
43
 Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
44
 and Board of Trustees of the 
                                                          
41 This definition builds, of course, on Coenen‘s definition for ―semisubstantive review.‖ See 
Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 23, at 1282-83. I eventually 
decided to use the term ―semiprocedural judicial review‖ rather than ―semisubstantive review‖ 
in order to avoid confusion, because only a very limited subset of rules that Coenen considers 
semisubstantive (his findings or study-based ―how‖ rules) satisfy my definition of 
―semiprocedural judicial review.‖ See id. at 1314-28.  
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 448 U.S. 448, 550-51 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For academic semiprocedural 
approaches, see, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 1, at 103-108; Coenen, Constitution of 
Collaboration, supra note 37; Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. 
L. REV. 1162, 1183-90 (1977). 
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University of Alabama v. Garrett
45—the Court appeared to look for evidence 
in the legislative record that Congress based its decisions on sufficient 




The key difference between semiprocedural judicial review and JRLP 
is that under the semiprocedural approach, judicial review of the enactment 
process is only justified when individual rights (or fundamental substantive 
values) are at stake.
47
 In contrast, I argue that JRLP is legitimate in and of 
itself, regardless of the constitutionality of the legislation‘s content, and 
independently of the need to protect individual rights or fundamental 
substantive values.    
 
                                                          
45 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
46 For a detailed discussion, see e.g., Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra 
note 23, at 1314-28; Frickey & Smith, supra note 10, at 1720-27. 
47
 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005) (―[W]e have never required 
Congress to make particularized findings in order to legislate, absent a special concern such as 
the protection of free speech.‖); Coenen, Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, supra note 
23, at 1283 (noting that ―the Court confines its use of semisubstantive rulings to cases in which 






II. THE RESISTANCE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 





 and legislation scholars.
50
 The prevalent view is that courts should 
exercise substantive judicial review (and perhaps also structural judicial 
review, in the sense of separation of powers and federalism), but should 
abstain from engaging in JRLP. Indeed, the rejection of JRLP is often 
explicitly accompanied by a reaffirmation that courts, should, of course, review 
the constitutionality of the statute‘s content.51 Despite the large variety of 
arguments employed,
52
 the common position is that JRLP is somehow less 
legitimate than substantive judicial review. Two major lines of argument seem 
to underlie this position. 
                                                          
48
 Indeed, courts often see the enactment process as a primary example of a nonjusticiable 
political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962); Public Citizen, 486 F.3d at 
1348 and decisions cited therein. See also cases cited in notes 4, 7, 13 supra.  
49
 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE 
L.J. 1457, 1505-07 (2005). 
50
 See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Framework Legislation and Federalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1495, 1530-39 (2008); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive 
Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 573-76 (2005); and 
sources cited in note 10 supra. 
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 Field, 143 U.S. at 672 (holding that courts should refrain from examining the process of 
enactment; ―leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the 
act… is in conformity with the Constitution.‖); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (―I know of no authority whatever for our specifying the precise form that state 
legislation must take, as opposed to its constitutionally required content.‖). 
52






One line of argument is that JRLP is less justified than substantive 
judicial review because JRLP is not aimed at the protection of individual 
rights. This claim is based on the view that ―the principal justification for the 
awesome (and antimajoritarian) power [of] judicial review‖ is ―[t]he necessity 
of vindicating constitutionally secured personal liberties.‖53 The view that ties 
the justification for judicial review to the protection of individual and minority 
rights resonates with a deep-seeded belief in constitutional law and theory,
54
 
and has long dominated debates about judicial review.
55
 Indeed, this view ―has 
become the global conventional wisdom.‖56  
The prevalent view that bases the justification for judicial review on the 
protection of individual liberties becomes particularly challenging when 
combined with arguments for limiting the scope of judicial review, such as the 
argument that courts have very limited resources and legitimacy capital, and 
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 Choper, supra note 49, at 1468.  
54
 See e.g., Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 418, 421 (1995) (Book Review) (―[C]oncern with the capacity of a majority 
to abuse its authority and oppress the minority resonates deeply with longstanding themes in 
democratic political theory and the American constitutional tradition.‖); Daryl J. Levinson, 
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 971-72 (2005) 
(―The civil rights movement solidified [the view] exalting the ‗countermajoritarian‘ protection 
of individual and minority rights as the primary purpose of constitutional law‖). 
55
 Yuval Eylon & Alon Harel, The Right to Judicial Review, 92 VA. L. REV. 991, 995 (2006); 
Adrienne Stone, Judicial Review Without Rights: Some Problems for the Democratic 
Legitimacy of Structural Judicial Review, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-2 (2008). 
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should therefore ―not act in ways which ‗waste‘ their institutional capital.‖57 
The argument is that given the high costs of judicial review, and the courts‘ 
limited institutional capital, judges should exercise this power only when most 
justified—namely, to protect individual and minority rights.58 It therefore 
poses a serious challenge to this Article‘s claim that JRLP is justified 
regardless of the content of legislation and its impact on individual liberties. 
The second line of argument is that JRLP is more objectionable than 
substantive judicial review. The claim is that several of the major concerns 
about judicial review in general—including ―separation of powers concerns . . . 
[and c]oncerns regarding judicial activism and the countermajoritarian 
difficulty‖—are ―at their zenith when courts invalidate the work of the elected 
branches based on perceived deficiencies in the lawmaking process.‖59  
Among these concerns, the primary and most common objection to 
JRLP is the argument that such judicial review violates the separation of 
powers and evinces lack of respect due to a coequal branch.
60
 JRLP is often 
seen by its critics as an interference with the internal workings of the 
legislature; and as an intrusion into the most holy-of-holies of the legislature‘s 
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 Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 233 (1999). 
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 Staszewski, supra note 10, at 468.  
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 Justice Scalia expressed this view when he held that ―[m]utual 
regard between the coordinate branches‖ prohibits courts from inquiring into 
―such matters of internal process‖ as Congress‘s compliance with the 
constitutional requirements for lawmaking;
62
 or when he objected in another 
case to ―interference in the States‘ legislative processes, the heart of their 
sovereignty.‖63 This argument is also at the core of most academic criticisms of 
JRLP and of semiprocedural judicial review.
64
 These critics argue, therefore, 
that any type of judicial inquiry into the enactment process is much more 
intrusive and disdainful than substantive judicial review.
65
  
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that JRLP is less 
legitimate than substantive judicial review. The following parts establish the 
practical and normative importance of reviewing the legislative process, and 
the theoretical justifications for such review.    
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62 Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
63
 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 876-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
64
 See Bar-Siman-Tov, EBD, supra note 5, at 330 & n. 29; Staszewski, supra note 10, at 468 & 
n. 256. 
65
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Why should courts not focus exclusively on reviewing the content of 
statutes and their impact on individual rights? Why divert some of the judicial 
attention and institutional capital to the enactment process of statutes as well? 
The answer lies in appreciating the importance of the legislative process and of 
the rules that govern it.   
 
A.  Process and Outcomes 
―Most participants [in the legislative process] and outside experts agree 
that a good process will, on average and over the long run, produce better 
policy,‖ observed one of the leading congressional scholars in the U.S.67 
Admittedly, there are significant methodological challenges to systematically 
proving this truism, primarily due to the lack of widely-accepted criteria for 
defining good policy.
68
 Notwithstanding this difficulty, several case studies 
and a wealth of anecdotal evidence support the argument that a flawed 
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 This Part builds upon, and elaborates, some of the ideas I originally discussed much more 
briefly in Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers, supra note 21, at 813-15. 
67
 Barbara Sinclair, Spoiling the Sausages? How a Polarized Congress Deliberates and 
Legislates, in 2 RED AND BLUE NATION?: CONSEQUENCES AND CORRECTION OF AMERICA‘S 
POLARIZED POLITICS 55, 83 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
68
 Id. at 78-83 (arguing that while there is rough agreement about what good process entails, 
the lack of a broadly agreed upon standard of what constitutes good policy and insufficient 





legislative process results in ―poor laws and flawed policy,‖69 or in laws that 
serve rent-seeking interest groups rather than the collective public good.
70
 
Empirical research demonstrates, moreover, that deviation from the regular 
rules that govern the legislative process can, and does, distort policy outcomes 
away from the policy preferences of the chamber‘s median and toward the 
preferences of majority party leaders.
71
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 See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 1-6, 13, 141-46, 173-74, 
216-24 (2008) (claiming that a flawed legislative process ―results in the production of poor 
laws and flawed policy‖ and discussing several cases that support this claim); GARY 
MUCCIARONI & PAUL J. QUIRK, DELIBERATIVE CHOICES: DEBATING PUBLIC POLICY IN 
CONGRESS 2-3, 55-91 (2006) (providing several examples that ―illustrate the dangers of 
inadequate or distorted legislative deliberation,‖ as well as several case studies). Cf. 
Christopher H. Foreman Jr., Comment on Chapter Two, in Nivola & Brady, supra note 67, at 
88, 92 (―The judgment of recent critics highlights a significant deterioration of quality [of 
laws] as a consequence of a recent decline in deliberative norms.‖). 
 
70 See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 69, at 217-18 (arguing that deviation from 
―regular order in Congress creates greater opportunities for parochial, special interest 
provisions to be added to legislation out of public view‖ and providing several examples); see 
also Seth Grossman, Tricameral Legislating: Statutory Interpretation in an Era of Conference 
Committee Ascendancy, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 251, 272-88 (2006); Andrew J. 
Schwartzman et al., Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Beware of 
Intended Consequences, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 581 (2006); Charles Tiefer, How To Steal a 
Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409, 442-47 (2001); 
Goldfeld, supra note 32, at 368-69; Max Reynolds, Note, The Impact of Congressional Rules 
on Appropriations Law, 12 J.L. & POL. 481, 508-09, 513-14, 518-19 (1996); E. Bolstad, 
Earmark Tampering Suggested, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10, 2007, at B1; David Heath 
& Christine Willmsen, Congress Hides $3.5B in Earmarks, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008,  
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008265781_apwaearmarkreform.html. 
71  Nathan W. Monroe & Gregory Robinson, Do Restrictive Rules Produce Nonmedian 
Outcomes? A Theory with Evidence from the 101st−108th Congresses, 70 J. POLITICS 217 
(2008). Cf., Cary R. Covington & Andrew A. Bargen, Comparing Floor-Dominated and 
Party-Dominated Explanations of Policy Change in the House of Representatives, 66 J. 
POLITICS 1069, 1085 (2004) (finding that legislative outcomes reflect the preferences of the 
majority party rather than those of the floor median member. Noting that this study supports 
the claim that the majority party determines various institutional rules that are motivated by 
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Indeed, regardless of one‘s view of what constitutes good process or good 
policy, one thing that has been repeatedly proven by theoretical, experimental, 
and empirical studies is that legislative procedures and rules have a crucial 
impact on policy outcomes.
72
 There is evidence, moreover, that legislators are 
well aware of this impact,
73
 which unfortunately, creates a strong incentive to 
manipulate and violate legislative rules and procedures.
74
 Hence, even from the 
sole point of view of legislative outcomes, there is good reason to pay greater 
attention to the process as well. 
 
B.  Process and Legitimacy 
Legislative procedures play a vital role in both the normative and the 
sociological legitimacy of the legislature and its laws.
75
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 See BRYAN W. MARSHALL, RULES FOR WAR: PROCEDURAL CHOICE IN THE US HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 87-103, 120-23 (2005); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes To Set 
Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 
19 J.L. & POL. 345, 393 (2003); Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, 25 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 169, 174-88 (2000); Karl-Martin Ehrhart et al., Budget Processes: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence, 59 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 279, 293 (2007); Monroe & Robinson, 
supra note 71, at 228-29; Keith E. Hamm et al., Structuring Committee Decision-Making: 
Rules and Procedures in US State Legislatures, 7 J. LEGIS. STUD. 13, 13 (2001); Bjørn Erik 
Rasch, Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe, 25 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 3, 4 (2000); Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort 
Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 1555, 1557 (2007). 
73
 Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers, supra note 21, at 841-42. 
74
 Id. at 842-43. 
75
 On the distinction between empirical-sociological legitimacy and normative-moral 
legitimacy, see Richard H. Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 





From a normative perspective, several scholars have observed a significant 
shift in emphasis in normative democratic theory from substantive legitimacy 
to legitimate political procedure.
76
 Roughly, substantive legitimation 
approaches in democratic theory focus on the content of the law and its 
conformity with some substantive moral standard; whereas procedural 
legitimation approaches appeal to features of the process by which laws are 
generated as the only (or main) source of legitimacy.
77
 Proceduralist 
democratic theorists argue that there is too much reasonable disagreement on 
the meaning of substantive justice, the common good, and other moral 
principles, and therefore no normative substantive standard can appropriately 
be used in justifying the law.
78
 Instead, proceduralist democrats seek to 
establish the legitimacy of law ―in the midst of a great deal of substantive 
moral and ethical dissensus,‖79 by arguing that ―[i]f justification for the force 
of law can be found in the generally accepted . . . processes whence contested 
                                                                                                                                                         
Argumentation as Rational Justification of Laws, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
LEGISLATION: ESSAYS IN LEGISPRUDENCE 239, 241 (Luc J. Wintgens ed., 2005).  
76
 David Estlund, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY 1, 2-7 (David Estlund, ed., 2002); Frank I. 
Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence Of The Futile Search: Tribe On Proceduralism 
In Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891, 891-92 (2007).  
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 See Luc J. Wintgens, Legitimacy and Legitimation from the Legisprudential Perspective, in 
LEGISLATION IN CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN LEGISPRUDENCE 4, 6-7 (Luc J. Wintgens & Philippe 
Thion, eds., 2007); Jose Luis Marti Marmol, The Sources of Legitimacy of Political Decisions: 
Between Procedure and Substance, in Wintgens, supra note 75, at 259. 
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laws issue, then no number of intractable disagreements over the substantive 
merits of particular laws can threaten it.‖80 
From the sociological or empirical legitimacy perspective, experimental 
and field studies demonstrate that the perception that the process by which a 
decision was made is fair increases people‘s sense that the outcome is 
legitimate and leads to greater support for the decision, regardless of whether 
they agree substantively with the outcome.
81
 Some of these studies even 
suggest that ―the process employed in attaining the decisions may be equally, if 
not more, important‖ to people than the result.82  
Studies that examined this hypothesis specifically on Congress and its 
lawmaking process confirm that people‘s perceptions regarding congressional 
procedures—particularly the belief that Congress employs fair decision-
making procedures in the legislative process—significantly impact the 
legitimacy of Congress, as well as legitimacy evaluations of the lawmaking 
process and of its outcomes.
83
 Many studies found, moreover, that the fairness 
                                                          
80
 Id.  
81
 See, e.g., Michael X. Delli Carpini et al., Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and 
Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 7 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 315, 327 
(2004). 
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of decisionmaking procedures affects not only the legitimacy of Congress, but 
also feelings of obligation to obey the law and everyday law-following 
behavior.
84
 These studies also show that although there are widespread 
differences in evaluations of substantive outcomes, there is striking agreement 
across ethnic, gender, education, income, age, and ideological boundaries on 
the criteria that define fair decision-making procedures, as well as widespread 
agreement that such procedures are key to legitimacy.
85
 
Studies by political scientists on public attitudes toward Congress and other 
political institutions also provide ample evidence that ―people actually are 
concerned with the process as well as the outcome. Contrary to popular belief, 
many people have vague policy preferences and crystal-clear process 
preferences . . .‖86 These scholars‘ research reveals, moreover, that the public‘s 
deep dissatisfaction with Congress is due ―in no small part‖ to public 
perceptions about the lawmaking process.
87
 As two leading scholars conclude 
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 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 273-74, 278 (2nd ed., 2006); Martinez, supra 
note 39, at 1026-27.  
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Tyler, supra note 83, at 826, 829; see also Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: 
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103, 132 (1988). 
86
 JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS‘ 
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 6 (2002). See also, Gangl, supra note 83, 
at 136.   
87
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in summarizing research about Americans‘ unhappiness with government, ―we 
are struck by the frequency with which theories and findings suggest 
explanations based on the way government works and not explanations based 
on what government produces.‖88 
 
C.  Process and the Rule of Law 
The rules that govern the legislative process (and the idea that this process 
must be rule-governed) have vital importance for the Rule of Law ideal.
89
 To 
be sure, Rule-of-Law arguments often invite the objection that the meaning of 
the phrase ―the Rule of Law‖ is so contested that such arguments ―should be 
regarded as relatively ad hoc and conclusory.‖90 Nevertheless, I argue that the 
idea that the legislative process should be a rule-governed process rests on a 
relatively uncontested view of the Rule of Law. This idea is also compatible 
with the three major conceptions of the Rule of Law: the ―thin/formal 
conception‖ (which, following Fuller, stresses formal requirements like 
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generality, publicity, consistency, prospectivity, and so on); the 
―thick/substantive conception‖ (which also includes human rights, fundamental 
substantive values, or some moral criteria); and, of course, the ―procedural 
conception‖ (which emphasizes procedural requirements and safeguards in the 
creation and application of legal norms).
91
   
The idea that the legislative process should be a rule-governed process 
stems from one of the most widely-accepted understandings of the Rule-of-
Law: that government should be ruled by the law and subject to it. As a recent 
review of the Rule-of-Law literature noted, disagreements about rule of law 
definitions notwithstanding, ―virtually everyone agrees‖ that the principle that 
the government is bound by law is at the core of the Rule-of-Law ideal.
92
 This 
principle requires that governmental power, including the legislature‘s 
lawmaking power, be exercised under the authority of the law and in 
accordance to the law.
93
 Hence, the rules that confer the necessary powers for 
making valid law and the rules that instruct lawmakers how to exercise their 
lawmaking power are both essential components of the Rule of Law.
94
 These 
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rules that ―create the framework for the enactment of particular laws‖ play an 
important role in ensuring that ―the slogan of the rule of law and not of men 
can be read as a meaningful political ideal.‖95 
My claim that the rules that govern the legislative process are important for 
the Rule of Law ideal is not only consistent with procedural conceptions of the 
Rule of Law, which emphasize procedural restrictions on governmental 
power.
96
 It is also in concert with formal conceptions of the Rule of Law. 
Admittedly, Lon Fuller‘s famous eight requirements for the inner morality of 
law
97—the epitome of the formal conception of the Rule of Law98—do not 
explicitly refer to the idea that lawmaking should be governed by procedural 
rules.
99
 However, the rules that govern the legislative process are important for 
several of the Rule-of-Law principles Fuller identifies. 
A primary example is the consistency of the law through time.
100
 Fuller 
argues that of his eight principles, that which requires that laws should not be 




 On such procedural conceptions and their emphasis on procedural safeguards, including in 
the legislative process, see Fallon, Jr., Rule of Law, supra note 90, at 18; Jeremy Waldron, 
Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91, 106-07 (2007).   
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changed too frequently or too suddenly ―seems least suited to formalization in 
a constitutional restriction. It is difficult to imagine, for example, a 
constitutional convention unwise enough to resolve that no law should be 
changed more often than, say, once a year.‖101 He fails to see, however, that 
there is in fact a straightforward means to realize this Rule-of-Law principle 
through formalized rules. That means is the rules that govern the legislative 
process. One of the important purposes of procedural rules such as bicameral 
passage, discussion in committee, and three readings is precisely to slow down 
the legislative process, and to make legislation an arduous and deliberate (and 
hopefully also deliberative) process.
102
 These rules thereby ensure, inter alia, 
that laws will not change too frequently or too hastily, thereby promoting the 
Rule-of-Law principle of stability. The rules that govern the legislative process 
also serve the purpose of giving citizens notice that the law is about to change 
and providing them time to orient their behavior accordingly.  
Finally, recognition of the importance of the rules regulating the legislative 
process is not in tension with substantive conceptions of the Rule of Law. As 
several recent substantive formulations of the Rule of Law demonstrate, one 
can coherently reject thin conceptions of the Rule of Law in favor of thicker 
conceptions that include additional requirements relating to human rights or 
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other substantive principles, and at the same time also recognize the 
importance of procedural requirements on the legislative process.
103
 
In conclusion, the rules that govern the legislative process serve vital 
functions in ensuring and promoting the Rule of Law ideal and some of its 
most important and widely-accepted principles. 
 
D.  Process and Democracy 
The rules that govern the legislative process are also important because 
they embody, and are designed to promote and protect, essential democratic 
values.
104
 These democratic values include, for example, majority rule, 




The rules that govern the legislative process, and particularly the rules 
regulating voting procedures, are designed to ensure that the laws produced by 
the legislature reflect the will of the majority of its members—and by 
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implication, of the voters whom they represent.
106
 In fact, both empirical 
studies and anecdotal evidence demonstrate how manipulation and violation of 
―even seemingly technical rules can [undermine] important objectives, such as 
ensuring that the will of the chamber rather than the will of its legislative 
officer is enacted into law.‖107 The rules that govern the legislative process are 
also designed to ensure that each member (including members of the minority 
party) is allowed to participate in the legislative process on equal and fair 
grounds.
108
 Requirements such as bicameralism, discussion in committee, and 
three readings, as well as the rules that regulate discussion and require minimal 
periods of time between the several steps of the legislative process, are all 
designed to enable and promote debate and deliberation.
109
 Other rules are 
designed to guarantee publicity, to promote a more transparent and accountable 
legislative process, and to provide citizens with an opportunity to both observe 
and participate in the process.
110
 In these ways, the rules that govern the 
legislative process serve essential principles of procedural democracy.  
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There is a great body of work by democratic theorists that establishes the 
instrumental and intrinsic value of democratic procedures;
111
 as well as 
important work that focuses on the principles and rules that govern the 
legislative process in particular.
112
 There is also sufficient historical evidence 
that demonstrates that the Framers greatly valued these procedural democratic 
principles,
113
 and wanted the legislative process to be ―a step-by-step, 
deliberate and deliberative process.‖114 Recounting all these arguments that 
establish the value of the fundamental principles of procedural democracy is 
therefore not required here.  
The relevant point here is to draw attention to the fact that part of the 
normative value of the rules that govern the legislative process stems from 
their importance in ensuring these fundamental principles of procedural 
democracy. Indeed, these ―principles . . . explain why we have the rules of 
legislative process that we have, and . . . afford a basis for determining the 
[importance of] compliance with them.‖115  
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E.  The Importance of Process 
Legislation scholars have long observed and lamented the legal academia‘s 
general tendency to disregard the rules that govern the legislative process, 
either overlooking these rules
116
 or seeing them as mere technicalities or 
―mindless proceduralism.‖117 This Part argued that legislative procedures and 
rules have vital practical and normative importance, emphasizing their 
importance for legislative outcomes, legitimacy, the Rule-of-Law, and 
essential procedural democratic values. Other scholars have additionally 
argued that these rules are crucial for the functioning of the legislature and for 
solving various collective-action problems facing a large multi-member body 
that must come to agreement.
118
  
The great importance of the rules that regulate the legislative process 
establishes my claim that the legislative process and its rules are no less 
deserving of judicial review than the outcomes of this process. Of course, this 
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still does not establish the legitimacy of such judicial review. That is, one may 
fully recognize the importance of protecting the integrity of the legislative 
process, but still deny that it is the legitimate role of courts to serve as 
protectors of this process. The next part addresses this issue.  
 
IV. THE IRONIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
If constitutional theory is ―an exercise in justification,‖119 constitutional 
theorists‘ favorite exercise seems to be developing justifications for judicial 
review.
120
 This Part argues that some of the major arguments that 
constitutional theorists raise in defense of substantive judicial review turn out 
to be even more persuasive when used to justify JRLP. Moreover, some of the 
arguments against judicial review are mitigated when applied to judicial 
review of the legislative process. Finally, some of the arguments raised by 
leading critics of judicial review can in fact serve as arguments in favor of 
judicial review of the legislative process. Given the plethora of scholarship 
dedicated to justifying judicial review, this Article does not purport to discuss 
all the existing justifications for substantive judicial review that are also 
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applicable to JRLP. Rather, it only focuses on some of the most prominent 
examples.  
   
A.  Marbury v. Madison 
Notwithstanding the criticisms it has attracted throughout the years, the 
centrality of Marbury v. Madison in discussions of judicial review cannot be 
denied.
121
 Marbury ―contains almost all the standard arguments in favor of 
instituting the judicial review of the constitutionality of laws—the same 
arguments that could be raised (and have been, historically) in all other 
circumstances.‖122 It is, therefore, the natural place to begin. 
 
1. Constitutional Supremacy Justifications 
Marbury‘s main argument can be summarized as follows: (1) The 
Constitution is supreme law, superior to ordinary legislative acts;
123
 (2) a 
legislative act, repugnant to the Constitution, is void;
124
 (3) courts may not 
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enforce a legislative act repugnant to the Constitution.
125
 Chief Justice 
Marshall argued that the purpose of creating a written Constitution was to 
create a government in which ―[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and 
limited,‖126 and that judicial enforcement of ―a legislative act repugnant to the 
Constitution‖ would undermine this purpose.127 In a passage that some 
constitutional theorists regard as Marbury‘s primary argument and as ―[t]he 
classic, and . . . most powerful, argument for judicial review,‖128 Marshall 
argued that the idea that courts would enforce a legislative act repugnant to the 
Constitution 
would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It 
would declare that an act, which, according to the principles and 
theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, 
completely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature 
shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding 
the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving 
to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the 
same breath which professes to restrict their powers within 
narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those 




To the extent that one accepts the argument that judicial enforcement of 
unconstitutional statutes undermines the very idea of a supreme written 
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constitution—and of its primary purpose of limiting the legislature—this 
argument is particularly applicable to a statute enacted in violation of the 
constitutionally prescribed procedure. It is well-established that the purpose of 
the lawmaking provisions in the Constitution was to ―prescribe and define‖ 
Congress‘s legislative power, and to limit it to a specific procedure.130 Indeed, 
the text, history and purposes of these provisions ―clearly [confirm] that the 
prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers‘ 
decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in 
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure.‖131  
In fact, the Supreme Court itself has recognized (in dicta) over a 
hundred years ago that the idea that ―under a written constitution, no branch or 
department of the government is supreme‖ requires ―the judicial department to 
determine . . . whether the powers of any branch of the government, and even 
those of the legislature in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in 
conformity to the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat their acts as null 
and void.‖132 This idea that the principles of constitutional supremacy and 
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―constrained parliamentarianism‖ require courts to ensure that the legislature 
exercise all its powers, including in the legislative process, in accordance with 




Moreover, while it is debatable whether substantive limits on the power 
of the legislature are an essential feature of all written constitutions and of 
constitutionalism, it is generally accepted that a constitution ―will certainly 
contain . . . procedural prerequisites for valid ordinary lawmaking.‖134 As Hans 
Kelsen has suggested, ―regulations . . . that determine the legislative 
procedure‖ are necessarily ―part of the material constitution.‖135  
More importantly, Kelsen theorized that while a constitution may also limit 
the content of future statutes, the defining feature that establishes the 
superiority of the constitution is that it regulates the way in which statutes are 
created.
136
 Indeed, Kelsen argued that the basis of the entire hierarchal 
structure of the legal order is that the creation of lower norms is regulated by 
higher norms, and that any norm in the legal system ―is valid because, and to 
the extent that, it had been created in a certain way, that is, in a way 
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determined by another [higher] norm.‖137 If one accepts this view, then judicial 
enforcement of a law that was enacted in violation of Article I Section 7 would 
undermine the very idea of constitutional supremacy even more than enforcing 
a law that infringes upon freedom of speech.
138
    
Marshall argued, furthermore, that the Constitution is supreme and binding 
on the legislature because it represents the ―original and supreme will‖ of the 
people, who as the real sovereign have ―an original right‖ to organize their 
government and set the principles by which they will be governed.
139
 This 
argument is particularly fitting to the Constitution‘s lawmaking provisions, in 
which the sovereign people delegated their original lawmaking power to their 
legislature, and prescribed the specific procedure by which the legislature may 
exercise this power. Judicial review of the legislative process protects the 
people‘s right not to be governed by ―laws‖ which were not really passed by 
their elected legislature, or which were not enacted in accordance with the only 
procedure by which the people agreed to be bound.
140
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2. Rule-of-Law Justifications 
Marshall‘s most direct invocation of Rule-of-Law principles was in holding 
that violations of vested legal rights should have a judicial remedy.
141
 
However, Marshall‘s justification for judicial review is also often interpreted 
as resting on a Rule-of-Law argument. As one scholar argues, ―Marshall[‘s] 
argument for judicial review is well known, as is [his] rule-of-law justification: 
Only the judiciary can impartially determine whether the elected branches have 
complied with constitutional limits on their authority.‖142 Other scholars have 
also cited Marbury as a significant source for the strong association of the Rule 
of Law with judicial review in American constitutional theory.
143
  
At any rate, whether or not Marbury is the source for such arguments, it is 
undeniable that Rule-of-Law arguments of the sort associated with Marbury 
are prevalent in constitutional theorists‘ justifications for judicial review.144 
The Rule-of-Law justification can be summarized along the following lines: 
(1) The Rule-of-Law requires that the government conducts its activities in 
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accordance to the law; (2) judicial review ―is necessary (or at least extremely 
important) to maintaining a disinterested eye on the conduct and activities of 
government . . . therefore [(3) judicial review is key to] the rule of law.‖145  
This justification is particularly applicable to JRLP. As I have argued in Part 
III.C., the argument that the Rule-of-Law entails the requirement that the 
legislative process be rule-governed rests on a relatively uncontested 
understanding of the Rule-of-Law, certainly no more contested than 
substantive conceptions that argue that this ideal must also include a 
commitment for human rights. 
Indeed, it seems that some leading Rule-of-Law theorists would more 
readily accept a Rule-of-Law justification for JRLP than for substantive 
judicial review. Joseph Raz‘s seminal account of the Rule of Law is 
particularly illustrative. Raz argues that one of the important principles that 
―can be derived from the basic idea of the rule of law‖ is that courts should 
have judicial review power over parliamentary legislation, but only ―a very 
limited review—merely to ensure conformity to the rule of law.‖146 It is clear 
that Raz does not mean substantive judicial review, as he insists that the Rule-
of-Law ―is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality . . . human 









rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man.‖147 He 
argues, rather, that the type of judicial review that is required by the Rule-of-
Law ideal is review power over the implementation of the Rule-of-Law 
principles he enumerates, including the important principle that the enactment 
of particular laws should be rule-governed.
148
 
Although the Rule-of-Law justification and the constitutional supremacy 
justification discussed in the previous section are often mentioned in tandem, 
there is an important difference between them. The Rule-of-Law justification 
does not rest on accepting the idea of constitutional supremacy, but rather on 
the acceptance of the Rule-of-Law principle that government must be subject 
to the law, and may only wield its power according to the law. This distinction 
has two important implications. First, Rule-of-Law arguments can justify JRLP 
even in legal systems that lack a written constitution and in which courts lack 
the power of substantive judicial review. Second, in constitutional systems, the 
Rule-of-Law justification can legitimize judicial enforcement of both 
constitutional and subconstitutional rules that govern the legislative process. 
As Fredrick Schauer recognizes:    
If the commands of . . . the rule of law . . . demand that 
legislation be made according to law, then the full range of laws 
that constitute and constrain the legislative function would be 
within the purview of [the courts]. Courts might plausibly, 
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therefore, be understood not only as enforcers of [constitutional 
rules,] but also as enforcers of the process by which legislators 
are expected to follow their own rules . . .
149
 
   
Indeed, in countries in which courts decided to also enforce the 
subconstitutional rules that govern the legislative process, Rule-of-Law 
arguments have played a central role in the courts‘ decisions.150 
 
3. Constitutional Basis and the Supremacy Clause 
In addition to his general arguments, Marshall found support for judicial 
review in the ―particular phraseology of the constitution.‖151 Marshall relied, 
for example, on Article III, section 2, which states that ―The judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution,‖ and on the oath 
imposed on judges to support the Constitution.
152
 The judicial duty to support 
the Constitution, and to adjudicate ―all Cases‖ arising under it, clearly applies 
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to violations of the Constitution‘s lawmaking provisions as well. As I have 
argued in more detail elsewhere, the text, purpose and original meaning of 
these provisions confirm that they were meant to be binding,
153
 and nothing in 
the Constitution requires committing their enforcement to another branch.
154
 
Most important for present purposes, however, is Marshall‘s reliance on 
the Supremacy Clause, which states, in part, that ―[t]his Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land.‖155 This argument remains central to debates 
about judicial review, with contemporary supporters of judicial review still 
arguing that ―[t]he text, history, and structure of the Constitution confirm that 
the Supremacy Clause authorizes judicial review of federal statutes.‖156 As 
Bradford Clark summarizes the argument: 
Although the Clause requires . . . courts to follow ―the supreme 
Law of the Land‖ over contrary state law, the Clause conditions 
the supremacy of federal statutes on their being ―made in 
Pursuance‖ of the Constitution. Thus, the Clause constitutes an 
express command for judges not only to prefer federal to state 
law, but also to prefer the Constitution to federal statutes. This 
means that, in deciding whether to follow state law or a contrary 
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federal statute, courts must first resolve any challenges to the 




If one accepts that the Supremacy Clause commands courts to examine 
whether statutes are ―made in Pursuance‖ of the Constitution, this should 
clearly include authority to determine compliance with the Constitution‘s 
procedural lawmaking requirements. 
Indeed, some of the leading critics of Marbury‘s reliance on the 
Supremacy Clause, such as Alexander Bickel, have based their criticisms, to a 
large extent, on the argument that the phrase ―made in pursuance thereof‖ is 
more plausibly interpreted as only requiring enactment in accordance with the 
Constitution‘s procedural lawmaking requirements.158  
To be sure, defenders of Marbury‘s reliance on the Supremacy Clause 
have contested Bickel‘s argument that the Supremacy Clause relates 
exclusively to procedural requirements.
159
 However, even some of these 
scholars conceded that the Clause also ―undoubtedly incorporates the 
procedural [requirements] that Professor Bickel invoked.‖160 In fact, in his 
earlier work, Bradford Clark himself noted that the phrase ―Laws . . . which 
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shall be made in Pursuance thereof‖ suggests that this Clause ―is tied to 
compliance with federal lawmaking procedures.‖161  
Interestingly, research about the original understanding of this Clause 
suggests that even at the time of ratification there were both judicial review 
supporters and skeptics who understood the Clause as establishing, at least, 
judicial enforcement of Article I, Section 7.
162
 
In short, one can certainly argue that ―‗Pursuance‘ embodies the 
expectation of constitutional review, the substantive and not merely the 
procedural sufficiency of ‗the Laws of the United States.‘‖163 However, it is 
hard to see how one could claim that the Supremacy Clause authorizes 
substantive judicial review while denying that it also authorizes JRLP. 
 
4. ―The Very Essence of Judicial Duty‖ 
Finally, Marshall also famously argued that judicial review is ―of the very 
essence of judicial duty.‖164 The argument, in short, is that those who apply the 
law must determine what the law is, and hence, when confronted with cases in 
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which a law conflicts with the Constitution, courts must determine which of 
these conflicting norms governs the case.
165
  
A similar argument was suggested by Kelsen, who argued that ―[s]ince 
[courts] are authorized to apply the statutes, they have to determine whether 
something whose subjective meaning is to be a statute has objectively this 
meaning; and it does have the objective meaning only if it conforms to the 
constitution.‖166 Hence, although Kelesn believed that the constitution should 
vest judicial review power in the hands of a single constitutional court, he 
argued that ―[i]f the constitution contains no provision concerning the question 
who is authorized to examine the constitutionality of statutes, then the organs 
competent to apply statutes, that is, especially, the courts, have the power to 
perform this examination.‖167 
This argument is also particularly applicable to JRLP. As one of the state 
supreme courts held as early as 1852 in establishing its authority to exercise 
JRLP: 
I hold the authority to inquire [into the enactment process] for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the [Act] has a constitutional 
existence to be incident to all courts of general jurisdiction, and 
necessary for the protection of public rights and liberties . . . . 
Courts are bound to know the law, both statute and common. It is 
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their province to determine whether a statute be law or not . . . . 
[I]t must be tried by the judges, who must inform themselves in 




In fact, the next section argues that this argument is most persuasive when 
justifying JRLP. 
 
B.  Rule-of-Recognition Theories
169
 
After many years of shaping ―much of the current debate in Anglo-
American jurisprudence,‖170 H.L.A. Hart‘s ―rule of recognition‖ idea is 
increasingly influencing debates in constitutional theory as well.
171
 In the first 
sub-section I build upon Hart‘s theory to develop an argument for JRLP. In the 
second sub-section I turn to the leading existing rule-of-recognition 
constitutional theory, and argue that it is most persuasive when applied to 
JRLP. 
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1. Judicial Review of the Legislative Process and the Recognition of Law     
Hart argued that any legal system necessarily possesses a ―rule of 
recognition‖—a rule that sets out criteria for identifying the legal rules of the 
system.
172
 The rule of recognition provides the system‘s test of legal validity: 
―To say that a given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests 
provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the system.‖173 
According to a dominant understanding of Hart‘s theory—which was 
reportedly accepted by Hart himself—the rule of recognition is ―a duty-
imposing rule.‖174 As Joseph Raz explains, ―the rule of recognition imposes an 
obligation on the law-applying officials to recognize and apply all and only 
those laws satisfying certain criteria of validity spelled out in the rule . . .‖175  
In addition to the rule of recognition, Hart introduced two other rules that lie at 
the heart of a legal system. The ―rule of change‖ confers the power to 
legislate—to create, alter, or abolish the legal rules of the system—typically by 
specifying the persons or institution authorized to legislate and the required 
procedure for legislating.
176
 The ―rule of adjudication‖ confers judicial 
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powers—the authority to determine whether a certain legal rule has been 
violated in a particular case, and usually also to impose sanctions in case of 
violation.
177
 It indentifies the individuals or bodies who are authorized to 
adjudicate and the procedure to be followed.
178
     
The nuances and complications in Hart‘s theory have been the subject 
of much discussion in analytic jurisprudence.
179
 This brief and necessarily 
simplistic sketch is all that is required, however, as background for developing 
an argument for JRLP. To clarify, I am not arguing that Hart himself would 
support JRLP. In fact, at least some statements in The Concept of Law may 
suggest that he would deny that his theory necessitates such judicial review.
180
 
Moreover, while Hart‘s theory was descriptive, I am not making a descriptive 
claim that any legal system must have JRLP. Rather, I am building upon Hart‘s 
theory and some of its arguments to develop the claim that the authority to 
exercise JRLP is inherent to adjudicative authority.  
Hart noted that adjudication is necessarily related to the rule of 
recognition: ―[t]his is so, because if courts are empowered to make 
authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been broken, these 
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cannot avoid being taken as authoritative determinations of what the rules 
are.‖181 The direct point Hart was making in this passage is that the rule of 
adjudication which confers jurisdiction constitutes at least part of the rule of 
recognition, because it allows people to identify the legal rules of the system 
through the judgments of the courts.
182
  
This passage invites an argument about the inescapable relation 
between adjudication and the authority to determine what the legal rules are: if 
the rule of adjudication empowers courts to apply legal rules to cases brought 
before them (to authoritatively determine whether a certain rule was violated in 
a particular case); and if the rule of recognition obligates them to apply only 
those rules satisfying the criteria of validity specified in that rule; then the 
courts‘ authority to adjudicate necessarily entails the authority and duty to 
determine the validity of the legal rules coming before them.
183
  
Note that this argument about the judicial authority to determine the 
validity of statutes is not contingent upon the existence of a written 
constitution or upon arguments about the supremacy of such a constitution. 
This argument would suggest that courts in any legal system should have the 
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authority to determine the validity of legislation in the sense of recognizing it 
as passing the criteria provided by the rule of recognition, and these criteria 




Of course, the authority to determine validity in the rule-of-recognition 
sense need not necessarily translate into a full-blown authority of judicial 
review of legislation. Indeed, writing at a time in which the English legal 
system was still unqualifiedly characterized by the traditional British model of 
parliamentary supremacy, Hart suggested that in such a legal system, the 
ultimate criterion for the identification of law might simply be captured by the 
expression ―whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law.‖185 However, I 
argue that the rule-of-recognition argument can support the claim that courts 
have JRLP authority even in a legal system without a written constitution, and 
in which courts have no power to exercise substantive judicial review. Indeed, 
Hart‘s work lends support to the argument that rules that specify the procedure 
for enactment are inevitable in any legal system, as well as to the argument that 
such rules have vital importance for the identification of the law. 
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Hart argued that even in an imaginary society governed by an absolute 
monarch, in which whatever the monarch orders is the law, there must be a 
way to distinguish her orders, which she wishes to have ―official‖ status, from 
her private utterances and orders to her household, which she does not wish to 
have ―official‖ status of law.186 Hence, even in such a simple legal system, in 
which absolute lawmaking power is vested in a single person, ancillary rules 
will be adopted to specify the ―manner and form‖ which the monarch is to use 
when she legislates.
187
 Of course, the need for secondary rules that specify the 
procedure for legislating significantly increases in more sophisticated legal 
systems with multimember legislatures and more complex procedures for 
producing law. Hart noted that every legal system—even one in which there is 
no written constitution and no substantive limits on the legislative power—




Hart noted that such rules are not ―duty-imposing‖ rules, and seemed to 
accept the argument that these rules should not be counted as ―limits‖ on the 
sovereign‘s legislative powers since they do not limit the content of the 
legislative power.
189
 He noted, however, that these rules ―must be taken 
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seriously if they are to serve their purpose,‖ indicating that these rules‘ 
essential purpose is to allow the sovereign‘s subjects to recognize which of the 
sovereign‘s utterances is ―law.‖190 The relationship between the ―manner and 
form‖ rules and the rule of recognition becomes clearer when Hart turns to 
discuss a legal system that does have a written constitution. Hart argued that 
constitutional provisions that specify ―the form and manner of legislation,‖ as 
well as the provisions that define the scope of the legislative power, ―are parts 
of the rule conferring authority to legislate.‖191 These provisions ―vitally 
concern the courts, since they use such rule as a criterion of the validity of 
purported legislative enactments coming before them.‖192 
Hart raised these arguments in the context of rejecting Austin‘s 
doctrine of sovereignty and its claim that conceptually there could be no legal 
limitations on the sovereign‘s legislative power.193 Indeed, the importance of 
these arguments in rejecting the view that the legislative process is a sphere of 
unfettered omnipotence in favor of the view that ―law-making cannot be 
understood except as a rule-governed process‖ is well recognized.194 Even 
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more important for present purposes, however, is the implication of Hart‘s 
arguments as to the connection between the rules that govern the legislative 
process and the rule of recognition. These passages suggest that the rules that 
specify the procedure for legislating are of vital importance for the rule of 
recognition, for they provide at least some of the rule of recognition‘s criteria 
for identifying the legal rules of the system.
195
  
These passages also seem to bring Hart very close to the ―new view‖ of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which was already gaining popularity among 
British constitutional theorists around the time The Concept of Law was first 
published.
196
 The ―new view‖ scholars argued that the rules that prescribe the 
sovereign‘s composition and lawmaking procedures are ―logically prior to the 
sovereign,‖ and that these rules are ―necessary for the identification of the 
sovereign and for the ascertainment of [its] will‖ in any legal system.197 They 
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argued therefore that procedural rules that govern the legislative process 
should not be viewed as limits on the will of the sovereign Parliament, but as 
―a necessary pre-condition to the validity of [its] acts.‖198  
To be sure, the ―new view‖ scholars focused on challenging Dicey‘s 
classic view of parliamentary sovereignty in English constitutional theory,
199
 
whereas Hart was mostly focused on challenging Austin‘s doctrine of 
sovereignty in legal philosophy.
200
 It appears, however, that Hart largely 
accepted the ―new view‖ scholars‘ views about the rules that govern the 
legislative process and their relation to parliamentary sovereignty.
201
 This is 
significant, because some of the leading ―new view‖ scholars expressly argued 
that the logical consequence of their arguments is that even under the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty, which prohibits substantive judicial review, 
courts must ―have jurisdiction to question the validity of an alleged Act of 
Parliament on [procedural] grounds.‖202 They argued that judicial examination 
of the enactment process is necessary in order for courts to determine the 
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authenticity of a putative Act, and conceptualized such judicial review as an 
inquiry whether Parliament has ―spoken.‖203 
Admittedly, all of the above is in tension with one passage in The 
Concept of Law. In discussing the relationship between the rule of recognition 
and the rules of change, Hart noted that there will plainly be ―a very close 
connection‖ between the two, and that the rule of recognition will ―necessarily 
incorporate a reference to legislation.‖204 He added, however, that the rule of 
recognition ―need not refer to all the details of procedure involved in 
legislation. Usually some official certificate or official copy will, under the 
rules of recognition, be taken as a sufficient proof of due enactment.‖205 I 
argue, however, that determining the procedural validity of legislation is not 
merely a factual question of ―proof,‖ and, therefore, the judicial need to 
recognize what constitutes valid law cannot be entirely resolved by ―some 
official certificate.‖ In fact, I argue that some of Hart‘s own arguments in later 
parts of The Concept of Law help to establish this claim.        
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In discussing the possibility of uncertainty in the rule of recognition, 
Hart conceded that even in a legal system ―in which there is no written 
constitution specifying the competence of the supreme legislature,‖ the 
formula ―whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law‖ will not always be 
an adequate expression of the ultimate criterion for the identification of law.
206
 
Hart acknowledged that even in such a legal system, ―doubts can arise as to 
[this criterion‘s] meaning or scope.‖207 Importantly, he noted that ―we can ask 
what is meant by ‗enacted by parliament‘ and when doubts arise they may be 
settled by the courts.‖208 
Hart went on to examine some of the vexing questions relating to the 
English doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, including the extent to which 
Parliament can alter the ―manner and form‖ requirements for legislation and 
entrench such provisions.
209
 Hart‘s conclusion is significant enough to be 
presented in verbatim: 
It is quite possible that some of [these] questionable 
propositions . . . will one day be endorsed or rejected by a court 
called on to decide the matter. Then we shall have an answer . . 
. and that answer . . . will have a unique authoritative status 
among the answers which might be given. The courts will have 
made determinate at this point the ultimate rule by which valid 
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law is identified. Here ‗the constitution is what the judges say it 
is‘ does not mean merely that particular decisions of supreme 
tribunals cannot be challenged…. [H]ere are courts exercising 
creative powers which settle the ultimate criteria by which the 




This statement is astounding when we remember that Hart was discussing a 




Two main arguments can be developed based on these passages. First, 
Hart seemed to recognize an important and often overlooked aspect of 
determining the procedural validity of legislation: this determination does not 
merely entail a factual determination that the requirements for enactment were 
met. It also entails an interpretative task of determining what the requirements 
are and what should count as satisfying these requirements.
212
 Indeed, I have 
argued elsewhere that determining whether a bill has been properly enacted in 
compliance with the Constitution is not merely a factual inquiry, for it raises 
the interpretative ―questions of what exactly are the procedural requirements 
set forth in Article I and what constitutes compliance with these requirements 
(for example, what constitutes ‗passage‘)...‖213 Hart‘s discussion in the 
                                                          
210
 Id. at 152. 
211
 Indeed, Hart himself realized that ―[a]t first sight the spectacle seems paradoxical.‖ Id. at 
152. 
212







passages above supports the claim that such interpretative questions of ―what is 
meant by ‗enacted by parliament‘‖ can arise even in legal systems that lack a 
written constitution which prescribes the procedure for enactment.
214
 
Second, Hart seemed to realize that the authority to answer the question 
of ―what is meant by ‗enacted by parliament‘‖ entails ―exercising creative 
powers‖ which settle the content of the ultimate criteria of validity itself.215 
The combination of these two arguments reveals the real consequence of 
courts‘ relying on ―some official certificate‖ of ―due enactment‖ instead of 
determining the validity of legislation on their own. The consequence is that 
the courts cede to the legislative officers who prepare this official certificate 
not only the power to make the factual determination that all lawmaking 
requirements were met, but also the power to determine the contents of the rule 
of change and, ultimately, of the rule of recognition itself.
216
  
Finally, there is an even graver consequence of judicial acceptance of 
―some official certificate‖ in lieu of an independent judicial determination of 
the validity of legislation, which Hart seemed to overlook. When courts treat as 
valid ―law‖ any document that bears this official certificate, they in fact give 
the certifying officers not only the power to determine the content of the rule 
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of change, but in fact the power to make law in violation of the rule of 
change.
217
 That is, the fact that courts accept any document that bears the 
official certificate as ―law‖ allows the certifying officers to produce such a 
document on their own and this piece of paper that was never enacted by the 
legislature will be part of the valid laws of the legal system.
218
 This argument 
may sound farfetched. In fact, however, there is at least one recent case in 
which the legislative officers of Congress allegedly certified and presented to 
the President a bill that they knew was not enacted in the same form by both 
Houses of Congress as mandated by the Constitution.
219
 Since the federal 
courts refuse to undertake an independent judicial examination of the 
procedural validity of legislation even in ―cases involving allegations that the 
presiding officers of Congress . . . conspired to violate the Constitution by 
enacting legislation that had not passed both the House and Senate,‖220 this 
―law‖ is now part of the legal system.          
Thus, the rule-of-recognition argument for JRLP can be summarized as 
follows: adjudication entails the authority to determine whether legislation 
satisfies the validity criteria provided by the rule of recognition; the rule of 
recognition‘s validity criteria are provided, in turn, at least in part, by the rules 
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that specify the procedure for legislating. Hence, while resort to these rules 
will not always be required, whenever there is doubt as to whether a certain 
statute was enacted by the legislature, courts should be authorized to determine 
compliance with those rules. This authority is not contingent upon the 
authority of constitutional judicial review, or even on the existence of a 
constitution. Rather, since rules that specify the procedure for legislating are 
inevitable in any legal system, and are vital for recognizing the law (which, in 
turn, is an inherent part of adjudication), the authority to adjudicate should 
entail the authority of JRLP in any legal system. 
To clarify, I am not claiming that the rule-of-recognition argument 
necessitates the conclusion that JRLP must exist, as a descriptive matter, in any 
legal system. Rather, I argue that the rule-of-recognition argument can provide 
a basis for the authority for such judicial review in any legal system. The fact 
that courts in some countries, such as the U.S., abdicate their inherent authority 
and duty to examine the procedural validity of legislation is therefore not 
detrimental to my claim. On the contrary, my rule-of-recognition argument 
helps underscore the serious negative consequences of such judicial abdication.   
 
2. ―Constitutional Existence Conditions‖     
The best example of a constitutional theory that develops a rule-of-





is Adler and Dorf‘s ―constitutional existence conditions‖ theory.221 These 
scholars argue that many provisions of the Constitution are best understood as 
setting ―existence conditions‖—that is, as stating the necessary conditions that 
statutes must meet in order to be recognized as law.
222
 While these provisions 
do not constitute the entire and ultimate rule of recognition in the American 
legal system,
223
 they operate like the rule of recognition in the sense that they 




Adler and Dorf claim that ―[o]nce one acknowledges that courts have the 
duty to apply statutes,‖225 it becomes clear that judicial enforcement of 
constitutional provisions that state existence conditions is unavoidable:  
If (1) the judge is under a legal duty to take account of [statutes] 
in reaching her decisions, then (2) she is under a legal duty to 
determine whether putative legal propositions of that type, 
advanced by the parties, really do have legal force. Yet this 
entails (3) a legal duty to determine whether these putative legal 
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They argue, therefore, that even if Marbury v. Madison was to be overruled, it 
would still be the inevitable legal duty of judges to exercise judicial review, in 
the sense of determining whether a putative statute satisfied the ―constitutional 
existence conditions‖ of legislation.227 
 If one accepts this argument for judicial review, the remaining question 
is which constitutional provisions set ―existence conditions‖—or more 
generally, what are the validity criteria under the American rule of recognition. 
Adler and Dorf are mostly interested in developing their argument into a 
justification of substantive judicial review. They ―aim to dislodge the intuition 
that procedural mechanisms such as Article I, Section 7 are the only existence 
conditions, whereas substantive provisions such as the enumerated powers and 
individual rights clauses are [not].‖228  
Importantly, however, Adler and Dorf‘s argument begins from the 
recognition that ―there is a certain intuitive logic‖ to consider the constitutional 
provision that identifies the procedure for legislating as setting forth existence 
conditions;
229
 and that this provision is the primary example of those 
provisions that ―Americans intuitively understand as (partly) constituting the 
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difference between law and nonlaw.‖230 They concede, moreover, that even 
under the most minimalist rule of recognition, the bare minimum that the 
validity criterion in the U.S. must include is the premise that a ―proposition 
constitutes a federal statute if and only if it satisfies the procedures for 
promulgating statutes set forth in the Constitution.‖231  
Adler and Dorf reject this narrow approach, arguing instead that the 
validity criteria in the American system include ―the rule of recognition itself, 
the Constitution, and all other rules derivative of these‖ and that ―[w]hether a 
constitutional provision sets forth an existence condition for some type of law 
is itself a constitutional question.‖ Based on this approach, they go on to 
establish their claim that many provisions of the Constitution, including 
substantive provisions, state existence conditions.
232
 Even under this approach, 
however, they note that the provisions that define the mechanisms of 
lawmaking are among the ―constitutional provisions that most clearly function 
as existence conditions.‖233  
In short, notwithstanding their primary goal of establishing that 
substantive constitutional provisions constitute existence conditions, every step 
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in Adler and Dorf‘s argument confirms that their argument for judicial review 
is most persuasive when applied to JRLP. To their credit, they readily admit 
that Article I, Section 7 is ―the clearest case of a constitutional existence 
condition,‖234 and that the courts‘ refusal to enforce this provision is hard to 
reconcile with their constitutional theory.
235
 
The question of what constitutes the validity criteria in the U.S. is far 
from settled in the analytic jurisprudence and constitutional theory literature.
236
 
There seems to be significant support, however, for the premise that the 
validity criteria include, at the very least, the procedural requirements for 
lawmaking set out in the Constitution.
237
 In fact, even some of the critics of a 
rule-of-recognition justification to constitutionalism base their objection, in 
part, on the argument that ―[t]he rule-of-recognition notion justifies . . . 
constitutional provisions defining the [procedural] conditions for the enactment 
of valid national legislation... But [it] hardly justifies the numerous substantive 
                                                          




 See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, in Adler & Einar 
Himma, supra note 171, at 1 (noting the difficulty of determining the rule of recognition for 
the U.S.). 
237
 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 174, at 240; Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition?, 
supra note 192, at 340-41. Cf. Michelman, supra note 134, at 1300-01 (noting that a 
constitution ―functions as what H.L.A. Hart calls a rule of recognition‖ in the sense that it ―sets 
conditions of validity for ordinary law‖ and that this ―certainly‖ includes ―procedural 





limitations on the national lawmaking power contained in [the 
Constitution].‖238  
In short, the rule-of-recognition argument provides a powerful reply to 
attacks on the legitimacy of judicial review. It suggests that debates about the 
legitimacy of judicial review are misdirected, because, legitimate or not, 
judicial review is simply an inevitable part of adjudication.
239
 As Adler and 
Dorf claim, it is simply ―impossible to take the entire Constitution away from 
the courts.‖240 If one accepts this argument, than the resistance to JRLP 
becomes particularly puzzling, because there is significant agreement—from 
Adler and Dorf to Klareman and Waldron—that the procedural requirements 
for lawmaking specified in the Constitution are inevitably part of the validity 
criteria in the U.S.  
 
C.  Dialogue Theories 
Dialogue theories are becoming increasingly influential and widespread 
in constitutional theory in recent years.
241
 Dialogue theorists argue that judicial 
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review should not be viewed as an instance of unaccountable judges 
superseding the will of elected representatives; but rather, as part of an ongoing 
dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution, in which all three branches of 
government and the general public participate.
242
 This Section argues that 
some of the major arguments underlying dialogue theories can in fact be used 
to underscore the claim that JRLP is more defensible than substantive judicial 
review. 
One of the crucial arguments underlying the dialogue justification is the 
claim that a judicial decision that invalidates a statute is merely an invitation 
for reconsideration by the elected branches. Dialogue theorists seek to 
undermine the counter-majoritarian argument‘s assumption that judicial review 
trumps majority will, by claiming that the political branches can respond to 
judicial decisions with which they disagree.
243
 Some dialogue theorists focus 
on the ability of the legislature to respond to judicial invalidations of 
statutes;
244
 others focus on the responses of the political process more 
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 The important point, however, is that both advocates and critics of 
dialogue theories agree that the dialogue argument is based on the legislature‘s 
(or the political process‘) ability to respond to judicial invalidations.246  
Substantive judicial review—at least in its American ―strong-form‖ 
version, in which the Court‘s constitutional judgments are purportedly final 
and unrevisable
247—poses a serious challenge to dialogue theory.248 To be 
sure, American dialogue theorists argue that notwithstanding the Court‘s claim 
to finality,
249
 the Court does not really have the final word on constitutional 
matters.
250
 The argument, in brief, is that controversial constitutional decisions 
by the Court create a backlash from the public and the political branches, 
which eventually—through ―the gradual attrition of the Justices, and through 
presidential appointment of successors‖—pushes the Court to reverse its earlier 
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decision and to ―come into line with popular opinion.‖251 However, even the 
proponents of this claim admit that it takes great efforts and a long time to 
reverse judicial decisions under this scheme, and that in the meantime 
―majority will still is frustrated.‖252 Moreover, empirical data suggests that 
even when Congress responds to judicial invalidations of legislation, the Court 
tends to get the final word on constitutional interpretation, limiting the 
legislature‘s role to salvaging some of its policy objectives within the 
constitutional confines imposed by the Court.
253
 
JRLP, in contrast, is, by design, particularly apt for enabling 
reenactment of invalidated statutes. A distinctive feature of JRLP is that the 
judicial decision remands the invalidated statute to the legislature, which is 
entirely free to reenact the exact same legislation, provided that a proper 
legislative process is followed.
254
 There is no claim to judicial finality or 
supremacy; instead, the invitation for a ―second legislative look‖ is inherent to 
this form of judicial review.
255
 JRLP allows for faster, easier and much more 
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direct political response to judicial invalidations.
256
 Moreover, JRLP provides 
more room for a legislative response that engages both policy and 
constitutional aspects of the legislation. Hence, to the extent that the ability of 
the legislature (or the political process more broadly) to respond to judicial 
invalidations is what takes the sting out of the countermajoritarian difficulty, 
this argument is more persuasive as support for JRLP. 
For some dialogue theorists the dialogue justification revolves entirely 
around the claim discussed above—that judicial invalidations of statutes 
―usually leave room for, and usually receive, a legislative response.‖257 Other 
dialogue theorists argue further that judicial review is justified because it 
promotes constitutional dialogue outside the courts.
258
 The argument is that 
judicial review not only leaves room for, but in fact encourages and facilitates, 
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an extra-judicial debate about the meaning of the Constitution.
259
 Barry 
Friedman argues, for example, that the ―Court acts as a catalyst for debate, 
fostering a national dialogue about constitutional meaning. Prompting, 
maintaining, and focusing this debate about constitutional meaning is the 
primary function of judicial review.‖260 According to Friedman, the Court 
plays a dual role in this dialogue: the role of ―speaker‖—declaring rights and 
―telling us what the Constitution means‖—and the role of ―shaper or 
facilitator.‖261 
The problem is that under the current model of substantive judicial 
review, the Court is much more a speaker and shaper than a mere facilitator in 
the national conversation about constitutional meaning—even if we fully 
accept dialogue theorists‘ descriptive account that the Court does not have the 
final word. In contrast, under JRLP the court is neither a speaker nor a shaper, 
but rather merely and truly a facilitator of the dialogue. Under JRLP, the court 
expresses no view on the content of the legislation, with all the value and 
policy judgments it entails. It leaves the debates about the proper meaning of 
the Constitution and about rights and policy entirely to the political branches 




 Id. at 1295-96. 
261
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and the public. Unlike semiprocedural judicial review, moreover, the court 
does not even have to provide provisional substantive interpretation.  
At the same time, JRLP also has inherent features that may contribute 
to improving constitutional deliberations outside the courts.
262
 By focusing on 
the process of legislation, and enforcing rules whose purpose is to enable and 
encourage deliberation and participation, it promotes dialogue within the 
political branches and the public.
263
 Indeed, even new-governance scholars, 
who are usually skeptical of courts, have recently argued that judicial review 
that focuses on the decision-making process of the other branches can be 
particularly useful in promoting dialogue outside the courts.
264 
Hence, under 
JRLP, courts truly are merely facilitators of the dialogue about the meaning of 
the Constitution. 
In short, dialogue theory goes a long way in rebutting claims that JRLP 
is more intrusive and disrespectful toward the legislature than substantive 
judicial review. It helps to demonstrate that JRLP is particularly apt for 
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enabling legislative response and that the judicial role under this type of 
judicial review is much more modest. 
 
D.  Process Theories 
The resistance to JRLP is perhaps most puzzling given the centrality of 
process-based justifications for judicial review in constitutional theory. Ely‘s 
―representation-reinforcing‖ theory,265 in particular, is arguably the most 
influential constitutional theory in the past few decades.
266
  
Accepting the charge that substantive judicial review is 
countermajoritarian, and therefore prima facie incompatible with democratic 
theory,
267
 Ely sought to develop an approach to judicial review that ―unlike its 
rival value-protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary 
(and quite by design) entirely supportive of . . . representative democracy.‖268 
He argued that rather than dictating substantive results or protecting 
substantive constitutional values, courts should only intervene when the 
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 Ely argued that judicial review that focuses 
on the political process, rather than substance, is not only more legitimate, but 
also, ―again in contradiction to its rival, involves tasks that courts, as experts 
on process and  . . . as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better 
qualified and situated to perform than political officials.‖270 While Ely was 
interested in the political process more broadly, he indicated that his theory is 
concerned ―with the process by which the laws that govern society are 
made.‖271 
Based on this brief description of Ely‘s theory, the uninitiated reader might 
be tempted to conclude that Ely was advocating JRLP against substantive 
judicial review. However, Ely and most process theorists do not advocate 
JRLP.
272
 Instead, they mostly use process-based theories to justify some 
version of substantive judicial review, and to delineate the areas in which 
substantive judicial review is legitimate.
273
 Generally speaking, process 
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theorists try to define the categories of cases in which the political process is 
likely to be untrustworthy and argue that substantive judicial review is (only) 
legitimate in these cases.
274
 They also typically seek to legitimize judicial 
protection of certain rights—democracy-enforcing rights, such as voting rights 
and freedom of speech—while delegitimizing judicial enforcement of other 
constitutional rights.
275
 Ely‘s theory itself was mostly an effort to justify and 
reconcile the Warren Court‘s decisions under ―a coherent theory of 
representative government;‖276 and to provide a ―constitutionally justified 
recipe for filling in the ‗open texture‘ of the Free Speech, Due Process, and 
Equal Protection Clauses.‖277 
The process theorists‘ arguments, however, are particularly applicable to 
justifying JRLP. In fact, the one premise from Ely‘s theory that seems to be 
most widely accepted is that correcting the defects in the political process is a 
legitimate function of judicial review.
278
 Indeed, many constitutional theorists, 
such as subsequent process theorists, public choice theorists, and civic 
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republican theorists adopted the premise that there are defects (of one sort or 
another) in the legislative process and that courts can and should cure such 
process failures.
279
 Ironically, even Justice Scalia, perhaps the staunchest 
opponent of JRLP on the Court,
280
 embraced this argument in the service of 
justifying his textualist theory of interpretation.
281
 
Admittedly, given its focus only on the enactment process, JRLP cannot by 
itself cure all the broader political process maladies targeted by process 
theorists. However, to the extent that these process theorists advocate 
substantive judicial review for the correction of procedural pathologies in the 
enactment process itself, JRLP is a more direct (and therefore more promising, 
and more straightforward) means to deal with such procedural defects.
282
   
Furthermore, JRLP avoids much of the criticisms leveled against Ely and 
other process theories. For one thing, much of the criticism Ely attracted was 
due to his argument that courts should avoid protecting substantive values and 
individual liberties that are not directly process-related. Laurence Tribe has 
famously argued that ―[o]ne difficulty that immediately confronts process 
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theories is the stubbornly substantive character of so many of the 
Constitution‘s most crucial commitments.‖283 Or as William Eskridge puts it, 
―[t]aking substance (liberty) out of the Constitution, or relegating it to the 
shadows as Ely does, is like taking God out of the Bible.‖284 JRLP avoids this 
criticism, because it does not entail rejection of judicial protection of 
fundamental rights and liberties. As courts that exercise JRLP demonstrate, 
this model can coexist side by side with substantive judicial review. 
Another major criticism of Ely‘s theory focuses on its blurry distinction 
between substance and process. Critics have argued that ―under Dean Ely's 
expansive definition of ‗process,‘ virtually every constitutional issue can be 
phrased in procedural terms that justify judicial review.‖285 JRLP, on the other 
hand, draws a sharper (even if not perfect) distinction between judicial review 
that examines the content of legislation and judicial review that examines the 
procedures leading to enactment.
286
 Moreover, the ―process‖ in JRLP is more 
narrow and clear: rather than referring to ―the democratic process‖ or ―the 
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political process‖ more broadly, it refers only to the enactment process within 
the legislature. The borders of this process are much clearer: from the initial 
introduction of the bill in one of the legislature‘s chambers to its signature by 
the President (or Congress‘s override of her veto). The definition of what such 
―process‖ entails is also relatively clearer, because it is specified in the written 
constitutional and subconstitutional rules that prescribe the requirements for 
valid enactment.    
A related common criticism relates to Ely‘s claim that he was advancing a 
value-neutral approach to judicial review. Critics have argued that procedural 
protections inevitably serve underlying values.
287
 This Article embraces this 
criticism. It argues that part of the justification for JRLP is precisely that it 
protects essential democratic values. Note, however, that JRLP only requires a 
commitment to a relatively uncontested set of procedural democratic values.
288
 
In this regard it is markedly different than semiprocedural judicial review, 
which employs review of the enactment process in order to protect substantive 
values, thereby inevitably inviting the question of which substantive values the 
courts should promote through heightened procedural lawmaking 
requirements.
289
 As JRLP applies across the board, regardless of the 
                                                          
287
 Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 56, at 897. 
288





legislation‘s content and the substantive values it represents or endangers, it 
largely avoids this problem. 
Finally, and also related, process theories have invited concerns as to the 
extent that such theories curb judicial discretion or merely provide a platform 
for judges to inject their own ideological preferences under the guise of a 
neutral approach to judicial review.
290
  JRLP is more suitable for curbing 
judicial discretion. To be sure, no model of judicial review can be entirely 
objective and discretion-free, and JRLP is no exception. Indeed, I have stressed 
earlier that determining whether a certain bill was properly enacted into law is 
not merely a factual question, and often interpretative questions will be 
unavoidable.
291
 Some rules that regulate the legislative process, moreover, may 
require more interpretation than others.
292
 Nevertheless, as a general matter, it 
seems that a model of judicial review that requires judges to examine whether 
a bill originated in the House, passed both chambers in the same form or 
passed three readings, provides judges with less opportunity to instill their 
personal political views than a model requiring them to decide whether a 
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certain law serves compelling interests, is cruel and unusual, infringes upon 
substantive due process and so on.
293
  
Hence, the irony should be clear by now: the most influential theory in 
American constitutional law bases the legitimacy of judicial review upon 
ensuring the proper functioning of ―the process by which the laws that govern 
society are made.‖294 The premise that courts are both justified and competent 
in correcting defects in the legislative process is widely employed in justifying 
substantive judicial review. And yet, there is significant reluctance to accept 
the model of judicial review that is most directly aimed at ensuring the 
integrity of the legislative process and correcting its defects. 
 
E.  A Waldronian Case For Judicial Review 
Most of the arguments in the preceding parts were primarily aimed at 
challenging the prevalent view that rejects JRLP as illegitimate, while taking 
substantive judicial review for granted. This section turns to one of the leading 
critics of (substantive) judicial review, Jeremy Waldron. I claim that several of 
Waldron‘s arguments—including some of his leading arguments against 
judicial review—can in fact be developed into a justification for JRLP.  
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While other prominent critics of judicial review (such as Mark Tushnet) 
may also be candidates for developing such a claim,
295
 Waldron‘s theory is 
particularly interesting for a number of reasons. Waldron is commonly 
regarded as one of the leading critics of judicial review,
296
 and one of the 
foremost proponents of legislatures and legislative supremacy.
297
 Furthermore, 
being one of the few thinkers who are active in both constitutional theory and 
academic jurisprudence,
298
 he is, inter alia, a strong critic of H.L.A. Hart‘s rule 
of recognition theory,
299
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Although Waldron has never explicitly expressed his opinion about 
JRLP,
301
 one might expect that he would object to this form of judicial review 
as well. The next subsections claim, however, that some of Waldron‘s 
arguments in different areas of his scholarship actually lend support to several 
of the arguments for JRLP that I developed in the previous parts. In fact, some 
of Waldron‘s arguments would lend support for a more comprehensive model 
of JRLP than the one defended by this Article. In the last subsection, I build 
upon Waldron‘s rights-based argument against judicial review to develop a 
rights-based argument for JRLP.  
 
1. The Rule-of-Recognition Argument 
In Part IV.B. I have built upon Hart‘s rule-of-recognition theory to develop 
an argument for JRLP.
302
 In Who Needs Rules of Recognition? Waldron 
challenges Hart‘s rule-of-recognition theory itself.303 His underlying 
arguments, however, lend support for some of my main claims. Part of my 
argument rested on the claim that the rules that specify the procedure for 
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legislating (―the rules of change‖ in Hart‘s terms) provide at least some of the 
rule of recognition‘s criteria for identifying valid law.304 In the context of 
attacking Hart‘s theory, Waldron actually makes an even stronger claim that 
―the criteria of validity are given in the first instance by the rule of change…. 
The rule of recognition gets its distinctive [and entire] content from the rule of 
change...‖305  
Waldron argues, moreover, that ―the constitutional clauses that authorize 
and limit the making of federal laws‖ are among the legal system‘s 
―fundamental secondary rules of change.‖306 Strikingly (albeit slightly less 
explicitly), Waldron seems to base his argument that these constitutional 
clauses negate the need for a separate rule of recognition, on the argument that 
these clauses provide all that courts need in order to recognize valid law: 
If we regard these provisions as part of the system‘s rule of 
change, then how should we think about the role of the rule of 
recognition? ... [One possibility is] that, given the operation of 
the rule of change, there is no need for a rule of recognition…. 
[This possibility] is analogue of what I said… about wills and 
contracts. To recognize a valid will, all a court needs to do is 
apply the rule of change… The court just runs through the 
checklist of valid procedures for this kind of legal change… It 
does not need a separate rule of recognition. I personally do not 
see why this could not be a sufficient account of what is going 
on at the constitutional level as well.
307
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Waldron continues to say that at least in one place in The Concept of Law Hart 
seems to agree with this claim, and that ―Hart is saying that the courts use a 
rule of change as a criterion of the legal validity of the norms that come before 
them.‖308 Hence, in the process of attacking Hart‘s rule-of-recognition theory, 
Waldron has actually lent support to my rule-of-recognition argument for 
JRLP.   
 
2. Legislating with Integrity 
In Who Needs Rules of Recognition? Waldron focused on the constitutional 
requirements for lawmaking, whereas I have argued that the rule-of-
recognition argument can also apply to judicial enforcement of 
subconstitutional and extraconstitutional procedural requirements for 
lawmaking.
309
 However, some of Waldron‘s other scholarship suggests that he 
in fact supports the view that Hart‘s secondary rules of change should be 
interpreted as including not only subconstitutional procedural rules, but also 
unwritten procedural values and principles. In Legislating with Integrity 
Waldron argues that 
legal positivists maintain that law-making cannot be understood 
except as a rule-governed process… I believe [that t]he 
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legislative process… ought to be understood not just in 
reference to the secondary rules that happen to constitute it and 
govern it, but also in reference to the… deeper values and 
principles that explain why the rule-governed aspects of the 
process are important to us. Another way of putting this is to 
say that the secondary tier of a legal system—what Hart called 





Hence, Waldron‘s arguments in this passage provide support for models of 
JRLP that enforce formal rules as well as unwritten procedural values. 
Waldron‘s scholarship here would support an even more expansive version of 
JRLP than the one defended by this Article. 
 Legislating with Integrity also lends important support, however, for 
the more modest model of JRLP that focuses exclusively on the enforcement 
of formal (constitutional and subconstitutional) rules. According to Waldron, 
―principles do not just complement the enacted rules. Their role is also to 
explain why we have the rules of legislative process that we have, and to afford 
a basis for determining the proper mode of our compliance with them.‖311 
Indeed, Legislating with Integrity lends very strong support to my arguments in 
Part III about the importance of the rules that govern the legislative process, 
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In fact, Legislating with Integrity even lends some support to the claim 
that courts may also have a role to play in ensuring the integrity of the 
legislative process. Waldron argues that ―[l]egislative integrity is not just a 
principle for legislators‖ and that ―[t]he integrity of the legislative process can 
also be a concern for other actors in the legal system. I have in mind 
particularly the role of judges... Judges have a duty to keep faith with the 
integrity of the legislative process too.‖313 To clarify, Waldron certainly does 
not advocate JRLP in this passage. He is quite clear that he is referring here to 
the role of courts in statutory interpretation.
314
 Nevertheless, in the process of 
making his argument that courts should assume a modest role in statutory 
interpretation, Waldron raises strong arguments that lend support to my claim 
that the integrity of the legislative process is no less deserving of judicial 
protection than the outcomes of this process.      
 
3. The Rule-of-Law Argument 
I have argued that the Rule-of-Law ideal requires the idea that the 
legislative process be rule-governed, and that this argument would support 
judicial enforcement of both constitutional and subconstitutional procedural 
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 Waldron has famously argued that the Rule of Law is ―an essentially 
contested concept.‖316 However, in later scholarship—in the context of 
criticizing substantive conceptions of the Rule-of-Law—Waldron has argued 
that the procedural rules that govern the legislative process are crucial for the 
Rule of Law, and that this understanding ―has been prominent in the rule-of-
law tradition‖ since Aristotle.317  
In fact, he argued that the Rule-of-Law ideal requires even more than 
compliance with constitutional and subconstitutional procedural rules, 
suggesting that ―procedural virtues—legislative due process, if you like—are 
of the utmost importance for the rule of law.‖318 Waldron argued that 
legislation that is, inter alia, ―enacted in a rush, in a mostly empty chamber, 
without any proper provision for careful deliberation and debate… with a 
parliamentary majority… used to force closure motions in debate after debate‖ 
―flouts the notion of legislative due process.‖319 Such legislation, according to 
Waldron, is ―in opposition to the rule of law.‖320 Of course, Waldron does not 
go on to argue that courts should play any role in ensuring the legislature‘s 
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compliance with this conception of the Rule-of-Law. However, if one would 
like to develop a Rule-of-Law justification for a model of judicial review that 
enforces ―due deliberation‖ principles in addition to the formal procedural 
rules, this would be a primary source of support. 
 
4. The Core of the Case against Judicial Review 
Even some of Waldron‘s arguments in his scholarship against judicial 
review may lend support for JRLP. In The Core of the Case against Judicial 
Review Waldron sets out some assumptions ―to distinguish the core case… 
from non-core cases in which judicial review might be deemed appropriate as 
an anomalous provision to deal with special pathologies.‖321 These 
assumptions include the assumption that ―the procedures for lawmaking are 
elaborate and responsible, and incorporate various safeguards, such as 
bicameralism, robust committee scrutiny, and multiple levels of consideration, 
debate, and voting.‖322 The accompanying footnotes appear to suggest that a 
legislature that fails miserably in following the requirements of ―legislative due 
process‖ and ―legislating with integrity‖ discussed above may fall ―outside the 
benefit of the argument developed in [Waldron‘s] Essay.‖323 
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To be sure, we should be careful not to read too much into these 
qualifications. Waldron clarifies that although his argument is conditioned on 
these assumptions, ―it does not follow that judicial review of legislation is 
defensible whenever the assumptions fail,‖ because there may be other 
arguments against judicial review that are not contingent upon these 
assumptions.
324
 Nevertheless, if significant failures in following a proper 
legislative process may be a consideration for qualifying the case against 
substantive judicial review, perhaps they can also be a consideration in 
supporting the case for JRLP, which is a more direct means to deal with such 
process pathologies.   
Another assumption that Waldron specifies is ―that the institutions, 
procedures, and practices of legislation are kept under constant review‖ to 
ensure that they do not ―derogate seriously from the ideal of political 
equality.‖325 Waldron is obviously referring here to review by society as a 
whole rather than by courts.
326
 However, this assumption does lend support to 
the importance of external review for ensuring political equality in the 
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legislative process. This brings us, finally, to Waldron‘s rights-based argument 




5. A Rights-based Justification for JRLP 
In his influential rights-based argument against judicial review, Waldron 
argued, in brief, that judicial review infringes upon the people‘s ―right to 
democratic participation‖—that is, ―a right to participate on equal terms in 
social decisions...‖328 Waldron argued that ―the right of having a share in the 
making of the laws‖ is the ―right of rights.‖329 This argument against judicial 




The key for developing a rights-based argument for JRLP is the 
understanding that the people‘s right ―to participate on equal terms in social 
decisions‖ must also be protected in the legislative process itself. The people‘s 
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right to have ―a share in the making of the laws‖ can be diluted, and even 
completely undermined, if their elected representatives‘ ability to participate 
on equal terms in the legislative process is violated. Indeed, courts in countries 
that exercise JRLP have acknowledged this crucial point. The German 
Constitutional Court has held, for example, that ―[t]he principle of formal 
equality, which has been developed by the Constitutional Court in its 
jurisprudence dealing with the right to vote‖ also requires that ―each 
[Parliament] member participates equally in the legislative process.‖331 The 
Israeli Supreme Court has similarly derived the ―principle of participation, 
according to which each [legislator] has a right to participate in the legislative 
process‖ as a necessary implication of representative democracy and voters‘ 
rights to political equality and democratic participation.
332
  
Admittedly, this argument is stronger in supporting models of JRLP, such 
as the one adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court, in which courts enforce the 
principle of equal participation in the legislative process, rather than merely 
enforcing the formal rules that govern this process.
333
 Nevertheless, models of 
JRLP that are limited to enforcing the written rules governing lawmaking also 
protect the people‘s rights ―to participate on equal terms in social decisions.‖ 
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This is because, as Part III.D. elaborated, one of the important functions of 
these rules is ensuring legislators‘ ability to participate on equal grounds in the 
legislative process. Such rules, therefore, essentially protect the people‘s right 
of equal participation in the making of laws.  
Ironically, the strongest support for developing such a rights-based 
justification for the enforcement of lawmaking rules may come from Waldron 
himself.  Waldron argued (in other work) that only a combination of the 
system of elections and the procedures within the legislature ―as a package‖ 
can satisfy political equality.
334
 He argued that the rules of the legislative 
process are no less essential than fair representation in the legislature and 
democratic enfranchisement ―in order to relate what happens in the legislature 
to the fair conditions of decision for a society whose ordinary members 
disagree with one another about the laws that they should be governed by.‖335 
Neither of them ―does it by itself; it is the package that works.‖336 This 
supports the argument that the people‘s rights to democratic participation and 
political equality should be protected not only by ensuring compliance with the 
rules that govern elections, but also with the rules that govern the legislative 
process.  
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In sum, I am not arguing that Waldron would necessarily support JRLP. 
There may be good reason to believe he would not. However, this Section has 
argued that several of Waldron‘s arguments can in fact lend strong support for 
developing the core of the case for JRLP. Ironically, a Waldronian-based case 
for JRLP would appear to support the most far-reaching and controversial 
models of JRLP. 
 
F.  The Irony Revealed 
This Article began with Calabresi‘s observation that the irony of the great 
debates in constitutional theory is that both sides have the same model of 
judicial review in mind—strong-form substantive judicial review that is 
focused on protecting individual rights. This Part has revealed that there is 
another great irony in constitutional theory, and particularly American 
constitutional theory.  
This Part examined several of the leading justifications for substantive 
judicial review—from Marbury v. Madison to some of today‘s most influential 
and in-vogue constitutional theories. It argued that each of these justifications 
is equally persuasive as a justification for JRLP, and most are actually stronger 
when applied to JRLP. It also demonstrated that the arguments raised by critics 
of these justifications—particularly criticisms of process theories—are 





ironically, this Part claimed that some of the arguments raised by leading 
judicial review skeptics—from Bickel‘s criticism of Marbury‘s reliance on the 
Supremacy Clause to Waldron‘s rights-based critique of judicial review—can 
actually lend support for the case for JRLP.  
The next Part claims that the arguments in this Article do more than 
revealing a great irony in constitutional theory, and challenging the prevalent 
position that JRLP is less legitimate than substantive judicial review. It claims 
that what emerges from these arguments is a basis for a theoretical foundation 
for JRLP.   
 
V. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The previous Part argued that JRLP is no less justifiable and defensible 
than substantive judicial review. This Part briefly demonstrates that the 
arguments in the previous parts of this Article can form a basis for an 
affirmative theoretical case for JRLP, which can stand on its own feet, 
independently of one‘s acceptance of substantive judicial review. These 
arguments establish the authority for JRLP, the importance of JRLP, and the 
legitimacy of such judicial review. They also provide at least a partial response 
to the two main objections to JRLP—the argument that judicial review should 
only be aimed at protecting individual rights; and the argument that JRLP 






A.  Authority 
The previous Part‘s arguments suggest that the authority for JRLP can be 
grounded in the Constitution itself. This grounding stems from the general 
constitutional provisions that are often interpreted as furnishing a constitutional 
basis for (substantive) judicial review, and particularly the Supremacy 
Clause,
337
 as well as from the Constitution‘s lawmaking provisions 
themselves.
338
 Indeed, even under some of the most conventional modalities of 
constitutional argument—arguments based on the text, structure, purposes and 
original meaning of the Constitution—there is a relatively strong basis for 




More importantly, however, the rule-of-recognition argument developed 
above establishes the courts‘ authority to review the enactment process on their 
authority to adjudicate.
340
 The authority to determine compliance with 
lawmaking rules is inherent in the courts‘ inevitable need to identify the law as 
part of their authority to apply statutes to the cases coming before them. The 
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rule-of-recognition argument provides a source of authority that is not 
contingent upon the existence of a written constitution or on arguments about 
constitutional supremacy, and can provide authority to enforce both 





B.  Importance 
JRLP is important because the legislative process and the rules that govern 
it have great practical and normative importance.
342
 These rules are crucial, 
inter alia, for legislative outcomes; for the legitimacy of the law and of the 
legislature; for the Rule-of-Law ideal; for the procedural aspects of 
democracy;
343
 and ultimately, for ensuring the people‘s rights for political 
equality and democratic participation.
344
 Hence, the integrity of the legislative 
process and the rules that govern it warrant judicial protection.   
In previous scholarship I examined Congress‘s capacity and incentives to 
enforce these important rules, and concluded that Congress lacks both the 













capability and will to adequately enforce these rules on its own.
345
 I argued that 
contrary to popular belief, the rules that restrict the legislative process are in 
fact an area in which political safeguards are particularly unreliable, and 
sometimes even create an incentive to violate the rules.
346
 JRLP is therefore 
important because it serves an essential function that cannot be adequately 
performed by the legislature or the political process alone. 
The function served by JRLP also cannot be adequately achieved through 
substantive judicial review. Substantive judicial review focuses on the 
outcomes of the legislative process and on the protection of individual liberties 
and substantive values. In contrast, by focusing on the integrity of the 
enactment process itself, JRLP ensures procedural democratic values and 
political or democratic rights.
347
 JRLP therefore protects essential aspects of 
democracy, which are no less deserving of protection, and which cannot be 
adequately guaranteed through substantive judicial review. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court of Israel has perhaps been most explicit in recognizing that the 
purpose of JRLP is the protection of the fundamental principles of procedural 
                                                          
345









democracy, ―without which (and without the principles of substantive 
democracy) democracy would not exist...‖348 
Taken together, these arguments go a long way in challenging the 
argument that courts should not ―waste‖ their limited institutional capital on 
protecting the integrity of the legislative process.    
 
C.  Legitimacy 
The discussion in Part IV provides several arguments for establishing the 
justification for JRLP and for replying to claims that JRLP is objectionable or 
illegitimate. 
The constitutional supremacy arguments suggest that judicial enforcement 
of the constitutional provisions that regulate enactment can be justified both 
through a Kelsenian hierarchy-of-norms theory and via the popular sovereignty 
argument developed above.
349
 The rule-of-law arguments provide a promising 
basis for justifying judicial enforcement of both constitutional and 
subconstitutional rules that regulate lawmaking.
350
 The constitutional 
supremacy and rule-of-law arguments also provide a basis for rebutting 
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arguments that the legislative process is a sphere of legislative prerogative, 
which should be regarded as immune from any external regulation.   
The arguments about process theories and dialogue theories are particularly 
helpful for highlighting the features of JRLP that are crucial for defending such 
judicial review against claims that it violates the separation of powers and is 
disdainful to a coequal branch. One important feature of JRLP is that it leaves 
the content of legislation entirely to the legislature. Process theories represent a 
widely-accepted belief that judicial review is less objectionable when courts 
merely serve as an external, independent, referee that ensures that the rules of 
the game are observed, rather than participating in the game itself or dictating 
its outcomes.
351
 Similarly, dialogue theories highlight the argument that 
judicial review is less intrusive when courts act as an impartial facilitator of the 
dialogue, rather than dictating the content for the political and societal dialogue 
about constitutional meaning, rights and policy.
352
  
Hence, both theories help to demonstrate that judicial review that focuses 
only the process of enactment, rather than its content, should be viewed as 
more respectful and less intrusive toward the legislature. These theories also 
help to establish the claim that such a judicial role is more legitimate; and can 
be more easily justified based on the courts‘ expertise and institutional position 
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among the three branches and in society.
353
 Such a judicial role can also better 
maintain courts‘ reputation (or at least appearance) as impartial and 
independent institutions, which are above the ideological controversies of 
society—a reputation which is the basis for their legitimacy. 
Dialogue theories are also instrumental, of course, in emphasizing the 
strong and sensible intuition that judicial review is more defensible when the 
decision of the courts is not final; when the elected branches can respond to 
judicial invalidations.
354
 Another important feature of JRLP is that judicial 
invalidations under JRLP are merely provisional. As we have seen, JRLP is 
particularly apt for enabling a legislative response, and for leaving room for a 
meaningful response that engages both policy and constitutional meaning.
355
  
Finally, the rule-of-recognition argument developed above provides 
perhaps the most promising reply to claims that JRLP is objectionable or 
illegitimate. By arguing that judicial review is simply inevitable and inherent 
to adjudication itself, this argument avoids the normative debates about the 
legitimacy of judicial review.
356
 As Michael Klarman noted in discussing the 
rule-of-recognition conception of constitutionalism, ―it seems pointless to offer 
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normative criticisms of the inevitable.‖357 Moreover, unlike most justifications 
for judicial review, it provides an argument for judicial review that does not 
depend on any argument about comparative institutional competence, or about 
instrumental and consequentialist arguments.
358
  
The rule-of-recognition argument is also particularly promising for it 
appeals to a very strong intuition that a bill that was not enacted in accordance 
with the procedural requirements for valid enactment is simply not law.
359
 
When courts refuse to recognize a purported statute as validly enacted law, 
they do not strike down a ―law.‖ Rather, they ensure that only that which was 
truly enacted by the legislature is recognized and treated as law.
360
 By 
determining compliance with the rules that the legislature must follow in order 
to express its will, courts do not undermine the will of the elected 
representatives of the people. Instead, they ensure that only true expressions of 
this will are enforced.
361
 This also helps rebut claims that concerns about 
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judicial review are ―at their zenith when courts invalidate the work of the 
elected branches based on perceived deficiencies in the lawmaking process.‖362  
This, of course, is only a brief sketch of the core of the theoretical case for 
JRLP. It does not purport to cover all the justifications for JRLP; nor does it 
purport to fully discuss all the arguments raised by its critics.
363
 It does 
establish, however, that courts have the authority to review the enactment 
process, and that it is both legitimate and important for courts to exercise this 
inherent authority. 
   
CONCLUSION 
The prevalent view that takes substantive judicial review for granted, 
while adamantly rejecting JRLP, is hard to sustain. Countering the orthodoxy 
in American constitutional law and theory, this Article argued that JRLP is no 
less important, and in fact, more justifiable than substantive judicial review.  
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But beyond inviting supporters of substantive judicial review to 
reexamine their objection to JRLP, this Article also invites critics of judicial 
review to see how they might well favor JRLP, in part for the very reasons 
they object to substantive judicial review. For uneasy supporters of JRLP, this 
Article provides a much needed theoretical foundation and justification. For 
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